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While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling
to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that
hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise,
have gone unwhipped of justice.'
This, then, is what is offered to the people of the United States as remedy
for wrongs, arsons, and murders done. This is what we offer to a man
whose house has been burned, as a remedy; to the woman whose husband
has been murdered, as a remedy; to the children whose father has been
killed, as a remedy. 2
**

*

[I]t defies history to conclude that Congress purposefully meant to assure
to the living freedom from such unconstitutional deprivation but that,
with like precision, had meant to withdraw the protection of the Civil
Rights statutes against the peril of death. The policy of law and the
1. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (Rep. Lowe).
2. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 807 (1871) (Rep. Butler).
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legislative aim are certainly to protect the security of life and limb as
well as property against these actions. Violent injury that would kill was
not less prohibited than violence that would cripple.,
INTRODUCTION

This article examines the use of 42 U.S.C. § 19834 in cases in which
violations of federal law by state or local officials result in a death and the
rules that govern the existence of the cause of action and the available
damages.' State remedies for the protection of individual rights from official
misconduct are often inadequate, 6 and public protection is frequently unavailing. 7 Thus, many plaintiffs seek alternative remedies, and in recent years
the estates, personal representatives and survivors of victims of wrongful
killings have increasingly turned to federal law and federal courts.8 Section
1983, however, is a threadbare statute, and federal courts have generally
looked to state law to supply details concerning its use as a wrongful death
remedy. This article reviews these developments and the tensions inherent
in the incorporation of state law to fill gaps in the § 1983 cause of action
when it is often the inadequacy of state law that influenced plaintiffs' choice
of federal remedies in the first place.
Actions by public officials that result in a death raise fundamental questions about the reach of federal constitutional law. Although the United
States Supreme Court has recently held that the excessive use of deadly force
by the police may be the basis for a § 1983 damage action to enforce the
fourth amendment, 9 it is unclear whether the due process clause of the

3. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921
(1961).

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) is derived from § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat.
13, and provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
5. Although this article focuses on § 1983 actions, a similar analysis applies to the civil
action against private conspiracies to deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws, which
was adopted in § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, and is now contained in 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982). See infra notes 534-37 and accompanying text.
6. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MnN. L. REV.
493, 496-504 (1955); Note, Cvil Rights Act Section 1983: Abuses By Law Enforcement Officers,
36 IND. L.J. 317, 320-21 (1961).
7. See R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
8. See generally P. SCHARF & A. BINDER, THE BADGE AND THE BULLET (1983) (discussing
the misuse of deadly force by the police and the increase in litigation involving allegedly
wrongful killings).
9. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) (statute authorizing use of deadly force to
apprehend unarmed, nondangerous, fleeing felons violates the fourth amendment).
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fourteenth amendment, standing alone, protects deprivations of life when
no substantive constitutional provision is violated.' 0 Nonetheless, some actions by public officials that result in death also violate specific constitutional
guarantees and give rise to § 1983 actions for damages." This article focuses
on the technical and often complex rules that determine the availability and
scope of § 1983 actions brought to assert the constitutional rights of decedents.' 2 There is an old German saying that "the devil lies in the details,"' 3

10. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution protects life itself: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life . . . without due process of law .... " The Court,
however, has not decided whether the excessive use of deadly force violates this provision and
gives rise to a § 1983 action. Under § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982)), the federal criminal civil rights statute on which § I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was patterned, excessive use of deadly force is equated with summary
punishment and is a violation of due process. Screws v. United States, 335 U.S. 91 (1945).
The Court has held that neither negligent nor intentional deprivations of property violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment where states maintain adequate post-depri.'ation
remedies, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984),
and lower courts have applied Parrattto deprivations of life and liberty. See, e.g., Daniels v.
Williams, 748 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985); Wilson
v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th
Cir. 1984); Enright v. Board of School Directors, 114 Wis. 2d 124, 346 N.W.2d 771, cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 365 (1984). A leading commentator has observed that the logical extension
of Parratt would limit Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), which established § 1983
as a supplement to state tort remedies, and has welcomed such a reexamination. See Bator,
Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL. 51, 56-58 (1982).
However, most courts that have addressed the continued vitality of Monroe in cases involving
substantive constitutional provisions, including violations of substantive due process, have held
that § 1983 is available regardless of the adequacy of state post-deprivation remedies. See
Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d
1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1984), and
cases cited; cf. Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555-56 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(rejecting argument that state wrongful death, action constitutes adequate post-deprivation
remedy to preclude § 1983 action for wrongful killing).
11. The Court has held that the deliberate indifference to the medical needs of a prisoner
constitutes an eighth amendment violation and is actionable in both actions directly under the
constitution and § 1983 actions. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1979); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976). It has also held the excessive use of deadly force to be a violation of the
fourth amendment. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). Because these violations of
federal law can result in death, some wrongful killings give rise to § 1983 claims and implicate
the survival and wrongful death issues addressed in this article, regardless how the Court
resolves whether deprivations of life and liberty are actionable under the due process clause.
12. This article does not address the broad empirical question of whether, as some have
claimed, the availability of damage actions against public officials and the political entities that
employ them deters the inappropriate use of deadly force. Nor does it address whether, as
critics of the expansion of official and entity liability have argued, the availability of such
remedies deters appropriately aggressive police activity. Rather, the article proceeds on the
assumption that effective remedies should exist to compensate victims and survivors of illegal
governmental actions, and that civil damage remedies can help deter inappropriate uses of
deadly force while spreading the cost of compensating victims to society as a whole. Cf. Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-58 (1980) (public interest in deterring illegal conduct
and spreading the cost of compensation supports denying municipalities a qualified immunity
in § 1983 actions). For a review of mechanisms other than private litigation to regulate the
improper use of deadly force by the police, see P. ScHARF & A. BINDER, supra note 8, at 181230.
13. The origin of this expression, which in German is "der Teufel steckt im Detail," is
unclear, but it must have come into the German language after the late 18th century when
"Detail" was incorporated into German from French. See Letter from Helmut Walther, Lan-
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and an important detail of § 1983 litigation involving wrongful killings is
the rules that determine whether and to what extent § 1983 actions survive
the death of the victim and are available to compensate survivors who have
been injured by the victim's death.' 4
The 1961 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Monroe v. Papeestablished § 1983 as a damage remedy to enforce the fourteenth amendment
when state remedies were inadequate in theory or practice. Monroe also

guaranteed plaintiffs direct access to federal courts without having to
demonstrate the inadequacy of state remedies or the absence of sympathetic
state forums and established § 1983 as a supplement to state tort remedies
by permitting § 1983
damage actions when the objectionable conduct also
6
violated state law.'
As a result of Monroe, § 1983 emerged as the principal modern remedy
for the private enforcement-of federal law against state and local defendants,
and the volume of federal court § 1983 litigation has increased sharply.' 7 A
significant percentage of the § 1983 cases filed in federal courts, including
Monroe, involve allegations of the excessive use of force,

8

although relatively

few of the underlying incidents resulted in the victims' deaths.' 9 Nonetheless,
§ 1983 litigation often follows wrongful killings, especially those alleged to
have been caused by the improper use of deadly force by police or other

law enforcement officials, and the entire matter frequently becomes a highly

guage Advisor for the Gesellschaft ffir deutsche Sprache (Organizations for German Language)
to Steven H. Steinglass (Aug. 13, 1985) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal). The phrase
appears in a number of current German dictionaries. See, e.g., 5 R. KLAPPENBACH & W.
STEINrrz, WORTERBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN GEOENWARTSSPRACHE 3723 (1976); 6 DuDEN, DAs GROSSE
WORTERBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE 2583 (1981); 6 BROCKHAUS WAHRIG DEUTSCHES
WORTERBUCH

212 (1984).

14. In focusing on this aspect of the remedial problems that arise where governmental
actions result in the deprivation of life, this article is less concerned with "issues of the definitions
of rights . . . than [with] the creation of a machinery of jurisdiction and remedies that can
transform rights proclaimed on paper into practical protections." Schmidt, Juries, Jurisdiction
and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REv.
1401, 1413 (1983). The article, however, does not address other remedial issues that often arise
in § 1983 litigation involving wrongful killings such as the scope of official immunities, see
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); the official policies that can be the basis for municipal
liability, see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985); or the reach of the state
action doctrine, see Belcher v. Stengel, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 429 U.S. 118 (1976).
15. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
16. Id. at 183.
17. Although no precise statistics are available on the volume of § 1983 as contrasted to
other civil rights litigation, the increase in civil rights litigation since Monroe has been dramatic
and § 1983 cases constitute a substantial part of this increase. See Steinglass, The Emerging
State Court § 1983 Action: A ProceduralReview, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 391 n.38 (1984).
18. See Eisenberg, Section 1983: DoctrinalFoundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 482, 550-51 (1982) (13.8% of the nonprisoner § 1983 cases filed in the Central District
of California in 1975 and 1976 involved allegations of assaults, batteries or shootings).
19. Between 1975 and 1979 the rate of justifiable homicides by the police in 50 major cities
was .66 per 100,000 population. The rate among cities, however, differed markedly. For example,
the rate in New Orleans was approximately 30 times the rate in Sacramento. See P. SCHARF & A.
BINDER, supra note 8, at 184-91.
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charged, controversial political and legal issue.2" Moreover, the financial
implications of § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings can be significant,

and substantial verdicts and settlements are becoming common. 2' Finally,
the stakes have been increased by Supreme Court decisions expanding municipal liability under § 198322 and by the application of state indemnification
statutes 23 and insurance coverage to § 1983 actions. 2A

When actions by state or local officials result in a death, plaintiffs often
frame damage actions under § 1983 not only to gain access to federal courts
but also to avoid state survival and wrongful death policies. Survival policies
determine whether the death of a litigant requires a pending action to abate

or prevents a new action from being filed. When the decedent is the plaintiff
who brought the action or the individual whose estate or other representative
is suing, the action is the one the decedent would have had but for his

death, and the damages are measured in terms of the injuries to the decedent.
On the other hand, in wrongful death actions survivors seek compensation
for losses they suffered as the result of the wrongful killing, but the cause
of action is also the one the decedent would have had if the wrongful act
25

had not taken his life.

Although all states have modified the harsh rules of the common law

under which actions for personal injuries abated upon the death of the

20. See P. SCHARF & A. BINDER, supra note 8, at 233 ("Virtually every police shooting
that leads to injury or death can be expected to lead to a civil suit in the 1980s, no matter
how justified the [police] action may seem to the outside observer.").
21. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding $1.04
million of judgment in case involving police killing and racially motivated coverup); Roman
v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ($3 million jury verdict upheld in
consolidated trials involving two shooting deaths); Prior v. Woods, No. 973818, 25 ATLA L.
Rep. 172 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 1981) (jury verdict of $5.75 million in compensatory and punitive
damages, including $3 million punitive against city under pendent state claim); Burkholder v.
City of Los Angeles, No. C291 783, 26 ATLA L. Rep. 123 (L.A. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 1982)
(jury verdict of $425,750). For a collection and summary of jury verdicts and settlements in
police misconduct cases many of which involved wrongful killings, see A. LLOYD, MONEY
DAMAGES IN POLICE MISCONDUCT CASES: A COMPILATION OF JURY AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS
(1983).
22. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2927
(1985) (reversing $1.5 million jury verdict for a police shooting death because the plaintiff
failed to establish the existence of an official policy).
23. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1268-72 (7th Cir. 1984) (state
indemnification statute makes city liable for judgment against law enforcement officials, including punitive damages); see also Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129
Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976) (state indemnification statute applicable in § 1983 action); Rosacker v.
Multnomah County, 43 Or. App. 583, 603 P.2d 1216 (1979) (state tort claims act makes
municipalities liable for employees' violations of § 1983).
24. Cf. Harris v. Racine County, 512 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (insurance available
to satisfy § 1983 award). Although the broader implications of municipal liability, state indemnification statutes and insurance coverage have not been fully explored, an immediate result
of bringing such "deep pockets" into the litigation is the increased likelihood that larger awards
will be made against public employees and will be satisfied. See generally P. SCHUCK, SUING
GOVERNMENT

(1983).

25. See infra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
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victim, and survivors-no matter how close their relationship with the decedent-had no actionable interest in the life of the decedent, state policies
vary markedly, and significant limitations on state causes of action, especially
with respect to the available damages, are common.26 Federal courts, nonetheless, generally look to state law to determine the survival of § 1983 actions
as well as the availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy.2 7 This
approach draws support from Supreme Court § 1983 decisions requiring
initial resort to state law on survival issues, but the Court has required an
independent examination of whether borrowed state survival policies are
consistent with § 1983's purposes of compensation and deterrence. 2 The
Court has also avoided state law in actions authorized by Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents 9 against federal officials directly under
the Constitution by rejecting the use of state policies that require actions to
abate when death resulted from the complained-of conduct, and has suggested it would reject state policies in similar § 1983 actions against state
or local officials.30 Nonetheless, the Court has not provided guidance on the
availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy in which survivors seek
compensation for their own losses, despite the importance of the issue, the
Court's demonstrated interest in it, and the existence of divergent approaches
by federal and state courts.
The use of state survival and wrongful death policies in § 1983 actions
has left federal and state courts in the uncomfortable position of having to
review the consistency of state policies with § 1983 rather than to develop
federal policies that meet the purposes of § 1983. Moreover, in scrutinizing
state policies, many courts have taken conflicting approaches to these issues.
For example, some courts have considered the availability and adequacy of
state wrongful death remedies in deciding whether to follow state policies
that require actions to abate when the complained-of conduct resulted in
death, but others have required survival actions to stand or fall on their
own. 3' Likewise, courts reviewing state policies that limit the damages in
survival actions have often failed to sort out the different interests at stake
in survival and wrongful death actions. Thus, some courts have followed
state policies that limit the compensatory and punitive damages that survive
while others have defined damages broadly to compensate for the taking of
life and have provided damages for lost earnings, conscious pain and suf32
fering, and punitive damages.
With respect to wrongful death claims, most courts entertaining § 1983
actions have followed state policies to determine which survivors can pursue

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1979).
See infra notes 444-62 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 463-78 and accompanying text.
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a wrongful death action but have rejected state policies that limit damages
to pecuniary losses or that impose statutory ceilings on recoveries. Some
courts, however, have gone further and awarded § 1983 wrongful death
damages for the mental anguish or grief of survivors and punitive damages.
However, both state and federal courts in Alabama, the one state that limits
wrongful death damages to punitive damages, have denied the availability
33
of a § 1983 wrongful death action for compensatory damages.
It is the thesis of this article that state and federal courts have often
limited the scope of § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings by failing to
distinguish adequately issues of survival and wrongful death,14 and have been
too quick to apply the borrowing approach used for § 1983 survival issues
to wrongful death claims. This excessive reliance on state law has resulted
from the failure to examine the legislative history and purposes of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, which contains the predecessor to § 1983 and which
supports a construction of § 1983 as an independent wrongful death remedy
regardless of state law. Although the impact of the borrowing approach has
been somewhat ameliorated by the willingness of many federal courts to
reject state policies that limit wrongful death actions, the Supreme Court
may be less willing to find state policies inconsistent with the purposes of
§ 1983. Moreover, the borrowing approach has contributed to an unfortunate
rush to constitutionalize the wrongful death issue by providing surviving
relatives a constitutionally based and actionable familial interest where state
law does not recognize a cause of action or where it limits the available
damages.3 Finally, the lack of guidance by the Court on whether there is
a uniform federal rule on the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy
has led courts to look initially to state law not only on the availability of
the cause of action but also on the applicable damage rules, thus departing
from the general policy of approaching § 1983 damage issues under uniform
36
federal standards.
Part I of this article identifies differences between survival and wrongful
death policies and reviews the treatment of these issues at common law. It
also describes the varied state legislative responses to the common law,
including the state of the law in 1871 when the predecessor to § 1983 was
enacted. The focus is on cases in which the victim dies from the complainedof conduct, and this review suggests why many plaintiffs avoid state remedies
in litigation involving wrongful killings. It also illustrates the range and

33. See infra notes 479-90 and accompanying text.
34. Parties litigating state law claims have also ignored the difference between survival and
wrongful death actions to their detriment. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.
App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (refusing to permit plaintiffs in a state wrongful death action
in which punitive damages were prohibited to amend to raise a survival claim in which punitive
damages were available). See also infra note 43.
35. See infra notes 400-33 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 305-18 & 572-74 and accompanying text.
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complexity of issues that arise when state law governs the availability of a
cause of action and the damages in § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings.
Part II examines the Supreme Court's approach to survival issues in §
1983 and Bivens actions as well as the Court's unsuccessful attempts to
resolve whether state wrongful death policies may limit § 1983 actions. It
also reviews the Court's approach to survival and wrongful death claims in
federal statutes that have no provisions directly on point and under the
admiralty jurisdiction.
Part III looks to the approaches the Supreme Court has taken in determining whether to fill other gaps in § 1983 with uniform federal policiesdespite the absence of clear legislative guidance-or with rules borrowed
from state law. This inquiry is made unique by the presence of a civil rights
choice of law statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 37 which supplements the more
generally applicable Rules of Decision Act 8 and limits the power of federal
courts to develop a federal common law to govern § 1983 litigation. Thus,
the threshold question in any case is whether independently or through §
1988 there is a uniform federal policy that obviates the need to look to state
law. Even when initial resort must be made to state law, however, the courts
must determine whether particular state policies are appropriate for incorporation, and whether borrowed policies should be rejected as being inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983.
Part IV reviews the approaches state and federal courts have followed in
addressing survival and wrongful death issues under § 1983 and concludes
that they have often been too quick to apply the borrowing approach used
for survival issues to § 1983 wrongful death actions. Moreover, this approach
has contributed to the rush to constitutionalize the interest of the survivor
in the continued life of the victim. Part IV also examines the treatment by
state and federal courts of state policies that limit the damages available in
survival and wrongful death actions. Although courts have sought to maintain minimum federal standards by scrutinizing state damage limitations in
light of the purposes of § 1983, this approach may yield results not justified
by § 1988, and the Supreme Court may not be as willing to reject state
policies.
Part V reviews the language, legislative history and purposes of § 1983
and concludes that § 1983 ex proprio vigore constitutes a wrongful death
remedy regardless of state law. Section 1983 can be read to authorize a
wrongful death remedy by treating the survivor of the person whose rights
were violated as the "party injured" under § 1983. Although this construction
transforms § 1983 into a third-party standing statute, the approach is consistent with prudential limitations on the ability of parties to assert the rights
of others.

37. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
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Finally, Part VI reviews briefly the framework courts can use to address
who may bring § 1983 wrongful death actions, the damages available in §
1983 actions involving wrongful killings, and how to distribute the proceeds
from successful suits.
I.

THE INADEQUACIES OF STATE SURVIVAL
AND WRONGFUL DEATH POLICIES

Plaintiffs with claims against police and other state and local defendants
arising out of wrongful killings often attempt to avoid state law and state
courts by framing civil actions under § 1983. On one level this reflects the
widespread belief that federal courts are a more sympathetic forum for the
protection of individual rights.3 9 This view is most widely held where victims
of putatively illegal killings are members of racial or ethnic minorities or
are engaged in suspect conduct immediately prior to their deathA° Even
where this is not the case, actions alleging abuses of governmental power
by police or other government officials are inevitably controversial, and
many plaintiffs reject state courts for the greater insulation of the federal
courts. 4' Moreover, plaintiffs often consider state law on survival and wrongful death actions and the available damages inadequate. State policies in
these areas reflect the legacy of the common law, 42 and often contain a
complex array of limitations that confuse both courts and litigants. 43 Thus,
when a death results from the actions of state or local government officials,
state policies that preclude survival or wrongful death actions or limit the
available damages give plaintiffs an incentive to frame their actions under
§ 1983 and argue for the rejection of state law.

39. See generally Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (discussing
factors that make federal courts better forums for parties enforcing individual federal rights).
40. See Foote, supra note 6, at 500-01.
41. The mere selection of a federal forum does not obviate the problem of litigating
unpopular cases against the police and other governmental officials. Cf. Project, Suing the
Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781 (1979) (arguing for new approaches to § 1983 in
light of the low recoveries and general lack of success by plaintiffs in police abuse cases). But
cf. Chevigny, Politicsand Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CoRNELL L. REV. 735,
767-82 (1984) (discussing use of state courts in cases challenging police surveillance).
42. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605,
605 (1960) (The common law "serves to perpetuate the force of some rules beyond the period
of their usefulness and to maintain their influence after the reason for their existence has been
long forgotten."). See also Comment, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983).
43. See Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L.
REV. 114, 114 (1925) ("Aconfusion of the underlying principles of modern statutes which give
these rights and actions, and an apparent inability to distinguish between the rights thus given
has developed a state of the law which could well be described as chaotic."). Litigants who
confuse survival and wrongful death actions can be denied damages to which they might
otherwise be entitled, see supra note 34, and this can also happen in § 1983 litigation. See,
e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894, 898 n.8 (1984) (upholding district court's
treatment of claim solely as a survival issue and its refusal to permit the plaintiff to amend
the judgment to treat the claim as a wrongful death action), vacated on other grounds, 774
F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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To a large extent this distaste for state law is based on factors independent

of state survival and wrongful death policies. The use of § 1983 to supplement
state tort remedies not only permits plaintiffs to bring actions in federal
courts but also enables them to avoid state policies that limit governmental
accountability. Although state law may be more favorable to plaintiffs than
§ 1983 in certain cases, 44 plaintiffs using § 1983 may avoid state immunity
46
doctrines,4 ignore the notice of claims requirements of tort claims acts,
and avoid restrictive state policies on damages.4 7 Finally, the availibility of

attorney fees to prevailing parties in § 1983 litigation makes counsel more
readily available, especially in cases not likely to result in substantial verdicts. 48 Thus, even plaintiffs who prefer state forums often attempt to avoid
state law by challenging its constitutionality49 or by framing state court

actions involving wrongful killings under § 1983.50

44. See Steinglass, supra note 17, at 431-34 (comparing § 1983 to state law remedies).
45. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (permitting state immunity defense
to a state wrongful death claim but not to a § 1983 claim). See also Foote, supra note 6, at
502-03.
46. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 742 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2153 (1985); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1970); Williams
v. Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976); Overman v. Klein, 103
Idaho 795, 799, 654 P.2d 888, 892 (1982). But see Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307,
451 N.E.2d 456, 464 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1982) (requiring notice of claim in private action under
42 U.S.C. § 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 551 (1983).
47. See Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1983) (state policy denying damages for
mental anguish where there is no physical injury not applicable in § 1983 actions), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 384 (1984); Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 340 N.W.2d
704 (1983) ($25,000 statutory ceiling on recoveries against municipalities not applicable in §
1983 actions). But see Ricard v. State of Louisiana, 390 So. 2d 882 (La. 1980) (punitive damages
not available in Louisiana courts in state or § 1983 claims).
48. Although the Court has suggested that the degree of success may be relevant in determining an appropriate attorney fee, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), it has not
precluded significant fees in cases involving only small recoveries. Moreover, lower courts have
construed Hensley as permitting fee awards that exceed the plaintiffs' monetary recovery. See,
e.g., Rivera v. City of Riverside, 763 F.2d 1580 (9th Cir), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 244 (1985);
Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Smalley
Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1530 (11th Cir. 1983).
49. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional Louisiana
statute precluding wrongful death actions by illegitimate children); Thompson v. Estate of
Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982) (Minnesota statute denying survival of intentional torts
but permitting other personal actions to survive violates state equal protection clause). But cf.
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (upholding
under state and federal constitutions the denial of punitive damages in California wrongful
death actions); Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis. 2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967) (Wisconsin statute
denying children wrongful death actions in favor of surviving spouse does not violate state or
federal constitutions). Federal courts entertaining state wrongful death claims in diversity actions
have also entertained constitutional challenges to limitations on punitive damages. See, e.g.,
In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago, Ill., 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting challenge
to denial of punitive damages); Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979)
(same).
50. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2401 (1984); Martinez v. State, 85 Cal. App. 3d 430, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1978), aff'd,
444 U.S. 277 (1980); Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 183 (1977); Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981),
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Despite the adoption by every American state of statutes governing the

availability of survival 5 and wrongful death actions,

2

the common law

background of state law and the 19th-century legislative approach of the

English continue to influence the law in this area. 3 Legislative efforts at
reform have often met resistance.5 4 Moreover, the statutory origin of both
survival and wrongful death actions has made state courts reluctant to review
the common law5 with the vigor with which they have approached and
updated common law aspects of tort law.16 With a few notable exceptions,7
state courts have confined their role to that of construing statutory remedies.
At common law the issue of survival was governed by the maxim actiD
personalis moritur cum persona-personalactions die with the person. The

origins of this maxim are unclear but probably lay in the yindictive and
quasi-criminal nature of suits for damages and the futility of trying to punish
a wrongdoer after his death."8 Nonetheless, the no-survival rule applied to

cert. dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 456 U.S. 430 (1982); Peaches v. City of Evansville,
180 Ind. App. 465, 389 N.E.2d 322 (1979); Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207 (La. Ct. App.),
appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 517 (1985); Cook v. City of Detroit, 125 Mich. App. 724, 337
N.W.2d 277 (1983); Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1978); State v. Brosseau,
470 A.2d 869 (N.H. 1983) (§ 1983 wrongful death counterclaim); Jenkins v. Kreiger, 67 Ohio
St. 2d 314, 423 N.E.2d 856 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1983); Enright v. Board of
School Directors, 114 Wis. 2d 124, 346 N.W.2d 771, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 365 (1984).
51. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 900 (4th ed. 1971) ("All jurisdictions have
modified the common law to some extent, if only to provide that causes of action for injuries
to all tangible property, personal or real, shall survive the death of both parties.").
52. See 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 35 (2d ed. 1975) ("Each of the
fifty states has some statutory system under which damages may be awarded for wrongful
death."); Note, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV. 402, 402-03
(1966) ("Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 created the first statutory right of action for wrongful
death, and such rights of action now exist by statute in all fifty states and in the territories
of the United States.").
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925, at 528 (1977).
54. See Smedley, supra note 42, at 624.
55. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1285 (1956) ("[R]estrictions imposed
on the [wrongful death] remedy ... are often applied with especial strictness because the right
itself originated in the statute which imposed the limitation.").
56. See, e.g., L. Baum & B. Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrine in
the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (M.
Porter & G. Tarr ed. 1982); see generally G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES (1982) (discussing the role of common law courts in reviewing obsolete statutes).
57. See W. PROSSER, supra note 51, § 126, at 900 n.32 (noting that four jurisdictions
authorize survival of personal actions ,as a result of judicial decisions); see also Gaudette v.
Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972) (allowing a common law remedy for beneficiaries
who would have been barred by the statutory wrongful death remedy, and overturning a 124year-old precedent). Cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (finding a common
law wrongful death action based on unseaworthiness under the federal maritime law).
58. Smedley, supra note 42, at 606-09; see also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at
950-51 (1st ed. 1941) ("The best conjecture on the subject is that it was a result of the
development of the tort remedy as an adjunct and incident to criminal punishment in the old
appeal of felony and the action of trespass which superseded it. Since the defendant could not
be punished when he was dead, it was natural to regard his demise as terminating the criminal
action, and tort liability with it. If it was the plaintiff who died, the early cases usually were
those of homicide, for which the crown executed the defendant and confiscated all his property,
so that nothing was left for tort compensation; and if not, it was still to be expected that lesser
crimes should be redressed by the crown rather than the successors of the deceased.").
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the death of the victim as well as the tortfeasor and, despite exceptions in
contract and real property actions,5 9 generally required pending personal
actions to abate and prevented new ones from being commenced. 60 In so
favoring the wrongdoer or his estate, the common law even precluded a
cause of action when a death resulted directly from the complained-of
61
conduct.
In addition to prohibiting the survival of personal actions, the common
law did not recognize a civil action based on the death of another. 62 This
doctrine, which has its roots in the felony merger rules of English law rather
than the no-survival maxim, 63 limited recoveries in common law actions
involving killings to the value of services between the time of injury and
the time of death.64 Thus, a master could sue for the -loss of services
occasioned by an injury to his servant but not for the losses flowing from
the servant's death;61 similarly, the incapacitation of a family breadwinner
gave financially dependent family members a cause of action but his death
did not."
Although English common law precedents on survival and wrongful death
were widely criticized,67 they became part of the common law in this country.
Judicial acceptance of the prohibition on wrongful death actions, however,
was uneven. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a number of state
courts recognized common law actions for wrongful death, 6 but the 1848

59. See F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 41-43 (1877); Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful
Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1046-47 (1965). Most tort actions not affecting real property
did not survive; for a listing of common law tort actions that did not survive, see W. KEETON,
D. DOBBS, R. KEATON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125A, at
940-41 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER & W. KEETON].
60. Under the common law, pending actions abated upon the death of a party, and new
actions could not be commenced. Some state survival statutes, however, distinguished these
situations and permitted some pending suits to survive while requiring similar actions not yet
begun to abate. See F. HARPER & F. JAmts, supra note 55, at 1288.
61. Smedley, supra note 42, at 619-20. The existence of statutory wrongful death actions
and the fear of double recoveries may have contributed to the reluctance to reject historical
limitations on survival actions where the complained-of conduct caused death. See Malone,
supra note 59, at 1051-52. But see Schumacher, supra note 43, at 128-29 (fears of double
recoveries only have a basis where wrongful death damages are available under enlarged survival
statutes), and infra note 93.
62. See F. POLLOCK, supra note 59, at 42.
63. Malone, supra note 59, at 1052-58.
64. F. TrFFANY, DEATH BY WRONOFuL ACT 17-18 (1st ed. 1893).
65. F. POLOCK, supra note 59, at 41-42.
66. Smedley, supra note 42, at 623-24.
67. Malone, supra note 59, at 1050-51 n.36. Much of the criticism of the rule prohibiting
wrongful death actions was directed toward Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep.
1033 (K.B. 1808), the English decision that first articulated it, and Lord Ellenborough, its
author. See, e.g., Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule of Baker v. Bolton, 32 L. Q. REV. 431
(1916); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 58, § 103, at 955 ("[I1n 1808, Lord Ellenborough,
whose forte was never common sense, held without citing any authority that a husband had
no action for the loss of his wife's services through her death, and declared in broad terms
that in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury!").
68. Gross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. 1838).
These cases, however, were later overruled. See F. TIFFANY, supra note 64, at 7-8, 12-14.
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decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Carey v. Berkshire R. Co. 69 rejected a common law wrongful death claim and is widely
credited with marking a turning point. 70 Other jurisdictions fell into line and
denied recognition to common law wrongful death actions, despite the uniquely
English origins of the prohibition.7' Thus, in 1877 the United States Supreme
Court, in refusing to permit an insurance company that had paid on a life
insurance policy to sue the killer of the insured, was able to observe: "The
authorities are so numerous and so uniform to the proposition that by the
common law no civil action lies for an injury which results in death, that
it is impossible to speak of it as a proposition open to question."" 2
Ironically, during the very period in which American courts were reaffirming the common law prohibition on wrongful death actions, state legislatures were radically changing the American law of wrongful death. The
adoption in England of the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846,' 3 more popularly
known as Lord Campbell's Act, which rejected the English common law
rule, 74 was a catalyst for similar legislation in this country. Lord Campbell's
Act did not alter the common law no-survival rule but created an exception
to it by establishing a new and independent cause of action in which a
statutorily designated beneficiary could recover losses suffered as a result of
the death of a close relative. 75 Nonetheless, the cause of action was still the

69. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 48 Am. Dec. 616 (1848). Carey involved an action by a widow
to recover for the negligent killing of her husband, and the companion case of Skinner v.
Housatonic R. Corp. was an action by a father for the loss of services of his I -year-old son.
In rejecting these claims, the Massachusetts court relied on English cases including Baker v.
Bolton. It has been noted, however, that Massachusetts had adopted a limited wrongful death
statute, and that this legislation might have made the Massachusetts court even more reluctant
to act. See Malone, supra note 59, at 1069. Nonetheless, this limiting interpretation did not
detract from Carey's prominence in the 19th century, and it was heavily relied upon by courts
and commentators.
70. Malone, supra note 59, at 1071. The decision in Carey was specifically rejected in
Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972), in which the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts authorized a parallel common law wrongful death action on behalf of a
survivor who had no cause of action under the state wrongful death statute.
71. The issue of the availability of a common law wrongful death action often arose when
relief was sought in circumstances not covered by state wrongful death legislation. Given the
legislative entry into the field, however, courts were even more reluctant to act than they
otherwise might have been. Malone, supra note 59, at 1067-73.
72. Mobile Life Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1877).
73. 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
74. Lord Campbell's Act reflected the settled nature of the common law prohibition on
actions for wrongful death by stating in its preface:
Whereas no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person who by his
wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused the Death of another Person,
and it is oftentimes right and expedient that the Wrongdoer in such Case should
be answerable in Damages for the Injury so caused by him ....
Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, cited in Malone, supra note 59, at 1058.
75. See Oppenheimer, The Survival of Tort Actions, 16 TULANE L. REy. 386, 387 (1942);
F. POLLOCK, supra note 59, at 44.
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one the decedent would have had at the time of his death had the wrongful

76
act not resulted in death.
Legislative change in this area was rapid. Prior to the adoption of Lord
Campbell's Act in 1846, a few American jurisdictions had responded to
specific evils such as dueling or the new dangers posed by the railroad and
steamboat travel by creating narrow wrongful death remedies tied to those

activities. 77 After 1846, however, most states went further and enacted general
wrongful death statutes patterned after Lord Campbell's Act. Thus, at the

time of the introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, thirty of the thirty-

seven American states had enacted general wrongful death statutes, 78 and

before
the end of the century every American state and territory had done
79
so.

76. Lord Campbell's Act provided as follows:
That whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect,
or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had not
ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover Damages
in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who would have been
liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the Death shall have
been caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony.
Lord Campbell's Act also precluded survival actions:
III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more than One Action shall
lie for and in respect of the same Subject Matter of Complaint ...
77. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 14, 1839, ch. 1214 Ky. ACTS 166 (authorizing wrongful death
suits by widow and children of persons killed in a duel); 1840 MAss. Acls, ch. 80 (railroads
and other common carriers liable for fines of up to $5,000 payable to the wife and heirs of
decedents killed by negligence). No state, however, had enacted a comprehensive wrongful
death statute before the adoption of Lord Campbell's Act, but after 1846 several states quickly
adopted wrongful death statutes patterned after Lord Campbell's Act. See Malone, American
Fatal Accident Statutes-PartI: The Legislative Birth Pains, 1965 DUKE L. J. 673, 678-82.
78. Of the 37 states in the Union on March 28, 1871, when the Civil Rights Act of 1871
was introduced, the following 30 states had general wrongful death statutes: Alabama: ALA.
REV. CODE §§ 2297-2298 (1867); California: Act of Apr. 26, 1862, Cal. Stat. ch. 330, §§ 1,
3; Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 1, ch. 6, § 98 (1866); Delaware: Act of Jan. 26, 1866,
13 Del. Laws ch. 31, § 2; Georgia: GA. CODE § 2920 (1867); Illinois: ILL. STAT. pp. 422-23,
§§ 1-2 (1858); Indiana: 2 IND. REV. STAT. pt. II, ch. 1, § 784 (1852); Iowa: IOWA CODE § 2501
(1851); Kansas: KAN. GEN. STAT. ch. 80, § 422 (1868); Kentucky: Act of Mar. 10, 1854, Ky.
Acts ch. 964, § 3; Maryland: MD. CODE art. 65, §§ 1-2 (1860); Michigan: MIcH. Comp. LAws
§§ 5003-5004 (1857); Minnesota: MINN. GEN. STAT. ch. 77, § 2 (1867); Mississippi: Miss. REv.
CODE § 676 (1871); Missouri: Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 3-4 (1865); Nevada: Act of Feb. 28,
1871, cited in NEv. GEN. STAT. §§ 3898-3899 (1885); New Jersey: Act of Mar. 3, 1848, N.J.
Acts §§ 1-2 at 151; New York: Act of Dec. 13, 1847, N.Y. Laws ch. 450, §§ 1-2. amended
by Act of Apr. 7, 1849, N.Y. Laws ch. 256, § 1; North Carolina: 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws
ch. 113, §§ 70-71; Ohio: Osno REv. STAT. ch. 87, §§ 636-637 (1860); Oregon: OR. LAws § 367
(1866); Pennsylvania: Act of Apr. 15, 1851, Pa. Laws No. 358, § 19, amended by Act of Apr.
26, 1855, Pa. Laws No. 323; Rhode Island: R.I. REv. STAT. ch. 176, § 21 (1857); South Carolina:
Act of Dec. 22, 1859, S.C. Acts No. 4480, §§ I-II; Tennessee: TENN. CODE §§ 2291-2292 (1858);
Texas: Act of Feb. 2, 1860, cited in 1822-97 Tex. Laws ch. 35, §§ 1-3; Vermont: VT. GEN.
STAT. ch. 52, §§ 15-17 (1863); Virginia: Act of Jan. 14, 1871, Va. Acts ch. 29, §§ 1-2, cited
in VA. CODE tit. 44, ch. 145, §§ 7-8 (1873); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ch. 103, §§ 5-6 (1868);
Wisconsin: Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 135, §§ 12-13 (1858). See also G. FELD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF DAmAGs
§ 629, at 493 n.5 (1876) (quoting numerous state wrongful death statutes);
T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON TH MEASuRE OF DAmAGES 696 n.2 (6th ed. 1874).
79. In 1893 Francis B. Tiffany observed in the first edition of his pioneering treatise Death
by Wrongful Act that every American jurisdiction had followed the English lead and created
a wrongful death remedy. F. TIFFANY, supra note 64, at 21.
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During the same twenty-five-year period between the passage of Lord
Campbell's Act in 1846 and 1871, the well-established common law nosurvival rule also began to give way. In England the rule survived largely
because of exceptions that had evolved,80 but in this country state legislatures
in the mid-19th century began to permit personal actions to survive the death
of the victim and the wrongdoer. A number of states enacted general survival
statutes, 8' but early survival statutes were often not available in cases of
wrongful killings. These survival statutes often contained specific exceptions
requiring personal actions involving injuries to the person to abate. In such
cases, however, statutorily identified beneficiaries could assert the decedent's
rights while suing to recover their own losses in state wrongful death actions. 2
Modern state survival policies permit most personal actions to survive the
death of the victim or the wrongdoer, and there has been a continuing trend
toward expanding the actions that survive. This trend has been accomplished
primarily through the adoption of general survival statutes that narrowly
limit the actions that abate. 83 In many states, however, the relevant legislation
does not enumerate all actions that survive but rather defines the survival
policy with references to the common law or to personal actions; 84 thus,

80. See F. POLLOCK, supra note 59, at 41 (criticizing the English no-survival policy as "a
barbarous rule.., made at all tolerable for a civilized country only by a series of exceptions").
England did not enact a general survival statute until 1934, see Law Reform Act (Misc.
Provisions) 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 41, and it was largely because of the dangers of another
form of modern transportation-the automobile. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 378 (5th ed. 1956).
81. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ch. 4, § 94 (1858); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 98 (1866); IOWA CODE
§ 3467 (1860); TENN. CODE §§ 2845-46 (1858); 1858 Wis. LAWS ch. 135, §§ 1-2.
82. See, e.g., ALA. REV. CODE §§ 2297, 2555 (1867); 2 IND. REV. STAT. pt. II, ch. I §§
782, 784 (1852); MINN. GEN. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 1-2 (1867); OR. LAWS §§ 365, 367 (1863).
83. In 1971 a leading commentator predicted that it is likely in the near future that all
personal actions will survive. See W. PROSSER, supra note 51, § 126, at 901. But see W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 126, at 943.
84. Some states permit the survival of actions that would have survived at common law
and then enumerate additional actions that survive. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 895.01 (1983) ("In
addition to the actions which survive at common law the following shall also survive . . .").
Accord ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 27-6 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1801 (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 228, § I (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (Page 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-6 (1969); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-7-8a (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). Other states define their survival policies in terms
of "personal" actions. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 411.140 (1970) ("No right of action for
personal injury or for injury to real or personal property shall cease or die with the person
injuring or injured, except . . . ."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-817 (1980) ("No
personal action ... shall be lost by the death of either party ... except that actions ... for the
recovery of penalties and forfeitures of money under penal statutes and proceedings in bastardy
cases shall not survive the death of the defendant."). All these statutes require courts to look
to the common law in interpreting the statutory language.
Other states permit all actions to survive but enumerate specific exceptions. See, e.g., HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 663-7 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1402 (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-1
(1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-26.1 (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (1980). Finally,
some states permit all actions to survive without any exceptions by type of action. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 46.021 (Harrison-West 1969) ("No cause of action dies with the person.
All causes of action survive .... "); see also IOWA CODE § 611.20 (1946); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2315 (West 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-233 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-501
(1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-4-1 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (1974).
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courts in those states have to look to the common law to construe the statute
85
and to determine which actions survive.
State survival statutes generally provide that civil actions may be pursued
in the name of the estate or the personal representative of the deceased and
permit the action to continue as if the death had not occurred. The cause
of action, however, is that of the decedent, and the damages are the losses
suffered by the decedent.16 Wrongful death actions, on the other hand, seek
to compensate survivors for the losses they suffered as a result of the
wrongful killing of another.8 7 Although influenced by Lord Campbell's Act,
states have followed several distinct statutory approaches to wrongful death
actions, especially as to the available damages.88 These developments, however, have been primarily legislative and state courts have been reluctant to
interfere with even inadequate statutory resolutions.8 9
Modern wrongful death actions are generally pursued in the name of either
statutorily designated beneficiaries or the estate of the decedent, and damages
are generally measured in terms of the loss either to the survivors or to the
estate. 90 Some jurisdictions, however, have addressed wrongful death issues
through their survival statutes by permitting the personal action of the
decedent to survive but by enlarging the available relief to include wrongful
death claims.9'
When a death results from the same conduct on which the cause of action
is based, principles of both survival and wrongful death are implicated. The
decedent has a potential cause of action for injuries suffered between the
time of his initial injury and his death. In addition, the killing itself will
deprive the decedent of the enjoyment of the balance of his life and may
violate his legal rights, although the invasion of such interests rarely are
directly compensable under state law. 92 Finally, survivors, especially those
with close financial or emotional ties on the decedent, may suffer injuries
beyond those of the decedent.

85. The federal government has followed a different approach than most states and has
not enacted a general survival statute. Although federal law sometimes addresses the survival
of particular statutory actions, federal courts often have no legislative guidance and follow a
common law policy under which civil actions survive unless they are penal. See Schreiber v.
Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76 (1884); see also infra notes 230-41 and accompanying text. This formulation of the common law permits the survival of a greater range of federal civil actions
than those state policies that do not permit "personal" actions to survive. For example, federal
law permits nonpenal personal actions to survive.
86. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1334; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
59, § 126, at 942-43.
87. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 946; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note
52, at 35-36.
88. 1 S. SPISER, supra note 52, at 29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 comment
b, at 529-30 (1977).
89. CM.ARFsi, supra note 56, at 217 n.37. But see supra note 70.
90. See generally I S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 29.
91. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 949-50; D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 555-56 (1973).
92. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Because the survival and wrongful death actions protect different interests,
they may be pursued simultaneously without providing double or overlapping
recoveries, 93 but states often require the actions to be consolidated. 94 A few
states, however, require plaintiffs to elect one of their remedies, 95 and some
require the decedent's personal action to abate in favor of the survivors'
wrongful death claims, 96 but most permit both actions to be maintained. 97
Nonetheless, the likelihood of substantial recoveries in either action is often
reduced by state limitations on the availability of the action and the damages
recoverable.
When a death results from the complained-of conduct, most states permit
the action for personal injuries to survive, but policies on damages vary
considerably. Damages in survival actions are measured in terms of the
injuries suffered by the decedent between the time of injury and death, 99
and generally include loss of earnings and medical expenses during this
period '°° as well as conscious pain and suffering. 0 In addition, most jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue permit the survival of claims for punitive
damages based on the culpability of the wrongdoer. 0 2 On the other hand,
most states limit the damages that survive to consequential damages and do
not independently award damages for violation of the underlying right; nor
do they make awards for the deprivation of life itself. 03
In states that allow survival of claims for conscious pain and suffering
and for punitive damages, the estate may recover substantial sums above
lost earnings when a death was not instantaneous." 4 The potentially openended nature of awards for pain and suffering and punitive damages, how-

93. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 554; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 133435; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 957-58; see also St. Louis, I.M. & S.
Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 658 (1915) (one of the actions "begins where the other ends, and
a recovery upon both in the same action is not a double recovery for a single wrong, but a
single recovery for a double wrong").
94. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 56-58.
95. See, e.g., Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 280 S.W.2d 17 (1955); see also
D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 553 & n.21; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1334.

96. See infra note 109.
97. See I S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 56-58.
98. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 126, at 943; 1 S.

SPEISER, supra note
52, at 56; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 926 comment a. at 533 (1977).
99. D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 554; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1334.
100. Survival damages generally also include funeral expenses, although this expense is
incurred after death. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 566.
101. 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 430-32. But see infra note 105.
102. 3 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS § 21.41; see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1985) (claims for punitive
damages survive). But see infra note 106.
103. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1240 n.41 (7th Cir. 1984); see also R.
POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

121-22 (1982).

104. Where death was instantaneous, some states do not permit the action to survive on the
ground that the decedent did not have a cause of action before his death. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 51, § 127, at 902; 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 415, 434-40.
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ever, has led many states to limit them; some do not permit any claims for
pain and suffering to survive, 05 while others bar survival of claims for
punitive damages.2 6
In addition to statutory limitations on the damages that survive, the
circumstances surrounding the death and the financial status of the decedent
often result in little or no damages being awarded. Where a victim never
regains consciousness, damages for pain and suffering are not available
because of state policies limiting such claims to conscious pain and suffering.'07 This precludes a significant portion of potential damage awards when
a decedent lingers in a comatose state between the time of injury and death
or when death is instantaneous. Moreover, when death is instantaneous,
there is no loss of earnings between the time of injury and death. Likewise,
the death of a person without a significant recent employment history will
not result in lost earnings regardless of the length of time between the injury
and death. Finally, when medical or funeral expenses are provided through
public facilities or programs, the decedent's estate may not be able to claim
these items of damages. 08 Thus, state limitations on recoveries in survival
actions can result in an absence of compensable losses in many cases.
There are a substantial number of states, albeit a minority, that still do
not permit personal actions to survive the victim's death when the complained-of conduct caused the death.'09 No state, however, denies all remedies
in such case."10 By clinging to the common law no-survival rule and remitting
parties to their wrongful death remedies, these states follow most closely the

105. See, e.g., Martin v. United States Servs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1975); Aviz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (West 1975); CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1985); CoLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-20-101(l) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAws § 91-8 (1969).
106. Froud v. Celotex, 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983) (claims for punitive damages
do not survive under Illinois law); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-101 (1973) (punitive damages
unavailable in actions that survive); IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (1979) (claims for punitive damages
do not survive under Idaho law).
107. Many states are also reluctant to award substantial damages for pain and suffering
during the few seconds preceding nearly instantaneous deaths, or for brief periods of terror
prior to death.
108. Under the collateral source rule, a plaintiff may generally recover for losses that were
compensated by others. Thus, where insurance payments cover medical costs, the defendant is
not given a windfall, and the plaintiff may recover the cost of medical care. See generally D.
DOBBS, supra note 91, at 581-87. A different rule may apply, however, where public programs
absorb the medical costs. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 49.65 (West Supp. 1984) (giving county
welfare agencies a claim against the proceeds of any recovery).
109. See 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 415-17. A number of states do not permit the
survival of actions for personal injuries which result in death. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980) (personal actions causing death abate in Indiana); Heath v. City of Hialeah,
560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D. W. Va. 1982);
O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1981);
Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 240 (1984);
cf. Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207 (La. Ct. App.) (personal actions of decedents in Louisiana
survive in favor of enumerated relatives but not estates), appealdismissed, 106 S. Ct. 517 (1985).
110. See I S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 35; F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, supra note 55, at 128788.
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model of Lord Campbell's Act."' The result of such policies, however, is
the elimination of the survival action as a vehicle for recovering potentially
substantial out-of-pocket losses such as lost earnings as well as the conscious
pain and suffering of a decedent whose death does not closely follow the
2
wrongful act."

Although all states make wrongful death actions available to some survivors, the adequacy of state wrongful death remedies in specific cases
depends on the particulars of state statutes," 3 and on the decedent's legal,

financial and emotional relationships with those who claim to have been
injured by his death.
State wrongful death statutes fill the void in the common law by addressing

who may sue, what damages may be sought, and how the proceeds of
successful suits are distributed. Most state wrongful death statutes permit

suits to be brought on behalf of designated beneficiaries, but a few states
give the cause of action to the estate either directly or through an enlarged
survival action." 4 The approach utilized by a particular state, however, has
implications not only for the ultimate distribution of any recovery, but also
for the elements of damages that are available and their measurement.
Under the prevailing "loss to survivors" approach, state wrongful death
statutes enumerate a list of beneficiaries and give these beneficiaries, individually or through a personal representative of the deceased, the right to
sue for damages they have suffered.' The available damages vary based on
the relationship of the survivors to the decedent, and in some cases, the
6
absence of a designated survivor precludes a suit."
In states which give the wrongful death action to the estate or measure
damages in terms of the estate's losses, the statutory representatives or the
estate bring the suit, and damages are distributed based on either the law
of intestate succession or the decedent's will.' "' Under these statutes, damages

111. Lord Campbell's Act expressly made the wrongful death cause of action the exclusive
remedy for wrongful killings. See supra note 68.
112. When actions abate under state law because the complained-of conduct resulted in
death, some but not all of the damages to which the decedent would have been entitled can
be recovered in the wrongful death action.
113. The dependence of wrongful death damage policies on the peculiar provisions of the
state wrongful death statute is illustrated by this unusual reminder in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 925 (1977): "The measure of damages for causing the death of another depends
upon the wording of the statute creating the right of action and its interpretation."
114. See generally 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 412-13.
115. See Note, supra note 52, at 423-24; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127,
at 947.
116. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1330; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 59, § 127, at 948; 2 S.SPEISER, supra note 52, at 213-14. But see Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Wisconsin law to allow the survival of
wrongful death claims).
117. Because the distribution in states that give the wrongful death action to the estate follows
either state law of intestate succession or the decedent's will, it is possible for wrongful death
awards to benefit persons who had no legal relationship with the decedent or who did not
suffer even indirectly from the death. See Note, supra note 52, at 423-24.
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are not calculated in terms of losses to particular survivors, but are based
on the losses to the estate that flowed from the death. Thus, there is no
overlap with damages available on the survival claim, which are measured
by the losses to the decedent between the time of injury and death." 8
State policies on the damages available in wrongful death actions differ
dramatically and this diversity is reflected in the wrongful death statutes
adopted by states during the 19th century." 9 Lord Campbell's Act authorized
the jury to award "such Damages as they may think proportioned to the
Injury,"' 20 but in 1852 in Blake v. Midland R. Co.,' 2' the Queen's Bench
rejected a widow's claim for a solatium for mental suffering because of her
husband's death and limited the recovery in wrongful death actions to
pecuniary losses. This limitation was widely followed in this country, 22 and
many states, unlike England, included provisions in their statutes limiting
damages to pecuniary injuries.' 23 On the other hand, some states expressly

118. See supra notes 61 & 93.
119. State wrongful death statutes also vary considerably as to the specificity with which the
available damages are defined. See D. DOBBS, supra note 84, at 556; F. HARPER &'F. JAMES,
supra note 55, at 1286; C. McCORMICK, DAMAGES 344 (1935); 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at
104.
120. The second section of Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, An Act for compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accidents (August 26, 1846), provided as follows:
And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the Benefit of the Wife,
Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall have been so caused,
and shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or Administrator
of the Person deceased; and in every such Action the Jury may give such Damages
as they may think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death to the
Parties respectively for whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be brought
Lord Campbell's Act was the model for many state laws. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 553
n.13; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 949, 951; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note
52, at 104.
121. 18 Q.B. 93, 118 Eng. Reprint 35 (1852).
122. See T. CooLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 271 (Ist ed. 1878) ("[]n this country
as well as in England, the ground of recovery must be something besides an injury to the
feelings and affections, or a loss of the pleasure and comfort of the society of the person killed;
there must be a loss to the claimant that is capable of being measured by a pecuniary standard.");
T. SEDOWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 646-48 n.2 (5th ed. 1869) ("In
most of the American acts, as in their English model, compensation for the pecuniary
loss only is contemplated, and . . . nothing is to be allowed for . . . the grief of his surviving
relatives."); see also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Barron, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 90 (1866) (discussing the
role of the jury under the Illinois statute limiting damages to "fair and just compensation with
reference to pecuniary injuries" and observing that the available damages would be greater
had the decedent not died).
123. See G. FIELD, supra note 78, § 631, at 502; see, e.g., Act of Dec. 13, 1847, N.Y. Laws
ch. 450, § 2, amended by Act of Apr. 7, 1849, N.Y. Laws, ch. 256, § 1 (defining damages
as "fair and just compensation, not exceeding five thousand dollars, with reference to the pecuniary
injuries resulting from such death"); Omo REv. STAT. ch. 87, § 637 (1860) (same); Wis. REv.
STAT. ch. 135, § 13 (1858) (same); ILL. STAT. pp. 422-23, § 2 (1858) (same). A number of states
also limited available damages to pecuniary losses through the use of language similar to that
used in New York but without the ceiling on damages. Act of Mar. 3, 1848, N.J. Acts § 2,
at 151; 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws, ch. 113, § 71; VT. GEN. STAT. ch. 52, § 17 (1863).
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Most states, however, did not define the

available wrongful death damages, and courts generally interpreted these
statutes narrowly to limit the available damages to pecuniary losses and to
deny claims for loss of society, mental anguish and punitive damages.' 2 A

few state courts, however, found the absence of an express limitation of
damages to pecuniary losses to be significant and awarded damages for
nonpecuniary losses. ,26
By 1871, few state courts had addressed the damage issues in wrongful

death actions. Although most published decisions had limited damages to
pecuniary losses and denied claims for loss of society, mental anguish, and
punitive damages, the law was in a state of flux. Moreover, even when

damages were limited to pecuniary losses, the definition of pecuniary varied,
and some state courts construed the phrase broadly to award damages for

intangible services that closely resembled loss of society.127 Thus, it is difficult
to characterize any policy on damages for loss of society as being well
established in 1871.128 Likewise, by 1871, few courts had addressed the
availability of damages for mental anguish or punitive damages, although
124. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 26, 1862, Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 3 ("in every such [wrongful death]
action, the jury may give such damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as they shall deem fair and
just"); Myers v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 215 (1871) (allowing punitive damages in suit for death
of an infant); Ky. GEN. LAws app. § I, at 681 (1866) (allowing "vindictive damages" in wrongful
death cases involving deadly weapons); Chiles v. Drake, 59 Ky. (2 Met.) 146 (1859) (punitive
damages allowed); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, Nev. Stat. § 2, cited in NEV. GEN. STAT. § 3899 (1885);
see also TEx. CONST. of 1869, art. 12, § 30 (providing expressly for exemplary damages to the
surviving husband, widow, and heirs in cases of homicide through willful act or omission).
125. See, e.g., Macon & Western R.R. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409 (1868) (limiting widow to
pecuniary losses despite statutory silence); Donaldson v. Mississippi & Mo. R.R., 18 Iowa 280
(1865) (no damages available for the grief and distress of the decedent's family or for the loss
of his society).
126. See, e.g., Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r, 24 Va. (29 Gratt.) 570 (1877) (noting the
absence of language in the Virginia statute limiting wrongful death damages to "pecuniary
injuries" and holding that a surviving mother could recover her mental suffering from the
death of her son); see also Murphy v. New York & N.H. R.R., 29 Conn. 496 (1861) (exemplary
damages not addressed expressly but permitted); Jeffersonville R.R. v. Swayne's Adm'r, 26 Ind.
477 (1866) (allowing damages for loss of society).
127. See T. COOLEY, supra note 122, at 274 ("In some other States the probable value of
the nurture, instruction, and physical, moral and intellectual training which the parent for
whose loss the suit is brought might have given to the children, are considered proper elements
of damages."); see also Beeson v. Green Mountain Gold Mining Co., 57 Cal. 20 (1880) (allowing
loss of society); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329, 339 (1869) (allowing recovery for
loss of the "services and companionship of the wife," but noting that the companionship did
not mean solace: "Certainly the service of a wife is pecuniarily more valuable than that of a
mere hireling. The frugality, industry, usefulness, attention, and tender solicitude of a wife
and the mother of children, surely make her services greater than those of an ordinary servant,
and therefore worth more. These elements are not to be excluded ....
). But cf. Michigan
C.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913) (interpreting FELA to limit damages for a widow's
loss of services to those services capable of measurement).
128. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1248-49 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding the
denial of damages for loss of society to be the prevailing state policy in 1871, but noting
significant variations).
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most that had had found them unavailable. 29 Nonetheless, the availability of these damages was less dependent on the state of the common
law than on the language of the applicable state statute and its construction.

The trend since the enactment of wrongful death statutes in the latter half
of the 19th century has been the expansion of the available damages. Virtually
all states now provide damages for loss of support, 30 and many states also
permit recovery for loss of inheritance. 31 Most states that measure wrongful
death damages in terms of the loss to the survivors also include damages
for loss of society. 3 2 In some states this has been done explicitly through

legislation, 33 but in others the courts have defined pecuniary loss broadly
to include the loss of society. 34 Moreover, the definition of loss of society
is not consistent. Some state courts limit loss of society to intangible "services" such as the nurture, training, education, and guidance a child would
have received but for the death of a parent, but others define loss of society
to include "a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives
from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and protection." ' An increasing number of
states have gone beyond awards for loss of society and permit survivors to
recover compensatory damages for the grief or mental anguish they experience
129. See, e.g., Brady v. City of Chicago, 3 F. Cas. 1196 (C.C.N.D. I11.
1865) (No. 1,796)
(no recovery for loss of society or for sorrow or grief); Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180 (1867)
(no recovery for punitive damages); Collier v. Executors of Arrington, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law)
354 (1867) (no recovery for punitive damages); Green v. Hudson River R.R., 32 Barb. 25 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1860) (denying husband recovery for loss of wife's society or for mental suffering);
Lehman v. City of Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1859) (no recovery for mental
suffering); Wise v. Teerpenning, 2 Edmond's Select Cases 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1848) (no
recovery for punitive damages); Hall's Adm'x v. Crain, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 453 (Scioto County
Ct. C.P. 1860) (no recovery for mental suffering); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. 298
(1860) (no recovery for wounded feelings or vindictive damages); Potter v. Chicago & N.W.
R.R., 21 Wis. 377 (1867) (no recovery for loss of society or punitive damages). But see supra
note 126.
130. See Note, supra note 52, at 405-06. Loss of financial support the decedent would have
provided or been expected to provide, regardless of a legal obligation to do so, is the primary
form of pecuniary loss. The formulas by which lost support is measured, however, vary,
especially with respect to deductions for the personal expenses the decedent would have incurred.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEEroN, supra note 59, § 127, at 953; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at
140.
131. See D. DOBBS, supra note 81, at 557; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 119, at 340; 1 S.
SPEISER, supra note 52, at 277-81; Note, supra note 52, at 405-06.
132. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587 & n.21 (1974) (observing that
a majority of states permit recovery for loss of society by express statutory provision or judicial
construction).
133. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 951-52.
134. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1331 n.15; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 59, § 127 at 951; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 925 comment b, at 529 (1977);
I S. SPEISER, supranote 52, at 113-15; Note, supra note 52, at 402, 409 n.39. But see Herbertson
v. Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962) (limiting wrongful death damages under Colorado

law to net pecuniary loss and excluding loss of society).
135. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 586-87 (summarizing state law).
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as a result of a wrongful death, 3 6 as well as punitive damages based on the

culpability of the wrongdoer.

37

Finally, one state-Alabama-maintains an

exclusively penal approach and excludes all compensatory damages and al3
lows only punitive damages.'

A few states that measure wrongful death damages in terms of the losses
to survivors have adopted a hybrid approach and allow certain designated
relatives-usually surviving spouses and financially dependent children or

parents-a broad range of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, including
loss of society, but deny nonpecuniary damages to other surviving relatives.
For example, in some states, a dependent parent may obtain nonpecuniary
damages on the death of an adult child but a nondependent parent may
not.

139

In states that measure wrongful death damages in terms of the loss to the
estate, many of these questions do not arise. The loss to the estate is the

accumulation that would have resulted but for the wrongful killing, and it
is an exclusively financial measurement based on such factors as the decedent's

136. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 952 & n.84; see, e.g., Dawson v.
Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589 (Mont. 1983) (awarding damages for mental anguish
for death of child); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (reversing 106-year-old
construction of state wrongful death act limiting survivors to pecuniary loss and permitting
parents to recover loss of companionship and mental anguish caused by wrongful death of
son). A number of states have also adopted statutes expressly allowing survivors to recover for
the mental anguish and grief they suffered from the death of the victim. See, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 27-909 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724(d)(5) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.21(2)-(4) (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1983); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 3-904(d)-(e) (1984); NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.085(4) (1979); Orno REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2125.01(B)(5) (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053(B) (West Supp. 1984);
VA. CODE § 8.01-52(1) (1984); W. VA. CODE 55-7-6(c)(1)(A) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
The Supreme Court has noted the difference between damages for loss of society and mental
anguish: "Loss of society must not be confused with mental anguish or grief, which is not
compensable under the maritime wrongful-death remedy. The former entails the loss of positive
benefits, while the latter represents an emotional response to the wrongful death." Sea-Land
Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585 n.17.
The increasing number of states that permit damages for mental anguish or grief is consistent
with the expanding availability of damages for the intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. See D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 558; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
55, at 1332 n.15; I S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 113-15; Note, supra note 52, at 411 & n.47;
see generally Note, Garland v. Herrin: Surviving Parents' Remedies for a Child's Wrongful
Death-the Pecuniary-Loss Rule and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, 32 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 641 (1983-84).
137. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 119, at 357 (noting that in 1935 about 10 states
permitted punitive damages in wrongful death actions); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
59, § 127, at 952 & n.85 (noting the increase in states permitting punitive damages in wrongful
death actions); 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 129-30; Note, supra note 52, at 421 n.106. See
generally Case Comment, Denial of Punitive Damagesfor Wrongful Death Violates Equal
Protection, 54 N.D.L. Rav. 104 (1977-78); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 comment
b (1977).
138. See Bruce v. Collier, 221 Ala. 22, 127 So. 553 (1930) (describing the Alabama wrongful
death statute as "creating a new cause of action, punitive in character, for the benefit of the
next of kin"); see also Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 375 (Ala. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2401 (1984).
139. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-1-1-2 (Supp. 1985).
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income and resources, life expectancy and spending patterns, as well as the

discount rate. Thus, in such states, the loss of society or the mental anguish
or grief of the survivors is generally not part of the available wrongful death
damages.'"

Because wrongful death actions were not recognized at common law, remedies under state law are almost exclusively legislative. The role of courts

in developing wrongful death remedies has depended largely on the language
of the statutes. When legislatures have defined the elements of damages with
specificity, the courts have played a minor role in developing the law. On
the other hand, when legislatures have delegated responsibility for developing
the remedy to the courts or spoken ambiguously, the courts have defined
the available damages and, in a few cases, have acted boldly to modernize
outmoded statutes.'14 Generally, however, state courts have been unwilling
to establish a parallel common law wrongful death action to fill voids in
42
the statutory action, despite the urging of commentators that they do so.
Legislatures have also often proceeded cautiously in creating wrongful death
remedies and have been reluctant to give courts broad authority to define
the elements of damages. In some cases they have limited the scope of

wrongful death remedies by specifying in detail the available damages.

43

In

others, they have broadly defined the available damages but have limited

awards by placing statutory ceilings on recoveries. These ceilings, which were
not used in England,'" were commonplace in this country1 45 and at one time
approximately half of the states placed dollar limits on wrongful death

recoveries.

46

140. See generally 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 369-82 (discussing the measure of damages
under loss to the estate statutes).
141. See, e.g., Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972) (finding a common
law wrongful death action); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 comment k, at
532 (1977) (acknowledging a common law role for courts "to fill in unintended gaps ... or
to allow ameliorating common law principles to apply").
142. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, supra note 56, at 38-40; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 16-19.
The Supreme Court, however, has found congressional silence on whether statutory wrongful
death actions in admiralty were intended to be exclusive to evidence a lack of intent to preempt
the common law role of the federal courts. Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375,
393 (1970).
143. The use of these limitations suggests a legislative distrust of courts as well as a recognition
of the difficulty courts have in controlling the discretion given juries to award damages. It also
reflects the difficulty of placing a value on the loss of life.
144. Lord Campbell's Act contained no ceiling on the amount of damages, but given the
narrow definition of the available pecuniary damages, a ceiling was not necessary to limit
damage awards.
145. See generally C. McCoRMICK, supra note 119, at 358; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at
689-95 (discussing damage limitations).
146. A commonly cited observation based on F. TIFFry, supra note 64, at 175-76, was that
in 1893, 22 jurisdictions had ceilings on recoveries. See also G. CALABREsI, supra note 56, at
39; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1285 n.4; C. MCCORMCK, supra note 119, at
358; 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 43, at 689. In 1871 the most commonly used ceiling was $5,000,
and the following states maintained that limitation: Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See sources cited supra note 78; see also
T. COOLEY, supra note 122, at 274 ("Many of the statutes fix a maximum of recovery, five
thousand being a common limitation . .

").
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Statutory ceilings on wrongful death awards, which were updated but only
slowly, 147 have been a major obstacle to plaintiffs seeking wrongful death
recoveries. 148 The trend in recent years, however, has been to eliminate
statutory ceilings, 149 and presently no state maintains an across-the-board
ceiling on wrongful death recoveries. 50 Nonetheless, some states achieve the
same end by limiting the damages in wrongful death actions to a narrow
definition of pecuniary losses. Moreover, some states that define damages
broadly for financially dependent survivors have defined damages more
narrowly for nondependents, 15' while a few use statutory ceilings to cap the
52
available nonpecuniary damages.

The inadequacies of many state policies on survival and wrongful death,
especially as to the available damages, fall disproportionately upon those
most likely to be victims of the excessive use of deadly force-young male
members of racial minorities.' Limitations on wrongful death recoveries to
pecuniary losses often exclude or limit awards for loss of society and invariably deny recovery for mental anguish, grief, and punitive damages;
thus, the possibility of a significant recovery when the victim is unemployed
is virtually eliminated. 4 Moreover, when employed victims have no dependents, there may be no one who can claim that the killing deprived them
of financial support. '5 Although in some of these cases the decedent's action
may survive, state survival policies often require actions to abate or limit
the available damages. 156 Thus, in some states there are virtually no compensable injuries for a wrongful killing of a person who is either unemployed
or without dependents when the death is instantaneous or the victim never
regains consciousness. 151

147. D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 567; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1285 n.5.
148. These limitations were often challenged on state and federal constitutional grounds but
were invariably upheld. Cf., e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695
P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (upholding constitutionality of $250,000 damage ceiling for
noneconomic losses in medical malpractice actions), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985). But
see White v. Montana, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1983).
149. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 691-93; D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 567; W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 951.
150. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 56, at 40.
151. See supra note 139.
152. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (1983) ($25,000 ceiling on nonpecuniary damages);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) ($50,000 ceiling on damages for loss
of society and companionship).
153. See W. Geller, Deadly Force: What We Know, in C. KLOCKARS, TMNKING ABOuT POLICE:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 313, 317-21 (1983).
154. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 952.
155. Wrongful death actions may be available where no close relative survives in states that
give the wrongful death cause of action to the estate and permit the estate to sue for the lost
inheritance. See supra note 117.
156. See 2 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 413-18, 423-40; D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 553;
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1334.
157. The absence of compensable injuries in such cases has led some courts entertaining §
1983 actions to award damages for the violation of the federal right itself. See infra notes 46872 and accompanying text.
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The impact of state policies limiting wrongful death recoveries to pecuniary
losses is illustrated in the treatment of cases involving the death of minor
children. In the 19th century, the value of a child was measured in terms
of the services he or she could perform on the farm or in the factory, and
58
the value of those services often exceeded the cost of raising the child.
That is hardly the case today, yet state wrongful death policies that limit
damage awards to net pecuniary losses leave courts and juries in the uncomfortable position of having to conclude that the life of a child is without
value.'5 Such conclusions, not surprisingly, were difficult to accept, and
courts often gave juries broad discretion to award damages in wrongful
death cases involving the killing of children.,6o
A number of state legislatures faced this problem directly by permitting
awards for loss of society to be made for the death of children.' 6' In other
jurisdictions, courts approached this problem indirectly by measuring damages to take into account not only financial support the deceased child was
providing at the time of death but also the contributions that might have
been made during the life of the parents, even when it extended beyond the
majority of the child. 62 Moreover, some state courts have reversed earlier decisions that narrowly construed state statutes, and now allow parents to recover
damages for loss of society for the death of a child. 63 Nonetheless, such
formulas often fail to compensate parents adequately for the death of chil64
dren by rarely allowing recovery for grief and other sentimental losses.1
Because state law traditionally defines damages in terms of the actual injuries
that result from the legal breach, the decedents' estates and survivors are
65
generally unable to claim damages for the invasion of the underlying right.
This limitation is less significant when the decedent loses substantial earnings
or experiences conscious pain and suffering before his death, since an award
for the violation of the underlying right would generally be considered
duplicative and not be available.' 66 When awards of actual damages are

158. See Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 334-36, 105 N.W.2d 118, 119-21 (1960).
159. See Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich. 223, 241, 76 N.W.2d 80, 91 (1956) (Smith, J.,
dissenting); see also D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 559; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note
59, § 127, at 951.
160. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES,. supra note 52, at 1330; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 119,
at 353; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 951.
161. See 1 S. SPESIER, supra note 52, at 514; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 55, at 1300
n.11.
162. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 523; D. DOBBS, supra note 91, at 560; C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 119, at 354.
163. See, e.g., Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
164. But see supra note 136. Some states also allow punitive damages in wrongful death

actions. See supra note 137.
165. See supra note 103; see also Greene v. Texeira, 54 Hawaii 231, 505 P.2d 1169 (1973);
Prunty v. Schwantes, 40 Wis. 2d 418, 162 N.W.2d 34 (1968) (rejecting common law survival
action for the enjoyment/loss of life). Some states avoid this result by allowing punitive damages
as well as awards for mental anguish, grief and outrage in their wrongful death actions. See
2 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 424-25.
166. See infra note 169.
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unavailable, however, states generally do not provide any more than nominal
relief for the violation of the underlying right. ,67 States have preferred to
limit damages to the more readily ascertainable actual losses and have avoided
entering the legal and philosophical imbroglio of determining either the value
of a human life or the value of the right that was violated independent of
its consequential damages.' 6 Thus, survival policies provide estates with
damages for losses to the decedent and typically stop short of awarding
damages for the illegal killing itself or for the violation of the underlying
right. Likewise, state wrongful death policies generally measure damages in
terms of losses to the survivors and do not award damages for the loss of
decedent's life or for the violation of the underlying right apart from the
consequences to the survivors.
The reluctance to award damages for the taking of life or for the violation
of the underlying right can be defended in survival actions where actual
damages are available and states seek to avoid double recoveries or windfalls.' 69 Where actual damages are unavailable, however, these policies deny
the decedent, through his representatives, the right to challenge the illegal
conduct that led to the wrongful killing. Although in many cases survivors
could assert the rights of the decedent in wrongful death actions, in some
cases virtually no wrongful death damages will be available under state law;
thus, the only vehicle for enforcing the rights of the decedent will be a
survival action seeking damages for the violation of the underlying right.
Survival and wrongful death claims pursued in § 1983 actions offer the
possibility of avoiding state policies that limit recoveries. To the extent §
1983 authorizes wrongful death actions independent of state law, plaintiffs
have an incentive to rely on § 1983 and argue for the application of federal
damage rules. Moreover, even when initial resort to state law is required
to determine the survival of § 1983 actions or the use of § 1983 as a wrongful
death remedy, courts will use federal standards to determine whether to
reject state policies inconsistent with § 1983's purposes of compensation and
deterrence. Thus, the use of § 1983 offers the possibility that in cases in

167. Although a majority of states permit the award of nominal damages when there are
no actual damages flowing from the wrongful killing, see 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 52, at 383;
D. DoBas, supra note 91, at 562 n.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925, at 530 (1977);
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 59, § 127, at 951, nominal damages are of little benefit
to plaintiffs other than as a predicate for punitive damages in the jurisdictions that allow them
and may not be enough of an incentive to get an attorney to take the case.
168. See Smedley, supra note 42, at 617.
169. Although there is a danger of double recovery where separate survival and wrongful
death claims are being pursued, the actions seek damages based on violations of different
interests. Thus, there is no duplication per se from recoveries in both suits. See supra notes
61 & 93. To the extent there is a danger of overlapping or duplicate recoveries, states have
the ability to minimize such problems by procedural devices such as requiring the actions to
be joined or the trials consolidated. See, e.g., Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302
N.E.2d 555 (1973). The harder issues, however, involve the possibility of duplicative awards
where plaintiffs seek actual damages as well as damages for the violation of decedent's underlying
rights or the taking of his life.
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which only limited damages are available under state law, courts will apply
federal damages policies. Moreover, when actual damages in the survival
action are modest, courts may consider the value of the underlying constitutional right as well as the decedent's interest in his continued life in assessing
damages. 7 '
II.

THi

SUPREME COURT, WRONGFUL DEATH AND SuRvivAL ACTIONS

The Supreme Court has reviewed § 1983 actions by survivors seeking
damages for wrongful killings' 7 ' and has demonstrated interest in resolving
whether state law can limit the amount or type of damages available to
survivors in § 1983 wrongful death actions. 7 2 The Court has held that state
73
law should be looked to initially on § 1983 survival issues, but has refused
to follow state policies that prohibit Bivens actions against federal defendants
from surviving where death results, 74 and has suggested that it would reach
a similar result in § 1983 cases. Nonetheless, the Court has never squarely
addressed whether, or to what extent, § 1983 is available as a remedy for
wrongful killings or whether state limitations on wrongful death recoveries
are applicable when an action is brought under § 1983. On the other hand,
the Court has authorized the use of the federal common law to govern the
availability of survival claims under federal statutes that provide only limited
guidance and has relied on the federal common law to reverse a centuryold admiralty precedent that precluded nonstatutory wrongful death actions.
A.

Wrongful Death and Survival Issues In § 1983 and Bivens Actions
1.

Jones v. Hildebrant

Jones v. Hildebrant'"7 was to have been the vehicle for the Court to
address the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy and the applicability

170. See infra notes 468-72 and accompanying text.
171. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2927 (1985); Tennessee v. Garner, 105
S. Ct. 1694 (1985). In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court reviewed a § 1983
damage action by survivors of the students killed by the Ohio National Guard in 1970 at Kent
State University without addressing the availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy. See
also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977), vacating as moot Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d
1007 (8th Cir. 1976); Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1976), dismissing cert. as improvidently
granted 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975).
172. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (per curiam), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976); O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982)
dismissing cert. for want of jurisdiction 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981). But see Carter v. City of
Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2401 (1984).
173. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
174. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1979).
175. 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (per curiam), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted 191 Colo.
1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976).
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of state wrongful death damage limitations to § 1983 claims. The plaintiff
in Jones was the mother of a fifteen-year-old boy killed by a Denver police

officer acting in the line of duty. She sued, in state court in her own name,
the police officer and two municipal defendants for $1,500,000 in actual and
$500,000 in punitive damages under the Colorado wrongful death statute
and § 1983.176 Colorado, however, severely limited the damages available in

wrongful death actions by imposing a $45,000 statutory ceiling on recoveries
by nondependent parents. 7 7 In addition, Colorado case law limited wrongful

death damages to net pecuniary losses, which excluded punitive damages,
damages for grief, and damages for the loss of comfort, society and pro-

tection. 178
Although the plaintiff's state wrongful death claim was limited to the

$45,000 ceiling, she argued that the limitation did not apply to her § 1983
claim. The trial court disagreed, and the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff finding the individual and municipal defendants liable for the intentional killing of plaintiff's son but limiting damages to $1,500, the approximate cost of his funeral.179
In affirming the judgment, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the

relationship between § 1983 and state wrongful death remedies. First, the
court held that the Colorado wrongful death remedy was "engrafted" into

a § 1983 action but that the state damage policies-the $45,000 ceiling and
the net pecuniary loss limitation-were an integral part of the remedy and
applied to § 1983 actions.'8 0 Second, the court held that a § 1983 wrongful
death action did not exist independent of state law.'"' Third, the court held

the plaintiff could not recover damages because of deprivations of either
her son's or her own constitutional rights. She could not pursue the former

176. Although the plaintiff did not specifically refer to § 1983 in her complaint, she claimed
that the defendant "while acting under color of law, intentionally deprived . . . [her] of rights,
security and liberty secured to her by the Constitution of the United States." Complaint at app.
3, Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977). The Colorado courts treated her action as having
been brought under § 1983 as did the Supreme Court.
177. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-203(1) (1973) ("[l]f the decedent left neither a widow, widower,
nor minor children, nor dependent father or mother, the damages recoverable in any such
action shall not exceed forty-five thousand dollars.").
178. Jones, 191 Colo. at 4, 550 P.2d at 341-42. Colorado law also permitted the survival
of personal actions but did not allow damages for pain and suffering or punitive damages.
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-20-101(1) (1973). Although the plaintiff could have also pursued a
survival claim under state law, see id., she elected to pursue only her wrongful death claims.
179. Jones, 191 Colo. at 3, 550 P.2d at 341.
180. Id. at 7, 550 P.2d at 342.
181. The court based this conclusion on "the perceived Congressional intent not to pre-empt
the states' carefully wrought wrongful death remedies, the adequacy in a death case of the
state remedies to vindicate a civil rights violation, and the overwhelming acceptance of such
state remedies in the federal courts." Id. ai 8, 550 P.2d at 345. Although the court did not
explain the basis for its conclusion about the "perceived Congressional intent," it did express
concern about having to fashion a § 1983 wrongful death remedy because of the difficulty of
developing rules concerning the beneficiaries, the proper parties and the available damages. Id.
at 8 n.ll, 550 P.2d at 345 n.11.
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because a party cannot assert the rights of others; the latter was precluded
because the state did not "directly ... restrict her personal decisions relating
to procreation, contraception, and child-rearing."'8 2 Section 1983 was not
available to provide compensation for these "collateral" losses resulting from
injuries to others, and § 1983's interests were adequately protected under
the state wrongful death statute. Thus, the court held that a § 1983 action
was not available to recover wrongful death damages not available under
8
state law. 1

The plaintiff, in her petition for a writ of certiorari, raised the issues of
the appropriate measure of damages in a § 1983 action involving a wrongful
killing, and of whether state limitations could "cancel and displace" federal
policies.'8 The issue of the relationship between § 1983 and state wrongful

death remedies had been recurring in the lower federal courts, and the
Supreme Court had reviewed actions by survivors but had never directly
addressed the issue.'8 5 After oral argument, however, the Court dismissed
the petition as improvidently granted over the strong dissent of Justice White
which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.

In dismissing the petition, the Court seized on an apparent shift of strategy
by counsel to emphasize petitioner's claim that the killing violated her own

constitutional rights, an issue the Court concluded had not been directly
addressed by the Colorado courts.8

6

Nevertheless, the Court's per curiam

182. Id. at 8, 550 P.2d at 345.

183. In ruling that the limitation on damages in the state wrongful death statute applied in
§ 1983 actions, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that the "trial court properly ruled that
the two actions were merged so that the §1983 claim should be dismissed." Id. at 7, 550 P.2d
at 344. In fact, the trial court did not dismiss the § 1983 action but only granted the defendants'
motion to reduce plaintiff's prayer for damages to $45,000. See Memorandum Opinion and
Order, Appendix at 15-16, Jones, 432 U.S. 183 (1977). Although this characterization did not
change the outcome of this case, the reasoning of the Colorado Supreme Court appears to be
that a doctrine of "merger" applies to § 1983 cases in state but not federal court. Jones, 191
Colo. at 8, 550 P.2d at 344. Such an approach, however, deprives § 1983 of its status as
supplement to state remedies. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (finding that the 42d Congress contemplated that the same conduct could give rise
to both state tort and § 1983 claims). Moreover, the plaintiff's choice of a state forum should
not affect the availability of the federal cause of action. See Steinglass, supra note 17, at 52325.
184. The petition presented the question as follows:
Where the black mother of a 15-year-old child who was intentionally shot and
killed by a white policeman acting under the color of state law brings a suit in
state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, what is the measure of damages?
Particularly, can a state measure of damages cancel and displace an action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
185. Jones, 432 U.S. 183, 189 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); see also supra note 165.
186. In her initial brief the plaintiff had addressed the availability of a § 1983 wrongful
death remed, independent of state law as well as borrowed from state law but without the
damage limitation'. In her reply brief and during oral argument, her counsel emphasized that
full damages should be available because the killing violated her constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court characterized this as her sole claim, Jones, 432 U.S. at 186-87, and dismissed
the petition because it had not been clearly presented below. In explaining this disposition, the
Court questioned whether the Colorado Supreme Court would have reached the same result
had the plaintiff squarely presented the claim that her rights had been violated. Id. at 197.
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opinion strongly suggests that the statutory limitation on wrongful death
recoveries would not logically apply to § 1983 claims based on deprivation
of the petitioner's own rights. The question presented to the Court initially
only made sense if the injuries in question under the state and federal claims
were the same. The Court, however, expressly refused to address whether
the petitioner's interest in raising her child was a constitutional liberty interest
87
that was violated by his killing.1
In his dissent, Justice White took the position that § 1983 should be
available to pursue wrongful death claims. Relying on the criminal statute
counterpart to § 1983, he pointed out that in some circumstances actions
under color of law that result in death violate the constitutional rights of
the victim and argued that the § 1983 remedial issues had been reached by
the Colorado court and therefore should be resolved.'"
The disposition of Jones demonstrates the Court's awareness of the differences between wrongful death actions seeking damages because of injuries
to survivors and survival actions on behalf of decedents. Moreover, the
Court's per curiam opinion illustrates how state wrongful death damage
limitations can impinge on § 1983 actions. Finally, the willingness of the
Court to grant certiorari, as well as its similar action in a subsequent
Colorado case also dismissed without reaching the merits, 89 suggest that
these issues warrant plenary consideration. The reluctance to reach the issues,
on the other hand, is more difficult to explain. The shift in emphasis by
counsel in Jones may have highlighted the complexity of the remedial issues.
Additionally, the underlying substantive issue concerning the source of the
right violated by the wrongful killing seems to have troubled members of
the Court who apparently preferred to avoid addressing a difficult constitutional issue.190 Thus, Jones identified but did not resolve a number of
important issues concerning the relationship between § 1983 and state wrongful death claims.

187. Id. at 187-89.

188. Id. at 189 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White also noted that federal courts had
permitted wrongful death suits under § 1983 where they were maintainable under state law,
but that the Court had never addressed "whether, independently or in conjunction with state
law, § 1983 affords parents a cause of action for a wrongful killing of their child by a state
law enforcement officer and, if it does, the further question as to the measure of damages in
such case." Id.
189. O'Dell v. Espinoza, 456 U.S. 430 (1982), dismissing cert. for want of jurisdiction, 633
P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981). In O'Dell the Colorado Supreme Court reversed its position on the
constitutional issue and held that children may assert a constitutional liberty interest in their
continued relationship with their parents, 633 P.2d at 463; thus, the state wrongful death
damage limitations did not apply to the survivors' § 1983 actions. The Colorado court, however,
did not repudiate its "merger" holding in Jones but distinguished it because the § 1983 claim
in O'Dell was not joined with a state claim and sought relief not available under state law.
633 P.2d at 461-62. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition under its final judgment rule
after it became clear that the state court had remanded the case for trial.
190. Jones, 432 U.S. at 187-89. The questioning of petitioner's counsel at oral argument
suggests that members of the Court were concerned about this issue. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 8-16, 22-24.
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2.

Robertson v. Wegmann

A few months after the dismissal of the petition in Jones, the Court agreed
to address the related issue of the relationship between § 1983 and state
survival policies. Unlike Jones, which was a wrongful death claim by a
survivor, Robertson v. Wegmann' 9' was a pure survival case in which the
death of the plaintiff was unrelated to his § 1983 action.
Clay Shaw, the New Orleans businessman indicted and prosecuted unsuccessfully for conspiring to assassinate President John F. Kennedy, filed a §
1983 action against James Garrison, the prosecuting attorney, and Garrison's
financial supporters for instituting bad faith criminal prosecutions. Prior to
the scheduled trial, however, Shaw died of causes unrelated to the action.
Under Louisiana law, Shaw's action for personal damages could have been
pursued by his spouse, children, parents or siblings, 92 but Shaw did not
have any of these statutory survivors; thus, his § 1983 claim for personal
damages abated.' 93
The Fifth Circuit, which earlier had embraced a borrowing approach to
§ 1983 survival and wrongful death issues,' 94 reviewed the Louisiana survival
policies under § 1983 principles of compensation and deterrence and concluded that the state rule was not consistent with federal law. It then applied
the federal common law to permit the action to survive.19S
In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court fully embraced the
borrowing approach to survival issues, while identifying circumstances in
which courts may reject borrowed state policies as being inconsistent with
the purposes of § 1983. Initially, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion and the "assumption" of the parties that 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a
civil rights choice of law statute, governed and that federal law was "deficient" in the sense that it did not "cover" the issue of the survival of the
federal cause of action.' 96 The Court then looked to state law and concluded

191. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
192. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1979).

193. Under state law, the executor of Shaw's estate could bring an action for property but
not personal damages. Id.
194. See Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
195. Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 984-86 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
196. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588. In looking to the state law of survival, the Court relied
on its statement in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 (1973), that federal law
does not cover every issue that may arise in a civil rights action. In Moor the Court had
foreshadowed the borrowing approach to survival issues by making the following observation
about the use of state law in § 1983 litigation:
One such problem has been the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983 upon
the death of either the plaintiff or defendant. Although an injured party's personal
claim was extinguished at common law upon the death of either the injured party
himself or the alleged wrongdoer ... it has been held that pursuant to § 1988
state survivorship statutes which reverse the common-law rule may be used in the
context of actions brought under § 1983.
Id. at 702 n.14.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:559

that the action would abate under Louisiana's survivorship statute unless
that result was "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
97
States."1
In approaching the inconsistency clause of § 1988, Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court, rejected a plaintiff-oriented approach to § 1988 under which
courts would reject otherwise applicable state policies whenever they caused
a plaintiff to lose.' 98 Nonetheless, he did not require a direct conflict between
the state policy and a federal statutory or constitutional provision. Had such
a conflict been the sine qua non for rejecting state law, § 1988 would be
reduced to a tautology permitting the rejection of state law only when there
was a specific federal requirement to do so, thus making resort to state law
unnecessary in the first place. Rather, Justice Marshall looked broadly to
the "policies underlying § 1983 [which] include compensation of persons
injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power
99
by those acting under color of state law." 1
Despite his willingness to look beyond square conflicts between state and
federal law, Justice Marshall applied his test narrowly. He dismissed the
argument that the Louisiana statute was inconsistent with the goal of compensating those who were injured by a deprivation of rights by pointing out
that the plaintiff was "merely suing as the executor of the deceased's estate. ' ' 20D This, however, effectively deprived the goal of compensation of
any independent impact in suits brought by legal representatives who did
not personally suffer any injuries. With respect to deterrence, he noted that
Louisiana law was not hostile to the survival of actions. Many actions not
survivable in other states survived in Louisiana, and even § 1983 actions,
including Shaw's case, would survive if a specified relative was available.
Thus, Justice Marshall did not view the Louisiana statute as adversely affecting the goal of deterrence, since "to find even a marginal influence on
behavior" it would be necessry to assume that state officials contemplating
illegal activity were aware of intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law as
well as the absence of statutory survivors in a particular case. 20'
Although the Court did not permit the plaintiff's claim to survive, Justice
Marshall's opinion in Robertson is closely tied to the facts of the case, and
he carefully distinguished § 1983 cases in which the death results from the
complained-of conduct. First, he left open how state survival policies would
be treated where, unlike Louisiana, there was a general inhospitability to
197. 436 U.S. at 588 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
198. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593 ("A state statute cannot be considered inconsistent with
federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation."). Justice
Marshall also rejected the Fifth Circuit's argument for nationwide uniformity. He viewed §
1988 as a congressional directive acknowledging state by state variations on issues of civil rights
enforcement on which Congress has not spoken. Id. at 593-94 n. 1l.
199. Id. at 590-91.
200. Id. at 592.

201. Id.at 592-93 n.10.
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the survival of § 1983 actions. Louisiana neither precluded the survival of
tort actions nor significantly restricted the actions that survived; thus, most
§ 1983 actions would survive if the proper relative had brought it. 202 Second,
he pointed out that the Court's holding did not "preclude survival of a §
1983 action when such is allowed by state law ... nor does it preclude

recovery by survivors who are suing under § 1983 for injury to their own
interest." 203 Perhaps significantly, Justice Marshall tied the survival issue to
state law, but he made no similar reference to state law in suggesting that
survivors could bring wrongful death claims under § 1983.204 Finally, in
discussing the impact of state no-survival policies on deterrence, Justice
Marshall emphasized the narrowness of the decision and specifically distin20 5
guished cases in which the illegal conduct caused the death.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan
and White, argued that § 1983 required a federal policy as the rule, not the
exception, and that the proper starting point was the issue conceded by the
plaintiffs: whether an appropriate federal rule of law was available. Although
Justice Blackmun agreed that § 1983 and federal law did not expressly address
the issue of survival, he was unwilling to concede that federal law did not
provide an appropriate survival policy. Thus, he saw initial resort to state
rules as improper, and he argued for the use of a federal rule in the first
instance, rather than only when state law is rejected under § 1988's inconsistency clause. 206 In support of his position, Justice Blackmun pointed to §
1983 decisions on issues of damages and immunities, which involved the
development of uniform federal rules despite the absence of specific statutory
20 7
provisions or relevant legislative history.
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the Court's application of the inconsistency clause and argued that state rules should be reviewed for their
impact on § 1983 litigation as well as on the underlying conduct. For example,
he expressed concern about giving a party an incentive to delay litigation in

202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 591.
Id.at 592 n.9.
Id.
Justice Marshall carefully limited the ruling by observing that:
We intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on state law
could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused
death .... (cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (CA5 1961) (deceased allegedly
beaten to death by policemen; state survival law applied in favor of his widow
and estate)).
Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594. Justice Marshall was no doubt quite familiar with the Fifth Circuit
decision in Brazier on which he relied, as he had represented the plaintiff in it. See infra note 400.
206. Id. at 595-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 596-97. Justice Blackmun relied on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S.
229 (1969), a damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, in which the Court construed § 1988 to
require courts hearing civil rights actions to search out the federal or state rule which "better
serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes." 396 U.S. at 240.
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the hope that the intervening death of a litigant would require the litigation
20
to abate. 1
Robertson is a disappointing decision, not so much for the result but
rather because of the approach the Court took to the threshold questions
raised by § 1988. Robertson was the Court's first § 1983 survival case and
the outcome might have turned on whether federal courts could develop
federal rules to resolve matters not directly addressed by § 1983. The Court,
however, failed to review the language and legislative history of § 1983 to
determine whether it provided an appropriate survival policy, or, whether
the federal common law of § 1983 justified the development of such a policy.
Nor did the Court interpret the deficiency clause of § 1988 to determine
whether it authorized resort to the federal common law to fill certain gaps
in civil rights statutes. 209 Thus, Robertson requires initial resort to state
survival policies but offers little guidance on other issues that may arise in
§ 1983 litigation.
Nonetheless, Robertson is an important decision. It rejects an unremittingly
pro-plaintiff reading of § 1988 and significantly narrows compensation as a
criterion for determining the availability of § 1983 actions on behalf of
plaintiffs suing in a representative capacity. Robertson also provides guidance
in reviewing whether borrowed state policies are consistent with the deterrence
purpose of § 1983. In such cases, courts must look both to the general
application of the state policy as well as to its application in the particular
case. Louisiana law was not generally hostile to the survival of § 1983 actions;
nor did the abatement of the particular § 1983 action have an "independent
adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983.11210 Thus, Robertson required
a two-level analysis of borrowed state policies with respect to deterrence. 21'
Finally, Justice Marshall's opinion suggests that even where death results
from the complained-of conduct, state survival law is the starting point, but
his repeated efforts to distinguish that situation suggest a state policy of
abatement would be rejected.
With respect to the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy, Robertson
provides little guidance. Although Justice Marshall suggests that a no-wrong-

208. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 600 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In emphasizing the purpose of
§ 1983 of deterring unconstitutional conduct, Justice Blackmun contrasted federal statutes that
are concerned primarily with compensation and loss-shifting. Id. at 601.
209. Rather than interpret the deficiency clause, the Court merely relied on its earlier observation that federal law does not cover every issue that may arise in the context of a civil
rights action. See supra note 196. Although it has been suggested that this was the Court's
interpretation of the clause and that "federal law should be considered 'deficient' and courts
should turn to the law of the forum state if federal law does not cover the issue," Brown v.
United States, 742 F.2d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 105 S.Ct. 2153 (1985), a better explanation of Robertson is that the concession of the
parties that federal law was deficient contributed to the Court's failure to address this issue.
210. Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594.
211. Justice Marshall's opinion does not respond to Justice Blackmun's concern for specific
deterrence and his argument that courts should look to the impact of the state policy on the
litigation as well as on the underlying conduct.
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ful-death policy would adversely affect the interest in compensating survivors
as well as the deterrence purposes of § 1983,212 the decision leaves unclear

how to approach the threshold question of whether federal law is deficient
in § 1983 wrongful death cases.
3.

Carlson v. Green

In Carlson v. Green, 21 3 the Supreme Court addressed indirectly one of the
issues left open in Robertson. Carlson was a Bivens damage action brought
directly under the Constitution against federal prison officials and not under
§ 1983. The plaintiff was a mother whose son died while a prisoner at a
federal correctional center in Indiana, and she sued as the administratrix of
his estate. She claimed that the denial of medical care that caused her son's
death constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court ultimately found an implied right of action against federal correctional officials
in the eighth amendment, 2 4 but the case also involved the survival of the
decedent's action.
The plaintiff had sought $1,500,000 in actual and $500,000 in punitive
damages, but the district court dismissed the complaint because it did not
meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. 2 5 In reaching this conclusion,
the district court treated Indiana law on both survival and wrongful death
21 6
as governing the availability of the action and the damages recoverable.
Under Indiana law, actions for personal injuries to deceased parties do
not survive where the complained-of acts caused the death.2 7 Indiana, how-

212. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
213. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
214. The district court had found that the allegations of the complaint stated a violation of
the eighth amendment standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate
indifference to medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment), and the Seventh Circuit
agreed. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
The United States did not contest that determination before the Supreme Court. Carlson, 446
U.S. at 17 n.3.
215. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17. The $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement for suits against
federal officers in 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) was repealed after the district court decision. Act of
Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721.
216. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17 n.4.
217. IND. CODE § 34-1-1-1 (1982). The decisions in Carlson do not address the proper
interpretation of state law on survival, and Indiana law may not have required the action to
abate. Under Indiana law, "[aill causes of action shall survive, and may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to such action.. . except actions for personal
injuries to the deceased party, which shall survive only to the extent provided herein." Id. In
cases within the exception, a wrongful death action is available. Subsequently, the Seventh
Circuit held that § 1983 actions based on wrongful killings were not "actions for personal
injuries" within the meaning of the state statute, thus permitting a § 1983 action to survive.
Blake v. Kattar, 693 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1982). But see Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985)
(treating all § 1983 actions as "personal actions" for purposes of choosing the appropriate
state statute of limitations; cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1976) (action for
damages under § 1981 is an "action for personal injuries" within the relevant Virginia statute
of limitations).
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ever, does not preclude all civil remedies in such cases, and wrongful death
actions may be brought by the personal representatives of one whose death
was caused by a wrongful act or omission. 21 The damages available in such
wrongful death actions were open-ended and included, but were expressly
not limited to, lost earnings as well as reasonable medical, hospital, funeral
and burial expenses; 219 in addition, Indiana case law clearly authorized awards
for loss of society. 220 This broad range of damages, however, was only
available to a decedent's widow or widower, dependent children or dependent
next of kin. When there were no such surviving relatives, wrongful death
damages were limited to reasonable medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses, as well as the expenses of administering the estate and prosecuting any
action. Thus, given the decedent's status as an incarcerated adult without
dependents, the plaintiff's only wrongful death damage claim for her son's
death was for the minimal cost of administering his estate.
Unlike the district court, which approached plaintiff's claim under both
the survival and wrongful death statutes, the Seventh Circuit treated the
action only as a survival claim. 221 The court saw the plaintiff as asserting
her son's cause of action as the administratrix of his estate and claiming
that the action survived his death notwithstanding contrary state law. 2 2 Thus,
the Seventh Circuit's opinion does not address the availability of a wrongful
death claim implied from the Constitution or borrowed from state law.
In affirming the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the state survival policy
did not prevent the action from surviving where death resulted from the
complained-of conduct, the Supreme Court did not attempt to resolve the
conflict over the proper characterization of the plaintiff's claim. The Court
only reviewed the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the survival claim, which
would have abated under state law even if the decedent had a spouse or
dependent relatives who could have obtained a substantial recovery in a state
3
wrongful death action. 22

218. IND. CODE § 34-1-1-2 (Supp. 1985) provides in relevant part:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another,
the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against
the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the
case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission.
219. See IND. CODE § 34-1-1-2 (Supp. 1985):
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another...
the damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or
jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial
expenses, and lost earnings ....
220. American Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Say. Bank, 216 Ind. 649, 660, 25 N.E.2d
777, 782 (1940). Cf. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979) (construing
Indiana law to allow damages for loss of care, love and affection, and training and guidance
of children, but not punitive damages).
221. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 672 n.4.
222. Id.
223. In declining to address whether the plaintiff had also alleged a wrongful death claim,
the Court stated cryptically that "[r]esolution of this conflict is irrelevant in light of our holding
today." Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 n.4. If the plaintiff was also pursuing a wrongful death claim
and seeking damages beyond those allowed under state law, resolution of this issue would have
been relevant regardless of the holding on the survival issue. The complaint dealt exclusively
with injuries to the decedent and no losses to his mother were pleaded. Moreover, the plaintiff
made clear that she was suing to vindicate the victim's rights, and not seeking compensation
for survivors under a wrongful death claim. Brief for Respondents at 52-57, Carlson.
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In approaching the survival issue, the Carlson Court was not constrained
by § 1988, which does not apply in Bivens actions, and concluded that only

a uniform federal rule of survivorship was compatible with the goal of
deterring the constitutional violations alleged in this case. 224 The Court also
pointed out that its holding was consistent with Robertson, as the death was
acts upon which the suit was based. 22

alleged to have been caused by the

Carlson is significant because it raises the question of the relevance of

state wrongful death remedies in considering the adequacy of state survival
policies. Had the death been unrelated to the cause of action, Indiana law

would have permitted the action to survive. Because the death resulted from
the complained-of conduct, however, any action brought on behalf of the
decedent for injuries suffered prior to his death and for the taking of his
life would have abated under state law.

In its brief, the United States argued that the Court should look at
Indiana's survival and wrongful death statutes as a whole and pointed out,
correctly, that in Indiana all tort claims survived to some extent.226 If the
victim died from an injury arising out of the complained-of conduct, the
personal injury action abated but the survivors had a wrongful death claim.
In rejecting the argument that Indiana law should govern, however, the
Court focused solely on the survival claim brought by the decedent's representatives and implicitly rejected the argument that the potential wrongful
death claim could adequately serve the purposes of compensation and de7

terrence that Bivens and § 1983 actions shared .2

224. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23. In concluding that a uniform rule of survivorship was required
where the complained-of conduct resulted in death, the Court noted that the federal government
operated its prisons throughout the country and that the states had little interest in applying
their survival policies to disputes involving federal officials. Id. at 24-25 n.11.
225. In choosing a uniform federal rule of survival for cases where the death is caused by
the complained-of conduct the Carlson Court focused exclusively on the deterrence rationale
of Bivens actions and did not address the goal of compensation. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann,
436 U.S. 584 (1978) (compensation not affected where suit brought by executor).
226. The United States argued that the availability of a wrongful death claim justified
following a state policy that required the decedent's claim to abate. Brief of United States at
47, Carlson. This, however, ignores the fact that the survival and wrongful death actions,
although both premised on the violation of the decedent's rights, protect different interests and
seek different relief. Moreover, given the absence of recoverable wrongful death damages in
this case, remitting the plaintiff to the wrongful death remedies would be akin to denying that
action.
227. Despite the availability of wrongful death actions against the federal government under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), which borrows state law
remedies, such actions do not adequately serve the purposes of Bivens actions. In rejecting the
argument that the FTCA established an exclusive remedy against the federal government, the
Carlson Court relied on the absence of jury trials and the unavailability of punitive damages
under the FTCA as well as on the increased deterrence that flows from personal liability.
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21-23. Given this refusal to permit state defined FTCA survival actions
to preclude Bivens claims, it would be anomolous to conclude that the wrongful death remedies
under the FTCA served the purposes of Bivens and justified permitting actions to abate where
death resulted from the complained-of conduct. Likewise, any state action a survivor had
against individual federal officers under Indiana law, see infra note 229, would have been
useless given the limitations of the Indiana wrongful death remedy. A more difficult question,
however, is whether a Bivens wrongful death action free of state damage limitations could
preclude a survival claim, see infra notes 444-62 and accompanying text, an issue the Carlson
Court did not discuss in analyzing the survival claim independently.
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Although the Carlson Court did not resolve how federal courts should
use state survivorship law on other issues in Bivens actions, 221 it made clear
that state law requiring abatement should not be used when a decedent dies
from the complained-of conduct. By reconciling that result with Robertson,
however, the Court did not depart from its holding that state law will be
the starting point for § 1983 survival issues regardless whether the complained-of conduct results in death. Nonetheless, the Court's treatment of
the deterrence issue leaves little doubt that state policies requiring such actions
to abate will be rejected as inconsistent with § 1983. Moreover, Carlson's
approach suggests that the same result would be reached where the state has
an adequate wrongful death remedy. On the other hand, Carlson is silent
as to the availability of wrongful death claims directly under the Constitution
or in conjunction with state law. The administratrix did not seek damages
she suffered from her son's death, and the Court did not address the
availability of such an action.229
B.

Survival and Wrongful Death Issues Under Other Federal

Statutes
Although the Court has not addressed the relationship between § 1983
and wrongful death actions, it has frequently considered the availability of
both survival and wrongful death claims under other federal statutes and
under general maritime law. The Court's approach in these areas has been
characterized by a willingness to review the legislative history and purposes
of congressional enactments despite the absence of statutory language directly
on point and to apply the federal common law to the particular statutory
actions. Moreover, in admiralty, the Court has reviewed critically the common law and reversed a 19th-century precedent that denied the existence of
common law wrongful death claims under general maritime law.
The Court's approach to survival issues under federal statutes that do not
specifically address the issue was established in an 1884 case in which the

228. The Court suggested that the uniform rule of survivorship applied in Bivens actions
when the complained-of conduct resulted in death might not apply to other survivorship issues,
by expressly leaving open whether on certain questions federal law might incorporate state
law as a matter of convenience. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24 n.11.
229. By examining the survival issue independently, the Court avoided the need to address
the availability of wrongful death actions against individual federal officials. Survivors have a
wrongful death remedy against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but the FTCA is not available in actions against federal officials.
Nonetheless, the Court could find authority for wrongful death actions against federal officials
directly under the Constitution by analogizing to Bivens actions that survive a decedent's death.
Although the textual support for construing § 1983 directly as a wrongful death remedy is not
available for Bivens wrongful death actions, see infra notes 494-95 and accompanying text, the
Court has construed the federal common law to allow nonstatutory wrongful death actions in
admiralty. See infra notes 246-60 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court's policy of
construing § 1983 and Bivens actions similarly, see infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text,
supports permitting Bivens wrongful death actions.
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Court relied on federal common law. In Schreiber v. Sharpless,230 a copyright
action for penalties and forfeitures, the Court looked to the common law
rule requiring the abatement of penal actions and refused to permit the
plaintiffs to prosecute the action against the executors of the deceased defendant's estate. 231 Although a state statute would have allowed the action to
survive, the Court stressed that the survival of the action was a matter of
federal law and dependent on the nature and substance of the cause of
action .

2

Federal courts addressing the survival of federal statutory actions under
statutes that provided no guidance on the issue of survival or the choice of
the controlling law233 have generally looked to federal common law for
guidance. 234 Although Schreiber, in requiring the abatement of penal actions
under federal common law, did not address whether all nonpenal actions
survived, federal courts have applied an evolving federal common law to
permit an increasing number of nonpenal damage actions to survive.23 5 Thus,
in Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Association,236 the Fourth
Circuit permitted the survival of a treble damage claim under the Sherman Act
by relying on the modern common law rule of survivability for claims for
property rights. In defending the use of an evolving common law standard,
the court stated:
[W]e entertain no doubt as to the survivability of the cause of action
when the statute creating it is interpreted in light of the common law
rule relating to survival. While there might be some doubt as to this
were we to look only to the ancient decisions, we think that the rule is
to be determined, not merely by a consideration of the state of the
common law at the time of the enactment of the statute de bonis asportatis in the reign of Edward III, or even by a consideration of the
common law rule at the time of the American Revolution, but in the
light of its subsequent development and the decisions interpreting it. It
must be remembered, in this connection, that the common law is not a

230. 110 U.S. 76 (1884).
231. Id. at 80.
232. Cf. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913) (refusing to look to state law

for the survival of an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908),
amended by 36 Stat. 291 (1910)).
233. Some federal statutes expressly incorporate state law to govern federal causes of
action. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333(a)(2)(A)
(1982) (requiring use of state procedures); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982)
(explicitly adopting state law to govern the liability of the United States). See also United States
v. Haskin, 395 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1968) (applying state damage ceiling in wrongful death
action under FTCA).
234. In some cases where the governing federal statute is silent, the Court has nonetheless
found a congressional intent to permit statutory actions to survive. See, e.g., Cox v. Roth,
348 U.S. 207 (1955) (holding that actions under Jones Act survive the death of a defendant
despite silence in FELA, which the Jones Act incorporated).
235. But see Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932) (dictum)
(observing that actions for personal injuries did not survive under the maritime law). See also
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 n.35 (1959).
236. 128 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1942).
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static but a dynamic and growing thing. Its rules arise from the application of reason to the changing conditions of society. It inheres in the
life of society, not in the decisions interpreting that life; and, while
decisions are looked to as evidence of the rules, they are not to be
construed as limitations upon the growth of the law but as landmarks
evidencing its development.237
Moreover, in looking to the common law and its evolution, courts have
28
often considered legislative as well as judicial developments. 3
In applying the common law, federal courts have been mindful of the
difficulty of determining which actions are penal 239 and have looked to the
purpose of the statute, the beneficiary of any recovery, and the relationship
between the recovery and harm suffered to determine whether an action
survives. Such an approach avoids simply asking whether an action is con24
sidered "personal" or determining how state law would characterize it. 0
Thus, a federal common law of survival closely tied to the nature of the
particular statute has been followed by federal courts in determining the
survivability of statutory actions where Congress was silent. 24 '
During the 19th century, the Supreme Court followed the approach of
the common law in refusing to recognize wrongful death actions. During
the ascendancy of Swift v. Tyson, 242 when federal courts were free to exercise
broad authority over the federal common law in diversity cases, the Court
followed state law and refused to permit wrongful death actions unless the
underlying state statute provided for such an action. Thus, in Insurance Co.
v. Brame,24a a diversity action by an insurance company to recover the
proceeds of a life insurance policy paid because of the defendant's killing
of the decedent, the Court reviewed the common law and refused to authorize
a cause of action that would not have been allowed under the applicable

237. Id. at 648.
238. See Sullivan v. Associated Bill Posters & Distribs., 6 F.2d i000 (2d Cir. 1925) (considering
statutory developments in determining the federal common law of survival and concluding that
an action under the Sherman Antitrust Act survives the death of a defendant). Cf. Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, 298 U.S. 375 (1970) (looking to state statutes to define the common law
of wrongful death).
239. Cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (discussing the meaning of penal statutes
in different contexts).
240. See, e.g., James v. Home Constr. Co., 621 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying a
three-part test to determine that a remedy under the Truth-in-Lending Act is not a penal
sanction and that the action survives).
241. See, e.g., Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1980)
(federal common law requires survival of action under § 1640 of the TILA); Asklar v. Honeywell,
Inc., 29 FEP Cases 1596 (D. Conn. 1982) (action under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act survives under federal common law); Layne v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418
F. Supp. 964 (D.S.C. 1976) (action for damages under Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act survives under federal common law, but claims for mental anguish and pain and
suffering are personal and do not); cf. Bowles v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 147 F.2d 425 (6th Cir.
1945) (action for treble damages under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 is penal and
does not survive under the federal common law).
242. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
243. 95 U.S. 754 (1877).

1985]

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS

state law. Similarly in 1886 in The Harrisburg,244 an action for wrongful
death under general maritime law, the Court held that the common law did
not authorize wrongful death actions under the federal courts' admiralty
jurisdiction. 245
The most dramatic modern development in the federal common law of
wrongful death occurred in 1970 in the area of general maritime law when
the Supreme Court decided Moragne v. States Marine Lines 46 and reversed
the eighty-four-year-old precedent of The Harrisburg.In Moragne, the Court
held that a wrongful death action is available under general maritime law
for a death caused by a violation of a maritime duty. 247 The case arose
because the survivors of the decedent, a longshoreman killed aboard a vessel
in navigable waters within Florida, could not pursue a wrongful death claim
for unseaworthiness under state law, and fell between the cracks of the
available federal wrongful death legislative remedies. Congress had passed
legislation authorizing wrongful death actions for deaths beyond state territorial waters24 and for seamen regardless of where the death occurred, 249
but neither statute applied to the decedent. Thus, under the prevailing law,
his survivors could only recover on a claim for unseaworthiness if authorized
2 °
under state law. Despite the congressional entry into this area, the Court held that it was
not precluded from addressing the availability of a wrongful death action
under general maritime law and, in a careful and scholarly opinion, Justice
Harlan reviewed the origins of the common law of wrongful death. Regardless of whether The Harrisburgwas correctly decided in 1886, Justice
Harlan found that intervening developments made clear "that the rule against
recovery for wrongful death is sharply out of keeping with the policies of
modem American maritime law." '25' He looked to the widespread legislative
abandonment of the rule and, relying on Roscoe Pound's observation that
"today we should be thinking of the death statutes as part of the general
law, '" 21 2 held that wrongrul death actions would be available in maritime
23
cases regardless of state law.
In declaring that the common law authorized a wrongful death action in
maritime cases, Justice Harlan responded to the argument that the devel244. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
245. Id. at 213-14.
246. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).

247. Id. at 409.
248. Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537 (current version at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-67 (1982)).
249. Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (current version
at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)).
250. The Florida Supreme Court construed state law to exclude such claims for unseaworthiness from the state wrongful death remedy. Moragne, 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968) (on certified

question).
251. 398 U.S. at 388.
252. Pound, Comment on State Death Statutes-Applicationto Death in Admiralty, 13
A. CLAmANTs Comur'N. ATT'Ys L.J. 188, 189 (1954).
253. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 390-91.
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opment of this nonstatutory action would require the Court to address a
myriad of questions that arise in personal injury litigation. He observed that
courts can look to analogous areas of federal law to select the appropriate
statute of limitations, to identify the proper beneficiaries, and to define the
2 4
measure of available damages. 1
The decision in Moragne, however, did not resolve all issues as to the
availability of wrongful death actions under the general maritime law. In
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,2"1 the Court addressed the measure of
survivors' damages in nonstatutory death actions under the maritime law
and held that damages could include compensation for loss of support and
services, for funeral expenses, and for loss of society, but not for mental
anguish or grief.25 6 The Court found that these awards to survivors would
not duplicate damages already received by the decedent, and declined to
look for guidance to other federal maritime statutes that limited damages
to pecuniary losses. 2 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
twenty-seven of the forty-four state and territorial wrongful death statutes
which measured damages by losses to beneficiaries permitted recovery for
28
loss of society.
The Court, however, has refused to extend the holdings of Moragne and
Gaudet to accidents directly covered by existing federal statutes, thus limiting
the availability of claims for loss of society to maritime accidents within
2 9
territorial waters. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
the Court addressed whether the nonstatutory wrongful death action under maritime law
also applied in the territorial waters where the Death on the High Seas Act
applied. In concluding that it did not, the Court limited recovery of survivors
of persons who died in accidents in territorial waters to their pecuniary losses
as the Act excluded recoveries for loss of society. 260 Thus, the Court was
not willing to create a parallel wrongful death remedy to cover cases that
Congress had directly addressed. Nonetheless, the Court's willingness in
Moragne to reverse the federal common law and authorize a common law
wrongful death action for unseaworthiness under the maritime law demonstrates the extent to which wrongful death actions have become part of
the general law.
III.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 1983 AND THE USE OF
STATE LAW

Given the absence of Supreme Court decisions directly addressing the
availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy, it is necessary to look
254. Id. at 405-08.

255. 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
256. Id. at 584-85 & n.17.

257. The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1982), which limited damages to
pecuniary losses, was not literally applicable because the accident took place in territorial waters
where the DOHSA does not apply.
258. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 587 n.21.
259. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
260. Id. at 624-25.
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to decisions involving other aspects of § 1983. This is not a simple task.
Although all cases involving interpretations of § 1983 can be reduced to
matters of statutory construction, 26' the Court has often failed to develop
clear and consistent approaches to interpreting federal statutes, 262 and § 1983
is no exception. Moreover, it has often not attempted to justify or even
explain the approach it has followed,
particularly with respect to the role
263
of state law in § 1983 litigation.
There are many possible approaches to the use of § 1983 as a wrongful
death remedy, all of which involve the need to construe § 1983 and to
determine its relationship to state law. The Supreme Court, when it reaches
this issue, will have to decide whether § 1983-independently, through the
federal common law, or through the incorporation of state law-is available
as a wrongful death remedy. It will also have to address the applicable
damage policies and, if state wrongful death causes of action are incorporated
into § 1983, whether state damage limitations, such as ceilings on recoveries
or prohibitions on awards for nonpecuniary losses, are also incorporated.
Finally, if § 1983 incorporates state wrongful death actions and their damage
policies, the Court will have to address whether the state policies are consistent with the purposes of § 1983. State law is relevant to these inquiries.
A review of state law in 1871 may help explain what members of the 42d
Congress, almost two-thirds of whom were lawyers, 264 intended in enacting
the predecessor to § 1983. In addition, current state law may give meaning
to § 1983 when it was contemplated that particular elements of the § 1983
cause of action would evolve over time. Finally, federal law may require
use of the law of the forum state to fill any gaps in § 1983 concerning its
availability as a wrongful death remedy.
The search for an applicable policy in § 1983 litigation is made difficult
because of the limited legislative guidance, but this is not unique. Federal
law is interstitial and federal courts often look to the law of the forum state

261. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951). In his dissenting opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 162 (1961), Justice
Frankfurter criticized treating interpretations of § 1983 as abstract matters of statutory construction in view of their implication on federalism: "So stated, the problem ... is denuded of
illuminating concreteness and thereby of its far-reaching significance for our federal system."
Id. at 202 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
262. See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HAav. L. Rv.892 (1982) (criticizing the Court's approach
to statutory construction); see also Wald, Some Observationson the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. Rav. 195, 215 (1983) (commenting on inconsistencies in the Supreme Court's approach to construing statutes); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS 286 (1985) (going further than Judge Wald to suggest that the Court's approach to
statutory construction "smacks of disingenuousness and opportunism").
263. See infra notes 271-318 and accompanying text.
264. Of the 238 members of the House of Representatives in the First Session of the 42d
Congress, 151 listed their occupation as lawyers. CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist
Sess., ix-xii
(1871). Of the 72 members of the Senate from 37 states seated at the start of the 42d Congress,

48 were lawyers or had legal training. See
1871).
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to fill gaps in -federal statutes, 261 usually under the general mandate of the
Rules of Decision Act. 266 What is unique about § 1983 and other surviving
Reconstruction-era civil rights acts, however, is the existence of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, a choice of law statute that may limit the power of federal courts
to use the federal common law to supply missing details in § 1983 and other
civil rights actions. Under § 1988, federal courts look to state law where
federal law is deficient; the most analogous state policy is then applied as
the federal rule unless it is inconsistent with § 1983's purposes of compen267
sation and deterrence.
Despite the surface simplicity of these steps, its application is more complex.261 Section 1988 defies a simple construction, and the Supreme Court
has provided only minimal guidance as to when courts should develop a
uniform federal rule or resort to the law of the forum state. Although the
Court has provided answers to many specific questions, courts facing new
issues are often uncertain whether to forge ahead to construe ambiguous
apsects of § 1983 or to look to state law. Moreover, the Court has not
developed standards to be used in selecting the appropriate state policy. 269
Finally, the Court has only begrudgingly applied § 1988's inconsistency clause
and has never rejected an otherwise applicable state policy once it made the
270
initial decision to resort to state law.

A.

Statutory Construction

The task of construing § 1983 has been made difficult for at least three
reasons. First, § 1983 is a threadbare statute and the Court has often been
265. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 498
(1954).
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The Rules of Decision Act applies to federal question as well
as diversity cases, and requires the use of state law in certain cases in which the underlying
statute is silent. See Hill, State Procedural Law in Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV.
66 (1955). There are also more specific federal statutes that require the use of state law on
both procedural and substantive matters. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (federal courts required
to give state court judgments the same full faith and credit that state courts would give them);
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
267. See Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2928-29 (1984) (discussing steps to follow in
applying § 1988).
268. Commentators on § 1988 agree that the statute is complex and confusing. See, e.g.,
Eisenberg, State Law and Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 499, 501 (1980); Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some
Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 601, 613 (1985) (reproducing § 1988 "to remind
readers of the full scope of its obscurity"); Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell,
79 COLUM. L. Rav. 213, 265 (1979). See also Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Observations on
42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Common Law, 36 LA. L. REv. 681 (1976) (discussing the
complexity of choice of law in civil rights cases).
269. But see infra note 354.
270. But cf. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984) (refusing to borrow a limitations
period for filing administrative complaints of employment discrimination because it was not
an analogous state policy); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (rejecting state survival policy
in Bivens action where the victim died from the complained-of conduct).
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unable to find answers in its language to issues that arise in § 1983 litigation.
Second, § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,271 unlike some of its other
provisions, was relatively uncontroversial, and members of the 42d Congress
did not discuss it in great depth. 272 Finally, the breadth of the cause of
action that would result from a literal interpretation of § 1983 was unacceptable to members of a Court sensitive to considerations of federalism
and influenced by a tradition of historiography that found suspect much
work of the Reconstruction Congresses. 273 Thus, the construction of § 1983
has often involved a search for limiting principles so that it would not
override traditional common law and equitable defenses and would not
provide a private right of action against all state and local officials and the
governmental entities that employed or elected them.
The threshold question in construing § 1983, although rarely addressed
expressly, is whether to give § 1983 a uniform interpretation. 274 The Court
has generally approached § 1983 with a view toward developing uniform
policies without regard to the law of the state in which the federal court
sits but has rarely discussed why. Where the language or legislative history
of § 1983 directly addresses a particular issue, the Court has had no difficulty
requiring a uniform interpretation of § 1983. In addition, where the language
of the statute was literally applicable, the Court has applied it uniformly,
although it has often limited the statute's reach. Finally, the Court has often
looked to the broad purposes of § 1983 to develop uniform policies where
the language and legislative history did not address the particular issues or
addressed them only obliquely.
The relationship between § 1983 and state law has raised few problems
where there are federal standards otherwise applicable in federal court litigation, or where it is necessary to construe § 1983 or other federal statutes.
In such cases the Court has developed uniform interpretations of § 1983
and has not looked to state law. Thus, the Court has resolved issues as
276
diverse as the applicable pleading requirements 27 and equitable principles

271. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
272. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978); see also Briscoe
v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 361 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
273. Justice Frankfurter's view of the work of the Reconstruction Congress is best summed
up in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1951): "The dominant conditions of the
Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of carefully considered and coherent
legislation. Strong post-war feeling caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and careless
phrasing of laws relating to the new political issues." See also 2 C. W.aRE, THE SuPRM
CoUTr IN THE UNIrED STATES HisTORy, 600-21 (1926) (criticizing the legislation of the Reconstruction Congress).
274. Cf. Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IowA L. REv. 433, 446-52 (1982)
(discussing whether principles of causation in § 1983 should be uniform).
275. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (defendants have a duty to plead official immunity
as an affirmative defense).
276. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (developing equitable standards that govern the
availability of injunction against state judicial proceedings). Cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents,
457 U.S. 496 (1982) (despite general equitable policy applicable in federal court, § 1983 guarantees direct access to judicial forums without exhaustion of administrative remedies).
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through the development of uniform policies. Likewise, where the interpretation of § 1983 required construction of statutory language for which there
is no state counterpart, the Court has looked to the legislative history and
purposes of § 1983 to develop a uniform interpretation. 2 7 Finally, the task
of reconciling § 1983 with other federal statutes that create rights or authorize
remedies has also resulted in uniform definitions of the scope of § 1983.278
On the other hand, where § 1983 was enacted against a background of welldeveloped state law governing litigation and where there was little legislative
guidance, the Court has not always made clear how it decided whether to
develop a uniform interpretation of § 1983 or to defer to state policies.
Thus, issues involving matters such as statutes of limitations, survival, immunities, and damages have presented the Court with the most difficult
issues concerning the construction of § 1983 and the use of state law. 279
Statutes of limitations are the archetypical area for borrowing state law,
and the Court has relied on state policies of repose in § 1983 litigation.
Prior to looking to state law, however, the Court considered whether there
was an available policy based on federal law. In O'Sullivan v. Felix, 0 the
case in which the Court first applied a state statute of limitations to § 1983,
the Court rejected the argument that the federal statite of limitations for
suits for penalties or forfeitures applied to all § 1983 actions. 2 ' Having
concluded that § 1983 neither contained a specific limitations period nor
provided for a penalty, the Court turned to state law for the applicable
period. 2 2 Nonetheless, the Court has not treated all questions relating to
statutes of limitations as being governed initially by state law. Although the
Court has looked to state law for the choice of the limitations period as
well as for the related rules on tolling 283 and on revival, 2 4 it has treated the
question of which state statute of limitations to borrow as a federal question
2 85
and has required use of the state limitations period for personal actions.
It has also considered the accrual of a cause of action to be a uniquely

277. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (defining "and laws"); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (defining "persons"); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) (defining "color of law").
278. See, e.g., Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984) (§ 1983 not available to raise
equal protection challenges involving the educational rights of handicapped children); Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (§ 1983 not
available to raise statutory claims under federal statutes that contain comprehensive remedies);
cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (§ 1983 not available in federal court to challenge
the fact or duration of confinement).
279. Comment, Choice of Law and § 1983, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1970).
280. 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
281. Id. at 322.
282. Id. at 322-25. This borrowing of state law took place without any reliance on or citation
to U.S. REV. STAT. § 722, the current version of which is 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
283. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
284. See Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650 (1983) (using the state policy on revival
but only after first searching for a uniform federal policy).
285. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
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federal issueU6 even though state law is not silent on such matters and even

though the date selected has a direct impact on the limitations period.
In addressing the survival of § 1983 actions, on the other hand, the Court
has departed from the approach used under other federal statutes in which
it searched for the appplicable policy in the statute authorizing the action
and in the federal common law. Thus, in Robertson v. Wegmann, 287 the
Court followed a borrowing approach to § 1983 survival issues without
considering whether an answer might be available in the language,
legislative
2

history, or purposes of § 1983 or in the federal common law. 11
The willingness of the Court to search for uniform interpretations of
§ 1983 where the language and legislative history provide little or no guidance
is best seen in immunity cases in which the Court provides state and local
governmental officials either absolute or qualified immunity from liability
for damages. The language of § 1983, if taken literally, creates a broad
damage action that allows no immunity. The Court, however, has been
uncomfortable with the prospect of imposing what might amount to strict
liability on state and local officials for violations of federal law. 219 In developing official immunities under § 1983, the Court has been guided by a
test ostensibly based on statutory construction and has developed uniform
policies without regard to the policies followed in the forum state. In reaching
this result, the Court has not addressed directly why it has rejected state

policies but has suggested that the use of state immunities could affect the
substance of the § 1983 action. 290
Even where the Court has determined that a uniform interpretation of
§ 1983 is required, it has often had difficulty determining what that interpretation should be, particularly where it would lock the cause of action into
an 1871 model. In construing § 1983, the Court has generally begun with
the language of the statute, but has rarely stopped there. When a provision

286. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981). Accord Delaware State College v. Ricks,
449 U.S. 250 (1980).
287. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
288. See supra notes 191-212 and accompanying text.
289. The Court has been similarly reluctant to burden federal officials with strict liability
and has applied the same objective good-faith immunity standard in § 1983 and Bivens actions.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980) (denying municipalities a good-faith immunity in § 1983 actions).
290. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 n.8 (1980) ("Conduct by persons acting
under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... cannot be immunized
by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense
to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the
supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced.")
(quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
917 (1974)). The Court's concern about permitting states to encroach on the scope of the § 1983
cause of action by immunizing conduct that would otherwise give rise to liability does not apply
to the use of narrower state immunities to broaden the liability of state and local officials. In
fact, the Court has suggested that expanded § 1983 liability could be imposed through § 1988.
See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 704 n.17 (1973). See infra notes 357-62 and
accompanying text.
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is not vague, the Court has occasionally relied on its plain meaning to
provide an expansive interpretation of the scope of the action. 29' In other
cases, the Court has been reluctant to give the broad general language its
full meaning, at least where it qualifies policies generally applicable in federal
courts. Thus, the Court was unwilling to interpret § 1983 literally to impose
liability on "every person" who violates another's constitutional rights. 292
When a phrase is vague or the contours of a doctrine are unclear, the
Court has looked to the legislative history and purposes of § 1983 but has
not always been consistent in identifying what it was seeking. In some cases,
the Court has searched for specific evidence that members of the 42d Congress intended a particular result. In other cases, the Court has looked to
the broad purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and construed § 1983
despite the absence of guidance in its language or evidence that the issue
was addressed in the debates. For example, in the immunity cases the Court
looked for specific evidence of congressional intent to create liability when
the immunity in question was well established in 1871.293 On the other hand,
when an immunity did not exist or was not well established, the Court has
been willing to construe the statute literally and deny the immunity despite
the absence of guidance in the legislative history. 294 This approach, however,
has not been consistently followed in other areas. For example, despite the
absence of guidance in the language or legislative history on the duty to
exhaust administrative remedies, the Court has relied on the broad tenor of
the legislative debates to conclude that § 1983 provides litigants direct access
"
to a judicial forum without exhausting administrative remedies. 95
In looking to the legal background against which the Civil Rights Act of
1871 was enacted, the Court has often focused on the state of the law in
1871.296 This has invariably involved reviewing case law because official
immunities were rarely codified, but the Court has never suggested that it
would not consider state statutes that abolished or modified traditional
immunities, and has looked to state positive law in determining whether an
29 7
immunity was well established.
291. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (interpreting "and laws" to reach all federal
statutes). Nonetheless, the Court has implied limitations on the reach of § 1983 as a remedy
for federal statutory violations. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1 (1981).
292. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 491-504. Virtually any phrase can be seen as
vague if one looks hard enough. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 13 n.l (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (arguing against a broad interpretation of § 1983 by suggesting that the phrase
"and laws" literally requires that rights be secured by both the Constitution and laws).
293. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (police witnesses immune); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges immune); Tenney v. Brandhove, 311 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators
immune).
294. See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984) (public defenders not immune);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governors not immune); cf. Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 322 (1979) (finding that § 1983 did not override the eleventh amendment because of lack
of clear evidence of congressional intent).
295. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
296. See Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
297. See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 311 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1951) (looking to state constitutions to find legislative immunity well established).
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Although the Court has generally asked whether a particular immunity
was well established in 1871, it has sometimes considered immunities that
appeared later. For example, in Imbler v. Pachtman,298 the Court relied
exclusively on post-1871 state court cases to conclude that prosecutors'
absolute immunity from suit was well established 299 and extended them an
absolute immunity for acts taken as prosecutors. On the other hand, in
considering the immunity of public defenders, the Court observed that no
such office existed in 1871 and refused to provide them an absolute immunity.3 0
The role of policy in the immunity cases has also been confusing. In
developing official immunities for § 1983 cases, the Court has reviewed
considerations of public policy and has suggested it would reject an immunity
not supported by policy considerations even where the immunity was well
established in 1871.301 The Court, however, has never rejected an immunity
solely on policy grounds, and the policy analysis invariably comports with
the conclusion based on the legislative history. 0 2 Moreover, the Court has
maintained parity with Bivens actions, despite the absence of any historical
or statutory constraints, 3 3 and has relied on § 1983 and Bivens cases interchangeably in determining which public officials are immune and in defining
the immunity. 304 Thus, although the year 1871 remains a touchstone in
addressing immunities in § 1983 cases, the Court has retained the flexibility
to avoid locking itself into the policies followed in 1871.
The Court's unwillingness to adopt a methodology that too tightly ties
§ 1983 to the state of the law in 1871 is most apparent in the treatment of
damages. Although § 1983's language and legislative history provide little
guidance as to the available damages, the Court has tied the availability of
damages to the principles of compensation and has allowed for the evolving
3 5
nature of the law by not limiting damages to those available in 1871. 0

298. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
299. Id. at 421-24 & n.19.
300. Tower v. Glover, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984).
301. Cf. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-71 (1981) (reviewing
considerations of public policy to determine whether municipalities should be subject to § 1983
liability for punitive damages despite settled immunity in 1871).
302. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 375 (1983) (police witnesses absolutely immune
from § 1983 claims for perjured testimony); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247 (1981) (cities immune from § 1983 claims for punitive damages). But see Tower v. Glover,
104 S. Ct. 2820, 2826 (1984) (claiming no power to give public defenders an absolute immunity
based on sound public policy).
303. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) (finding it would be "untenable to
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials").
304. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 nn.15-16, 815-19 (1982).

305. Section 1983 authorizes an "action at law" and, in responding to a question of how
to measure damages for the presumed neglect that gives rise to an action under § 6 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1986), Representative Poland stated:
"Precisely the same as you do in a tort action. The question of damages is a question in the
sound discretion of the jury." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871).
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In Carey v. Piphus, 6 the leading § 1983 damage decision, the Court
refused to award substantial damages for a procedural due process violation
without actual proof of damages. The Court ruled that the plaintiff, an
Illinois high school student challenging a procedurally defective suspension,
could not recover unless he could show he would not have been suspended
after a hearing or that he had suffered a mental or emotional injury; 3°7 such
damages, however, would not be presumed, although the Court left open
whether damages for the violation of a substantive constitutional right could
3 0°
be awarded where the underlying violation was not procedural.
In addressing these issues under the principles of compensation, the Court
identified the source of the principles in the policies followed by the common
law. The Court, however, did not look to the Illinois common or statutory
law of damages, nor did it look to the damages generally available at common
law in 1871. Rather, it identified an evolving body of common law that
courts must adapt to provide fair compensation for injuries caused by deprivations of constitutional rights. 309
In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,310 the Court held that a
municipality may not be held liable for punitive damages under § 1983. In
addressing the availability of this element of damages, the Court cited Carey
only in passing"' and relied on the methodology of the immunity cases.
Because the immunity of municipal corporations for punitive damages was
settled in 1871, such damages were not available in § 1983 actions absent
evidence that the 42d Congress intended to override the immunity. The Court
also considered whether the immunity was good public policy and concluded
it was. 312 Thus, although Fact Concerts involved an element of damages, the
Court treated the case as an immunity case and never considered whether
3a
evolving principles of compensation justified a different result.
The Court's most recent § 1983 damage case, Smith v. Wade,31 4 involved
the standards that govern awards of punitive damages. Carey had suggested

306. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
307. Id. at 263-64.
308. Id. at 264-65.
309. Id. at 257-59. In emphasizing that the process is one of adapting not borrowing common
law damage rules, Justice Powell noted that: "The purpose of § 1983 would be defeated if
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights went uncompensated simply because
the common law does not recognize an analogous cause of action." Id. at 258. For direct
support for this proposition, Justice Powell cited Justice White's dissent in Jones v. Hildebrant,
432 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1977).
310. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
311. Id. at 268.
312. Id. at 266-71.
313. Id. at 260 & n.21. The Court's only references to the current state of the law were
made in passing in the course of reviewing the state of the common law in 1871, and the Court
noted that "[j]udicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a municipality has
persisted to the present day in the vast majority of jurisdictions." Id. at 260. Given this finding
and the absence of statutes authorizing punitive damages against municipalities, there was no
need for the Court to review in depth the current state of the law.
314. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
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that punitive damages were available in § 1983 actions," 5 and Fact Concerts'
immunization of municipalities did not undercut that. Still, it was unclear
as to the applicable standards and role, if any, of state law. In upholding
the use of a "recklessness" standard for punitive damages in § 1983 cases,
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, looked to state law in 1871 and
found that the majority of states did not limit punitive damages to cases of
intentional misconduct.3 16 Justice Brennan, however, also relied on post-1871
cases, and defended this reliance by suggesting that the 42d Congress intended
31 7
to permit the availability of damages to change as the law evolved.
Despite the Court's willingness to approach damage issues in light of
evolving principles of compensation, the policies followed in 1871 have
special significance. When it was well established in 1871 that a specific
element of damages was unavailable, those damages are unavailable in
§ 1983 actions unless the law has evolved or considerations of public policy
dictate otherwise. Moreover, a curious feature about the § 1983 damage
cases is the almost total disregard of § 1988, which the Court had once
suggested required damages in civil rights litigation to be based on the state
or federal damage policies that best serve the purposes of the federal statutes.318 Carey, Fact Concerts and Wade, however, all stand for the propo-

sition that issues of the available damages in § 1983 litigation will be based
on uniform federal standards.
In construing § 1983, which was enacted by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871, the Court has also been willing to seek guidance from debates on
other sections of the Act. For example, the Court has looked to the debate
315. Carey, 435 U.S. at 257 n.11.
316. Wade, 461 U.S. at 41.
317. In responding to Justice Rehnquist's dissent criticizing his reliance on modern tort
decisions, Justice Brennan questioned the premise that "Congress necessarily intended to freeze
into permanent law whatever principles were current in 1871, rather than to incorporate applicable general legal principles as they evolve." Wade, 461 U.S. at 34 n.2.
In a separate dissent, Justice O'Connor was also willing to look to policy considerations
where there was no clear guidance from the common law of 1871. After observing that both
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist "display admirable skills in legal research and analysis of great
numbers of musty cases," id. at 92, she stated that "Itihe battle of the string citations can
have no winner." Id. at 93. She then argued that where there is a "significant split in authority"
courts should look to the policies underlying § 1983 to determine which rule best accords with
those policies. Id. at 92-93.
318. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969), the Court, relying on
§ 1983, stated that:
Compensatory damages for deprivation of a federal right are governed by federal
standards ....

This means, as we read § 1988, that both federal and state rules on damages
may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes.
Cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 [5th Cir. 1961]. The rule of damages, whether
drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever
a federal right is impaired.
Although it is not clear whether the Court was referring to the policies of the forum state
or to general state principles of compensation, the former is a more likely explanation given
the reliance on Brazier which involved borrowing the policies of the forum state. See infra
notes 395-405 and accompanying text.
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on the Sherman Amendment to support a construction of § 1983 as not
31 9
imposing vicarious liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
320
It has also looked to § 6 of the Act,
which was the compromise that
resulted from the controversy over the Sherman Amendment, for support
for the principles of compensation it found equally applicable to § 1983.321
Similarly, in concluding that police witnesses had an immunity under § 1983
for testimony given in trials, the Court considered the debates of the 42d Congress on the conspiracy and criminal actions created by § 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.322
What is present in varying degrees in all these areas is the Court's reliance
on traditional tools of statutory construction-the language, legislative history and purposes of the statute in question-to give meaning to the statute.
Even where neither the language nor the legislative history of § 1983 addressed specific issues, the Court has not hesitated to search for a uniform
federal definition of elements of the § 1983 cause of action, and state law
has played only a limited role. Although the Court rejected early the ar323
gument that only federal law could limit federally created § 1983 actions,
there is no support in the language or legislative history of § 1983 that
Congress prohibited the Court from using the full range of statutory construction tools to resolve issues not specifically addressed in the language or
legislative history of § 1983.

B. Section 1988-The Civil Rights Choice
of Law Statute and Wrongful Death Actions
Section 1988 of Title 42, which is derived from § 3 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866,324 requires federal courts entertaining certain civil rights actions

319. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-95 (1978).
320. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982).
321. Carey, 435 U.S. at 255-56 & n.10.

322. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336-41 (1983). The Briscoe Court also acknowledged
that § I had its roots in the criminal provisions of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but
found no guidance in the earlier Act on the issue of the immunity of police-witnesses in civil
suits. Id. at 341 n.26.
323. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914).
324. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27. Section 3 included the following provision:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters hereby conferred on the district and
circuit courts of the United States shall be exercised and enforced in conformity
with the law of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the
same into effect; but in all cases where such laws are not adapted to the object,
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offences against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of the cause, civil
or criminal, is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern said courts in the
trial and disposition of such cause, and, if of a criminal nature, in the infliction
of punishment on the party found guilty.
This language is virtually identical to what is now in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, see infra note 330,
with the significant exception that § 3 only applied to actions created by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.
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to look to state law to fill gaps in federal law. This provision was incorporated
by reference into § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871325 and was made
generally applicable to civil rights actions in the 1874 codification of the
revised statutes. 326 The argument has been made that § 1988 does not apply
to original actions filed in federal court, but applies only to state court
actions removed to federal court.3 27 But the Court has continued to rely on
§ 1988 to restrict the power of federal courts to develop a uniform federal
common law where the civil rights acts are silent. 32 The Court has also
rejected a construction of § 1988 that would permit federal courts to select
the procedures that enabled plaintiffs to prevail, 32 9 but § 1988 has had only
a minor impact on, § 1983. For the most part, the issues on which state
policies have been borrowed would have also resulted in borrowing absent
§ 1988, and the Court has developed uniform national policies on many
elements of § 1983 despite the minimal guidance available from its language
and legislative history.
Section 1988 is relevant to the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy
in three ways. First, § 1988 might be expected to provide guidance on how
federal courts should approach the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy
and on whether they may look to the federal common law if they determine
that no answers are provided by § 1983's language and legislative history.
Second, in cases in which neither § 1983 nor the federal common law provides
an applicable policy, § 1988 could be the vehicle for engrafting appropriate
state wrongful death policies into § 1983. Third, if § 1988 requires the
incorporation of state wrongful death policies into § 1983, including damage
and other limitations on the cause of action, it also provides explicit authority
for scrutinizing borrowed state policies in light of the purposes of § 1983.
1. Section 1988-The Deficiency Clause and the Use of State Law
What is most noteworthy about § 1988's deficiency clause is the limited
attention it has received from the Supreme Court. The clause requires courts
hearing civil rights actions to follow "the laws of the United States" except

325. The concluding clause of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provided as follows:
such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the
United States, with and subject of the same rights to appeal, review upon error,
and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of
the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six [Civil Rights Act of
1866] ... and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their
nature applicable in such cases.
17 Stat. 13 (1871). The only section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that dealt with procedural
and remedial matters was § 3.
326. U.S. REv. STAT. § 722, 18 Stat. 137 (1874).
327. See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 525-41.
328. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S.
650 (1983); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
329. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
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"where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law."
Where federal law is "deficient," courts are required to follow the "common
law, as modified and changed" by the law of the state in which the court
is sitting.330
This clause constitutes the linchpin of § 1988 and should govern the
threshold determination whether a court initially looks to state law or follows
federal law. Yet, aside from a cryptic comment in a 1969 decision suggesting
an open-ended process of looking to state and federal law for the most
suitable policy to govern the availability of damages in civil rights actions,33 '
the Court has not construed the deficiency clause in any of the § 1983 and
other civil rights actions in which it relied on § 1988 to require initial resort
to state law. 332 Moreover, the Court has often ignored § 1988 and the
deficiency clause in cases in which it developed uniform federal policies to
govern various elements of § 1983 despite the absence of specific guidance
in the language and legislative history of § 1983.
The failure of the Court to construe the deficiency clause may have resulted
from the fact that despite the volume of § 1983 litigation there have been
few close questions concerning whether federal courts should initially look
to the state law. Moreover, because the Court has been willing to construe
even vague provisions of § 1983 based on its broad purposes, it has rarely
had to look to the deficiency clause for guidance.
In approaching § 1988, the Court has never made clear whether a court
making a deficiency finding should consider the federal common law. Professor Eisenberg has argued against such an interpretation in attempting to
demonstrate the incoherence of § 1988 and its inapplicability to § 1983 and
other actions filed under the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. 333 In

330. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), absent the provision governing attorney fees, is
as follows:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity
with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the
same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts
in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
331. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Valley, 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969); see supra note 318.
332. In Robertson, the Court looked to state law for the applicable survival policy after
observing that federal law does not cover every issue, but did not address why federal law,
including the federal common law, did not cover the survival issue. 436 U.S. at 588. See also
Kreimer, supra note 268, at 612 n.51 (identifying different Supreme Court formulations of the
approach to § 1988).
333. Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 513.
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addition to a textual argument,334 he has suggested that the federal common

law bears no necessary relevance to § 1983115 and that reliance on it gives
courts the opportunity to manipulate results. 336 Finally, Eisenberg points out

that, absent § 1988, federal courts entertaining § 1983 actions will still be
337
able to look to state law for guidance.

An interpretation of § 1988 that considers the federal common law before
making a deficiency finding is also subject to the criticism that it deprives
§ 1988 of independent meaning by making it applicable to § 1983 and other
civil rights actions only where no other sources of federal law-the statute,
legislative history, statutory purposes, and federal common law-provide an
answer. 331 In such cases, however, state law would be relied upon anyway,
and the deficiency clause would somewhat lamely only require the use of
state law where state law is otherwise applicable.
In applying the federal common law, however, courts do not proceed
independently of the underlying federal statutory or constitutional provisions
they are enforcing.33 9 In fact, in many ways the federal common law represents a set of guidelines for construing federal statutes that have gaps, but
the reference point is still the federal statute at issue. Thus, federal courts

334. Professor Eisenberg's textual argument contrasts the unmodified phrase "laws of the
United States" in the introductory language of § 1988 with the phrase "common law," which
defines the law relied upon where there is a deficiency. He then discounts the possibility that
Congress had two different kinds of common law in mind and concludes that the former refers
only to "federal statutory law." Id. at 515. However, given the lack of clarity in the drafting
of § 1988, which Eisenberg has noted, id. at 501, Congress may have expected federal courts
entertaining actions to which § 1988 applied to look to the federal common law before borrowing
state law. See generally Theis, supra note 268. Although under the regime of Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the phrase "laws" was read narrowly, in this era federal courts
also had broad authority over the federal common law. Moreover, in areas of special federal
concern, federal courts still rely on the federal common law. See Friendly, In Praiseof ErieAnd of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 383 (1964).
335. Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 513. Eisenberg makes the same observation about other
federal statutes in arguing that the reference to "law" in the deficiency clause should not be
construed to permit federal courts to borrow the approaches followed in other statutory actions.
Id. at 509. Cf. Comment, supra note 279, at 499-500 (arguing that courts should not rigidly
rely on the federal common law in construing § 1988).
336. See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 518. Eisenberg has suggested that instead of relying
on the federal common law courts should "fill out the federal civil rights program by the same
techniques used to fill out other federal programs," whether the policies are derived from state
or federal law. Id. at 543. It is difficult to see how this approach will be any less subject to
manipulation than one that relies on the federal common law.
337. See id. at 543.
338. As Professor Eisenberg notes, if one is willing to press hard enough, a federal rule can
always be found and federal law will never be deficient. Id. at 514. Cf. Dobson v. Camden,
705 F.2d 759 (1983) (applying § 1988 to find federal law deficient on the impact of a settlement
on an award against a co-defendant, but creating a federal rule after rejecting the state policy
under the inconsistency clause), vacated, 725 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
339. Professor Kreimer makes a similar point in also urging courts to develop a federal
common law of civil rights actions. See Kreimer, supra note 268, at 628-30. He believes,
however, that courts should not consider the federal common law in making the deficiency
finding, but should interpret the "common law" looked to after federal statutory law is found
deficient to include the federal common law. Id. at 618-19 & n.86. This is theissue left open
in Robertson, 436 U.S. at 589-90 n.5.
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applying a federal common law of survival to statutory actions may reach
different conclusions based on the character of the causes of action and the
relief sought, but such an approach is closely tied to the underlying statute.-4
Moreover, given the Court's awareness of the concerns of the 42d Congress
and the need to engage in a parallel analysis in Bivens actions, courts should
be permitted to fill gaps in § 1983 through the use of a common law of
§ 1983 that seeks to effectuate its dual purposes of compensation and
deterrence.
In addition, even if the deficiency clause has no independent force in
expanding the issues on which state law is initially looked to, § 1988 taken
as a whole still establishes the framework for determining which state policies
to borrow and when they should be rejected. Finally, in light of the remedial
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 34' § I of which contained a reference
to the predecessor to § 1988,342 it would be inappropriate to construe § 1988
to preclude federal courts from engaging in the lawmaking that is incidental
to adjudicating cases. Whether this is characterized as developing the federal
common law or, more narrowly, the common law of § 1983, it can be
reduced to a question of statutory construction. In fact, in approaching §
1983, the Court has been reluctant to characterize its actions in terms of
the federal common law and has subsumed under the rubric of statutory
construction decisions that in other areas have been treated as being governed
by the federal common law. Thus, questions of the scope and definition of
official immunities and the damages available in federal court litigation are
often viewed as matters of federal common law in Bivens actions, but in §
1983 litigation, these issues are approached as matters of statutory construction.343
Nonetheless, the question remains as to what impact, if any, § 1988 has
on limiting the ability of federal courts to develop a federal common law
of § 1983. This can be addressed less abstractly by asking how decisions in
which § 1988 was relied upon would have been resolved in its absence.
Clearly when § 1983 itself-through its language, legislative history, and
purposes-requires a particular remedial policy, federal law is not deficient
and § 1988 does not alter the outcome. Likewise, if, absent § 1988, federal
courts would look to state law, § 1988 is not relevant to the initial issue of
whether state law should be borrowed. The difficult question, however, is
whether § 1988 precludes or limits the power of courts to look to the federal

340. See supra notes 230-61 and accompanying text.
341. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 68 (Rep. Shellabarger) ("This act is remedial,
and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional
provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficiently construed. It would be most
strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of interpretation.").
342. See supra note 325.
343. In fashioning immunities in Bivens actions, the Court has maintained parity with §
1983, despite the absence of any statutory requirement to do so. See supra notes 303-04 and
accompanying text.
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common law to resolve issues not addressed by the language, legislative
history, or purposes of § 1983.
The statute of limitations cases would probably be resolved similarly absent
§ 1988, as the Court required the use of state law in § 1983 actions more
than seventy years ago without even considering § 1988.1 44 The survival issue,
however, is more complex. Under an approach based on federal common
law, federal courts permit nonpenal federal actions to survive despite the
absence of relevant statutory provisions or legislative history. 345 This suggests
that § 1983 actions should survive,4 but the Court in Robertson v. Wegmann3 47
treated federal law as being deficient and borrowed a state no-survival policy.
The Robertson Court, however, did not seek an answer to the survival issue
in either § 1983 or in the federal common law. This failure to consider
whether federal common law permitted the action to survive could mean the
Court believed the action would have abated under federal common law, or
that the survival of the action under federal common law was not relevant
as § 1988 precluded resort to federal common law. In any case, the parties
did not argue that federal common law applied, and the Court did not
address it independently. 48 Thus, Robertson does not provide a clear answer
as to whether § 1988 denies or limits the power of federal courts hearing
§ 1983 actions to exercise their normal discretion to fill the interstices of federal
statutes with federal common law.
The confusion in the Court's approach to the § 1988 borrowing issue is
also seen in the damage cases. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,349 a
§ 1982 case arising in state court, Justice Douglas found § 1988 applicable
and suggested a construction that would have permitted courts entertaining
civil rights actions to look to state and federal law for the most suitable
damage policy. Such a construction, however, alters the nature of the § 1988
inquiry and permits courts to reject otherwise applicable federal policies.
Moreover, although it is not free from doubt, Sullivan appears to require
courts to look to the law of the forum state in developing the policy that
then becomes the federal policy.3 50 This open-ended approach to § 1988,

344. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914). But see Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S.
650 (1983) (using § 1988 to borrow a state policy of reviving statutes tolled because of pending
class actions despite an available federal policy).
345. See supra notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
346. In refusing to make applicable to § 1983 a federal statute of limitations based on the
limitations period for penalties and forfeitures, the Court concluded that § 1983 was not a

penal statute. See O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 324-25 (1914).
347. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).

348.
349.
350.
(1985)

See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text.
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
See supra note 318. But see 2 J. CooK & J. SoBEsKI, CIVIL Rio=rs AcTIONs, 4.06
(arguing that Sullivan presages Carey and requires courts to look to the state common

law, not the law of the forum state, in developing the applicable federal policy). Sullivan can

also be viewed as a case in which the Court used § 1988 to borrow a state damage cause of
action to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982). Section 1982 prohibits private discrimination in matters
affecting property but contains no express remedies, and the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
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however, has not been followed, and the Court has 5all but ignored § 1988
and the law of the forum state in its damage cases.1 '
There often have been sharp divisions within the Court on particular
constructions of § 1983, but the threshold decision of whether uniform
interpretations should be sought has rarely resulted in major disagreements.
Although not framed in these terms, the Court has generally developed
uniform federal policies on issues that go to the substance of the § 1983
cause of action and that affect the underlying conduct § 1983 was intended
to control; but where the policy at issue does not affect this primary conduct,
the Court has permitted initial resort to state law. Thus, issues involving
the application of official immunities or the elements of damages influence
primary conduct, and the Court has consistently applied federal definitions.
On the other hand, statutes of limitations and survival policies generally
have little effect on the underlying conduct, and initial resort to state law
is acceptable, especially given the Court's treatment of the choice of the
most analogous state policy as a federal issue and the availability of the
inconsistency clause to reject borrowed state policies that are inconsistent
with § 1983's purposes.
The failure of the Court to provide adequate guidance when federal law
is deficient leaves unclear the proper approach to § 1983 wrongful death
claims. Lower federal courts, however, influenced by the Court's treatment
of the closely related surivial issue, 352 have generally looked to state law for
the applicable policies.3 5 3 Thus, the Court's failure to articulate the standards
it has been following to determine whether federal law is deficient has led
lower courts to take the path of least resistance and borrow state wrongful
death policies rather than to look closely at the language, legislative history,
and purposes of § 1983 to see if § 1983 independently or through the federal
common law constitutes a wrongful death remedy.
2.

Section 1988-The Incorporation of State Wrongful Death Actions

Where federal law is deficient on a particular issue, § 1988 requires federal
courts to adopt the most analogous state policy. Often this involves difficult
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414 n.14 (1968), left open whether damages were available. Although the
Sullivan Court's reliance on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1947), and other cases dealing with
implied federal remedies suggests that authority for a damage action came as a direct implication
from the federal statute and not from the law of the forum state, the Court relied upon § 1988 to
support using state damage policies. Nonetheless, § 1988 did not play a central part in the
case. The petitioner's brief primarily addressed the nature of the substantive violation, and
only briefly discussed the damages available in § 1982 actions. Petitioner's Brief at 50-54. Although
the Court cited § 1988 in its brief discussion of damages, see supra note 318, this was apparently
the result of the petitioner's having requested the Court to provide guidance on the measurement
of the available damages.
351. See supra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
352. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); see also Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973) (dictum).
353. See infra notes 391-433 & 479-90 and accompanying text.
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questions as to which competing state policy to use, but the choice of a
particular policy is a federal issue. 31 4 Competing policies are less likely to
exist, however, with respect to state wrongful death remedies,355 but there
still may be limitations on the extent to which courts may use § 1988 to
incorporate state wrongful death policies into § 1983. Moreover, even if
§ 1988 can be used to engraft state wrongful death policies that authorize the
cause of action, it is unclear whether state damage limitations
accompany
36
the wrongful death cause of action and must also be used. 1
The Supreme Court has construed § 1988 as not permitting the incorporation of new and independent state causes of action. In Moor v. County
of Alameda,357 the plaintiffs, who sought damages based on allegations of
the improper use of force by county law enforcement officials, argued that

§ 1988 permitteftfie use of state law to impose vicarious liability on the county.
At the time this case arose, counties had an absolute immunity from § 1983
definition of "person. ' 358

liability by virtue of their not being within § 1983's
Nonetheless, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court found a more basic
reason to dismiss the vicarious liability claim. Even assuming a deficiency
in federal law, § 1988 did not permit federal courts to borrow entire causes
of action from state law. Section 1988 did not authorize an independent
cause of action but only addressed the choice of remedies to be applied in
actions arising under the civil rights acts. 319 In so holding, however, the
Court distinguished, but did not disapprove, two courts of appeals decisions
that used § 1988 to borrow state law and to impose vicarious liability on
supervisory law enforcement officials in § 1983 damage cases. 360 These cases

354. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984). But see Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938
(1985) (characterizing § 1983 actions as "personal actions" and requiring the use of the state
limitations period for such actions).
355. But cf. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpreting
ambiguous state law to conclude that father's wrongful death claim for the killing of his adult
son survived the father's death and could be brought by his estate); Blake v. Kattar, 693 F.2d
677 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting ambiguous state law to conclude that § 1983 damage action
for wrongful killing was not personal and, thus, survived).
356. But see Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 7, 550 P.2d 339, 344 (1976) (finding state
damage limitations to be an integral part of § 1983 wrongful death actions), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 183 (1977); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592
(1959) (requiring admiralty courts that adopt a state cause of action to "take the right subject
to the limitations which have been made a part of its existence").
357. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
358. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). But see Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe and holding that municipalities were "persons" within
§ 1983). The Court in Moor also questioned the use of pendent party jurisdiction and noted
the lack of independent jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims against counties. Moor
v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710-17 (1973).
359. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703-04 (1973) ("Properly viewed . . .
§ 1988 instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in causes of action arising under federal
civil rights acts. But we do not believe that the section, without more, was meant to authorize
the wholesale importation into federal law of state causes of action-not even one purportedly
designed for the protection of federal civil rights.").
360. Id. at 704 n.17 (citing Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1971); Lewis
v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir. 1955)); see Schnapper, supra note 268, at 265-66.
But see Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979) (on rehearing rejecting use of state
law on respondeat superior to broaden § 1983 liability).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:559

were distinguishable because § 1983 actions were independently available
against the individual defendants; thus, the vicarious liability claims were
36
not based on § 1988 alone. Although this distinction is not altogether clear, '
the Court seems to have suggested that if a particular defendant is independently amenable to suit under § 1983, § 1988 can be used-state law
3 62
permitting-to expand the scope of liability.
363
In Runyon v. McCrary, the plaintiff relied on § 1988 to seek attorney
fees on a private attorney general theory, but the Court further limited the
availability of § 1988 to authorize new remedies. 3 64 Although state law did
not authorize fees, the plaintiff argued that § 1988 independently provided
the necessary authority. The Court, however, refused to allow this use of §
1988 as it would incorporate a new and independent remedy 365 as well as
conflict with the prevailing policy preventing federal courts from awarding
366
fees absent specific statutory authority.
The application of these principles to wrongful death claims is a close

question. Traditionally, wrongful death claims were not available at common
law, which did not recognize an actionable interest of survivors in their
continued relationship with a decedent. This was changed in this country by

361. Although § 1983 was not available against the county in Moor, a claim for § 1983
liability against individual defendants based on vicarious liability might also be barred under
§ 1983's rejection of liability based on respondeat superior. Cf. Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (prohibiting the use of respondeat superior to impose liability on
municipalities under § 1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (prohibiting use of respondeat
superior to subject individual supervisors to claims for injunctive relief under § 1983). In City
of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (1985), Justice Stevens criticized Monell
and argued in dissent that § 1983 should be construed to impose liability on municipalities
based on respondeat superior. In proposing this uniform interpretation of § 1983, Justice
Stevens did not address whether § 1988 could be used to expand municipal liability in states
which authorized vicarious liability under state law.
362. Even if § 1988 incorporated a new cause of action based on the state law of vicarious
liability, Moor precluded this expansion of liability under the inconsistency clause, since the
borrowed state law directly conflicted with § 1983's interpretation of "person" to exclude
municipalities. 411 U.S. at 706-10. Thus, § 1988 may be available to broaden § 1983 liability
of those already amenable to suit as long as the expansion of liability is not specifically barred
by § 1983. There is, however, no federal policy prohibiting the use of § 1983 as a wrongful
death remedy, and nothing in its legislative history suggests that such a use would be inconsistent
with its purposes. See infra notes 496-546 and accompanying text. Thus, even if Monell bars
the borrowing of state law through § 1988 to impose vicarious liability in § 1983 actions against
municipalities and supervisory officials, as seems likely, the use of § 1988 to borrow state
wrongful death remedies may still be appropriate.
363. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
364. Id. at 182-86.
365. This issue might have been resolved differently had state law authorized attorney fees.
In such a case, § 1988 would only be using state law to expand the relief that could be awarded
against defendants otherwise amenable to suit. See supra note 347. The presence of state
authority to award fees should also overcome the Court's independent holding that an award
of fees would be inconsistent with the lack of inherent power of federal courts to award fees.
Where the borrowing of state law is appropriate, federal courts may rely on state statutes that
authorize fee awards. See Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259
n.31 (1975) (federal courts may apply state attorney fees statutes in diversity cases).
366. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185-86 (1976); see also Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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the adoption of new and independent statutory causes of action patterned
largely after Lord Campbell's Act. The purpose of wrongful death statutes
was to avoid the harshness of the prevailing common law rules against the
survival of actions, but the statutes did not address directly the issue of
whether a decedent's cause of action would survive. Rather, they gave
survivors an actionable interest that they did not have at common law.367
Wrongful death statutes permit survivors to sue when a killing violated
their decedent's rights, but the defendants in such actions are already amenable to survival actions based on the same wrongful acts. Moreover, both
survival and wrongful death actions assert the identical legal rights of the
decedent. Thus, the effect of using state law to incorporate wrongful death
actions into § 1983 is to create new plaintiffs who can seek relief against
defendants already amenable to suit as well as to expand the relief available
against those defendants.
At one time wrongful death claims were viewed as new and independent
actions,3 68 and they must still be distinguished from survival claims to keep69
3
clear the different interests at stake and the different measure of damages.
Nonetheless, the claims are integrally related, and a number of states do
not even maintain independent wrongful death remedies; rather, they simply
permit wrongful death claims to be pursued in enlarged survival actions.3 70
Finally, nothing in § 1983 expressly or by implication precludes wrongful
death claims from being heard through § 1983, and, although it is not free
from doubt, the better view is that courts should be able to use § 1988 to
incorporate state wrongful death actions into § 1983.
Assuming courts may use § 1988 to incorporate state wrongful death and
survival policies into § 1983, there is an independent question of whether
state limitations on damages are also incorporated. These issues will arise
with regard to state ceilings on the amount of damages, state definitions of
the elements of compensatory damages, and state policies on the availability
of punitive damages.
Most state and federal courts that have addressed this issue assumed that
state damage limitations accompany the cause of action and are initially
incorporated into § 1983.1 71 Moreover, the Supreme Court has required the
attributes of the cause of action to accompany the cause of action when
federal admirality courts borrow state causes of action3 72 and has also required state courts entertaining federal causes of action to utilize the entire

367. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
368. But see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
369. See supra notes 34, 43 & 93.
370. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1250-53 (7th Cir. 1984); Jones v.
Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339, 344 (1976), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
432 U.S. 183 (1977).
372. See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
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cause of action. 7 Nonetheless, strong arguments can be made to permit
courts entertaining § 1983 claims to look to state law on the threshold issue
of the availability of the survival or wrongful death action, yet allow those
74
courts to apply federal policies as to the available damages.1
Courts entertaining § 1983 actions that involve wrongful killings have
looked initially to state law for survival and wrongful death policies because
they have implicitly or explicitly concluded that federal law is deficient. The
federal law of damages, however, is not similarly deficient, and courts
entertaining § 1983 actions have developed a full body of § 1983 damage
law.3 75 Moreover, courts borrowing causes of action generated by other
jurisdictions have often been under a special obligation to borrow the entire
cause of action, including its remedial attributes. For example, state courts
376
entertaining federal causes of action are obligated by the supremacy clause

and the interpretation of the federal statute being enforced to borrow the
entire c~use of action and all of its attributes.3

77

Similarly, federal law often

expressly requires federal courts to borrow an entire cause of action from
state law.378 On the other hand, § 1988 has a more limited borrowing
requirement and contemplates the use of state law only where federal law
is deficient.

79

Thus, state and federal courts entertaining § 1983 survival

373. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 238, 245 (1942) (federal burden of
proof on whether a release was executed freely applicable in state courts entertaining a federal
cause of action); Central Vt. Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511-12 (1915) (burden of proof on
contributory negligence in a FELA case governed by federal law in state courts).
374. This approach, if adopted by the Court, could cut both ways. Although in many cases
it would permit federal courts to ignore state damage limitations and award damages otherwise
available under federal law, there will be circumstances in which state law authorizes damages
not available under federal law. In such cases, the separation of the cause of action from its
damage provisions could limit the available elements of damages. Cf. Grandstaff v. City of
Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 173 n.* (5th Cir. 1985) (Garwood, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that
damages for grief over the death of a married adult child, although authorized by state law,
should not be available in § 1983 wrongful death action).
375. See supra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
376. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
377. See, e.g., Steinglass, supra note 17, at 449-51; Hill, Substance and Procedure in State
FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHto ST. L.J. 384 (1956).

378. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982) (incorporating state causes of
action); see also United States v. Haskin, 395 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1968) (requiring use of
complete state wrongful death cause of action including damage limitations).
379. The separation of the cause of action from its damage policies often takes place when
states entertain causes of action created by other states. Although states are obligated by the
full faith and credit clause to entertain other states' wrongful death claims, see Hughes v.
Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), state courts have declined to apply the survival policies of the
states whose law they were borrowing, see Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944
(1953) (classifying survival as "procedural"), and have borrowed state wrongful death actions
without regard to their damage ceilings, see Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (treating damage ceiling in borrowed wrongful death
action as procedural and refusing to apply the ceiling in light of strong New York public policy
against such limitations); see also Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962)
(applying foreign wrongful death action without regard to damage limitations).
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and wrongful death actions should be able to rely on state law to authorize
the action but ignore state limitations on the available damages. 8 0
3.

Section 1988-The Inconsistency Clause

Even when courts look to state law for the appropriate policy, the requirement that state law be used is not absolute. The language of § 1988
qualifies that obligation by requiring the use of state law only "so far as
the same is not inconsistent with the Constititution and laws of the United
States." The inconsistency clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court
to permit courts to reject a borrowed state policy when its application would
either conflict with federal law or be3 8 inconsistent with the purposes of
§ 1983-compensation and deterrence. '
As with the deficiency clause, the interpretation of the inconsistency clause
is far from clear. If an inconsistency arose only when a federal law expressly
or implicitly conflicted with a state policy, the clause would have little
meaning. Federal courts applying § 1988 already follow federal law as a
threshold matter, and a second requirement-after resort to state law-seems
unnecessary.3 82 In addition, the Court hardly needs the inconsistency clause
to justify a refusal to borrow state policies that violate federal law.
When there are direct conflicts between borrowed state law and federal
law, the Court has had little need to construe the inconsistency clause. Thus,
in Moor, the Court relied on the inconsistency clause as an alternative basis
for refusing to permit the state law of vicarious liability to support a § 1983
claim against a municipality that was outside the § 1983 definition of "person. ' 3 3 Similarly, in Runyon, the Court refused to permit § 1988 to authorize
part, because to do so would violate the longan award of attorney fees, 3 in
14
established American rule.
The Court's major interpretation of the inconsistency clause came in
Robertson v. Wegmann. 385 After concluding that federal law was deficient
and that the action would abate under applicable state law, the Court
addressed whether such a result was inconsistent with federal law. In interpreting the inconsistency clause, the Court went beyond the literal language
of the clause and held that the use of state law would be improper when it

380. Even if courts entertaining § 1983 actions were required to adopt state damage limitations
with the borrowed survival or wrongful death claims, § 1988 requires courts to examine state
limitations under the inconsistency clause and reject them if they are inconsistent with § 1983's
purposes. See infra notes 463-90 and accompanying text.
381. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978); seesupra notes 198-205 and accompanying
text.
382. See Eisenberg, supra note 268, at 518-21.
383. 411 U.S. 693, 706-10 (1973).
384. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 185-86 (1976); see also Alyeska Pipeline Servs. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975) (federal courts have no inherent power to award
attorney fees to prevailing parties on a private attorney general theory).
385. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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would be inconsistent with the underlying purposes of § 1983--compensation
and deterrence.
Despite this construction, the Court's application of it was timid, and the
Court concluded that abatement of the action was consistent with compensation and deterrence. The goal of compensation was disposed of almost
summarily. Because the original plaintiff had died, he no longer had an
interest in compensation that justified the survival of his action; his estate's
interest in obtaining compensation was ignored, but the Court observed that
survivors pursuing wrongful death claims based on their own injuries would
have an interest in compensation. The deterrence analysis, however, was
more complex. The Court embraced a theory of marginal deterrence by
reasoning that the purposes of § 1983 would not be undermined if survival
of the action was conditioned on the existence of particular relatives. Since
defendants would rarely be aware of the composition of their victims' families, it was unlikely that their conduct would be influenced by knowledge
that an action would not survive. 386 On the other hand, if state law was hostile
to the survival of personal actions, a different assumption would be warranted. Thus, a state policy that required all personal actions to abate would
be rejected because of its adverse effect on deterrence. Similarly, a state
policy that required actions to abate when death resulted from the complained-of conduct would be inconsistent with the deterrence rationale of
§ 1983.
Issues involving the inconsistency clause have arisen in the Supreme Court
most frequently with respect to state statutes of limitations and related
policies. The Court, however, has never rejected an otherwise applicable
state policy on the basis of its being inconsistent with the purposes of §
1983. For example, when the Court rejected a six-month statute of limitations
borrowed from state employment discrimination administrative procedures,
it did so on the basis of the statute's not being the analogous state policy.
Thus, although the Court suggested that it would reject an unreasonably
short limitations period, it did not have to reach the final step of the
borrowing process to determine whether the policy in question was incon387
sistent with § 1983's purposes.
In Board of Regents v. Tomanio,3"8 however, the Court reached the inconsistency issue after borrowing a state policy under which the statute of
limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a related cause of action.
The plaintiff had split her claims and pursued a state claim in state court
and a § 1983 claim in federal court, but the statute had run when the latter
was filed. In reviewing this policy under the inconsistency clause, the Court

386. Id. at 592-93 n.10.
387. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 n.15 (1984) (citing with approval Campbell
v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615 (1895) (a short statute of limitations might not give plaintiffs
the "reasonable time to sue" to which they are entitled)).
388. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
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disposed of plaintiff's arguments in a single sentence. Neither compensation
nor deterrence were significantly affected because the plaintiff only had to
have commenced her suit within the three-year limitations period to avoid
3 89
the state rule.
Despite the development of a test of inconsistency based on the broad
purposes of § 1983, the Court's approach to these issues has been timid,
and this may have significant implications for the use of § 1983 as a wrongful
death remedy. If the Court holds that § 1983 may be used as a wrongful
death remedy only through the incorporation of state law and that state
damage limitations accompany the action, the validity of these state damage
limitations will become a major remedial issue in § 1983 litigation involving
wrongful killings. Thus, the fact that the Court has never rejected an otherwise applicable state policy as inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983 suggests that the Court may require deference to state policies except in unusual
situations.

IV.

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LOWER FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS IN

§ 1983

WRONGFUL DEATH CASES

The absence of Supreme Court cases directly addressing the availability
of § 1983 as a wrongful death action and the confusion concerning the
proper interpretation of § 1988 have left state and federal courts little
guidance. Nonetheless, since Monroe v. Pape,319 litigants have frequently
relied on § 1983 to pursue wrongful death claims, and courts have generally
been receptive to hearing them. Their approach in these cases, however, has
changed as new issues have arisen in § 1983 litigation involving wrongful
killings.
A.

The First Generation-The Pioneering Cases

Most of the early § 1983 cases involving survival and wrongful death
issues arose in jurisdictions that authorized the actions under state law, and
courts had only to address whether § 1983 could be used to pursue the
claims. Nonetheless, the first reported § 1983 case based on a wrongful
killing dealt with the availability of § 1983 directly under federal law. In
3 9
' the decedent was allegedly killed by a police officer
Davis v. Johnson,
whose gun discharged when he struck the decedent without provocation. The

389. Id. at 574. The Tomanio Court also addressed whether considerations of federalism
and uniformity justified the rejection of a state policy that denied plaintiffs the ability to
present state claims to state courts without foresaking their access to federal forums but upheld
the state tolling policies. In rejecting these arguments, however, the Court left open the possibility
that in some cases considerations of federalism and uniformity might justify the rejection of
a state policy. Id. at 489-92.
390. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
391. 138 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
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suit was brought in federal court by the administratrix of the decedent's
estate. In rejecting the argument that the action did not survive the death,
the court did not distinguish between survival and wrongful death actions
but relied on cases permitting other federal statutory actions to survive under
principles of common law. The court then looked to the "party injured"
language in § 1983 and concluded that the phrase included the administrators
of estates. In so holding, it relied on the broad purposes of § 1983 and the
injustice of giving defendants an incentive to kill rather than merely injure
their victims. 3 92 Thus, the court did not base its decision on state law, 93 but
treated the survival issue as one directly under § 1983 and subject to a
uniform national interpretation.3 94
The first reported case clearly permitting a wrongful death claim under §
1983 was the Fifth Circuit's 1961 decision in Brazier v. Cherry.3 95 The plaintiff
claimed that the death resulted from a brutal racially motivated beating by
police following an illegal arrest. 391 The decedent's widow, suing as his
survivor and as administratrix of his estate, alleged the unconstitutional use
of deadly force. Under Georgia law, claims which the decedent had during
his lifetime survived and widows had the right to recover "the full value of
the life of the decedent ' 3 97 in wrongful death actions. The district court,
however, held that § 1983 damage actions did not survive absent express
legislative authorization. In so holding, the court relied on the express au-

392. Id. at 574. In construing § 1983 broadly, the Davis court relied on Justice Cardozo's
statement on wrongful death statutes in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 350-51
(1937) (citations omitted):
Death statutes have their roots in dissatisfaction with the archaisms of the law
.... It would be a misfortune if a narrow or grudging process of construction
were to exemplify and perpetuate the very evils to be remedied. There are times
when uncertain words are to be wrought into consistency and unity with a legislative policy which is itself a source of law, a new generative impluse transmitted
to the legal system. "The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of
the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will
should be recognized and obeyed." Its intimation is clear enough in the statutes
now before us that their effects shall not be stifled, without the warrant of clear
necessity, by the perpetuation of a policy which now has had its day.
393. Although the Davis court cited § 1988 and the Illinois wrongful death statute, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1955), it did so in the course of discussing the policy of § 1988 "that
'suitable remedies' shall be extended for the 'protection of all persons in the United States in
their civil rights, and for their vindication,' " 138 F. Supp. at 574, and never indicated whether
the plaintiff's action survived under state law. In fact, under prevailing Illinois law the action
would not have survived because the death was instantaneous. See Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill.
2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
394. See also Nelson v. Knox, 230 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1956) (relying on federal common law
to permit § 1983 action to survive plaintiff's unrelated death). But see Pritchard v. Smith, 289
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961) (applying Arkansas law to permit an action based on an illegal arrest
and beating to survive despite the death of the defendant police chief).
395. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'g 188 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. Ga. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 921 (1961).
396. A fuller account of this incident, which was the subject of an investigation by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, is contained at 5 U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTs
REPORT, JUSTICE

397. See

9-12 (1961).

GA. CODE

§ 105-1302 (Supp. 1958), quoted in Brazier, 293 F.2d at 407.
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thority for claims by survivors in 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which also originated
in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 , 3 8 and on the inference that Congress would
have been explicit had it intended § 1983 claims to survive or to be available
to survivors?9
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that § 1983 itself should be construed to
authorize a wrongful death action. The Fifth Circuit did not reach this
issue, however, but held that § 1983 was available as a wrongful death
remedy in Georgia by relying on the authority of courts under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 to borrow state-created actions.
In concluding that the decedent's widow could bring a wrongful death
claim under § 1983,401 Judge John R. Brown, one of the leading forces in
the Fifth Circuit's efforts to end segregation in the South, 402 considered the
legislative history and purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. He looked
to the circumstances of the Act's passage and concluded, as had the court
in Davis, that it would be anomalous to allow a civil rights damage action
40 3
where a victim was injured but not killed. He then considered § 1988404
and read it broadly to permit federal courts to use state law when federal
remedies are not suitable. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Brown rejected
the argument that § 1988 was only "procedural" and thus did not permit
40
the incorporation of new and independent substantive remedies. 1

398. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 is the current version of § 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat.
13, the compromise that resulted from Senator Sherman's unsuccessful effort to impose broad
liability on counties for failing to prevent private conspiracies to violate federal rights. See
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978) (discussing the legislative
history of the Sherman Amendment).
399. Brazier, 188 F. Supp. at 820-21. But see infra notes 538-45 and accompanying text.
400. In arguing that § 1983 provided a cause of action for damages for a "party injured"
by the wrongful killing of a husband, appellant's lawyers, who included Jack Greenberg and
Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., argued that such
a construction was consistent with the legislative history of the Act and the requirement that
it be liberally construed:
To recognize that the taking of life in violation of §§ 1983 and 1985 gives rise
to a cause of action for wrongful death to the widow who was so injured is
entirely consonant with the major legislative purpose of these statutes. The Civil
Rights Act of 1871 was, as is well known, a broad remedial statute designed to
protect a helpless minority against the very type of act perpetrated in this case.
Indeed, Representative Shellabarger stated that the act is remedial and therefore
must be construed liberally.
Appellant's Brief at 10, Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921
(1961).
401. The plaintiff also argued that federal law independently required the decedent's § 1983
action to survive his death, but the Fifth Circuit held that the action survived on the basis of
borrowed state law.
402. See J. BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).

403. Brazier, 293 F.2d at 404. See infra text accompanying note 528 for quotation from
holding.
404. At the time Brazier was decided, the Supreme Court had not construed § 1988 in a
civil action. But see United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 416 (1920) (construing § 1988
in a case involving the power of grand juries to indict after initial refusals).
405. In reaching the conclusion that § 1988 incorporated substantive aspects of state law,
Judge Brown relied on the Conformity Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 196, 197, which required
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Brazier's conclusion and methodology were widely followed by federal
courts,0 and on several occasions the Supreme Court cited Brazier approvingly. 407 The limitations of Brazier, however, gradually became apparent as

cases arose in states that did not have broad survival or wrongful death
statutes. 408 By tying the availability of § 1983 survival and wrongful death
claims to their availability under state law and by addressing the legislative
history of § 1983 only to show that Congress permitted the use of § 1983
in cases involving wrongful killings, Brazier provided little guidance on

whether courts were required to hear § 1983 wrongful death claims where
4
state law did not allow them. 0

B.

9

The Second Generation-Constitutionalizingthe Issue

The second generation of wrongful death cases illustrates the limitations
of Brazier. These cases arose in jurisdictions that recognized wrongful death
actions, but the cases involved claims on behalf of family members who
were not statutory beneficiaries or for relief that was not available under
state law. Because Brazier addressed the availability of § 1983 wrongful
death actions only when state law authorized them, litigants in states that
did not recognize their claims attempted to constitutionalize the issue.

Plaintiffs who were unable to convince courts that § 1983, standing alone
or in conjunction with state law, constituted a wrongful death remedy in

the "practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding" in federal courts to "conform,
as near as may be, to the practice ... existing at the time" in the state courts, and argued that
limiting § 1988 to the incorporation of state "procedural mechanisms" would have made it
superfluous. 293 F.2d at 408 n.18. The Conformity Act of 1872 was passed after the adoption
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which had incorporated the predecessor to § 1988 and made
it applicable to actions created by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See supra note 325.
Because the Conformity Act rejected the "static conformity" that had locked most federal
courts into following state practices established in 1789 or 1828, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 399-402 (4th ed. 1983), § 1988 and its assumption of "dynamic conformity"
can be viewed as a predecessor of the Conformity Act of 1872. See Kreimer, supra note 268,
at 628 n. 18. Thus, § 1988 was not superfluous when it was passed. Nonetheless, the fact that
both statutes were included in the 1874 codification of federal law, see U.S. REv. STAT. §§ 722,
914 (1874) supports Judge Brown's conclusion that § 1988 should be given some substantive
meaning. Although the Court in Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), held that
§ 1988 did not authorize the incorporation of new and independent state remedies into § 1983,
it has not rejected giving § 1988 some substantive meaning. See supra notes 357-62 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp.,
340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
407. See, e.g., Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594 (1978); Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 240
(1969).
408. See infra notes 410-34 and accompanying text.
409. Although initial law review commentary on Brazier was favorable, see, e.g., 40 Tax.
L. REv. 1050 (1962); 15 VAND. L. REv. 623 (1962); 47 VA. L. REv. 1241 (1961), one Notewriter praised the result while criticizing the failure to construe the "party injured" language
and suggesting an interpretation of § 1983 as independently authorizing a wrongful death
remedy. Note, Federal Civil Rights Act IncorporatesState Wrongful Death and Survival Laws,
14 STAN. L. REv. 386, 392-94 (1962).
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which they could assert the constitutional rights of a decedent have often
claimed a constitutional interest in their continued relationship with the
decedent. In this way, beneficiaries under state wrongful death acts have
attempted to avoid state policies that placed ceilings on the available damages
or that limited damages to pecuniary losses. 410 Likewise, deferred beneficiaries
under state wrongful death acts and parties suing as individuals in states
that give the action to designated personal representatives have often asserted
their own constitutional interests.4 1 Finally, nonstatutory beneficiaries, with
no cause of action under state wrongful death statutes, have also claimed
41 2
a constitutional interest in the continued life of the decedent.
These arguments have often been advanced by parents whose children
were killed by the improper use of deadly force. In arguing that their interest
in a continued relationship with their child was of constitutional dimension,
these parents frequently have relied on Supreme Court cases establishing
fundamental familial rights involving marriage, procreation, and child rearing
as the 3source of a substantive due process right in the parent-child relationship.

41

State and federal courts that have addressed these issues have disagreed
on whether the parent-child relationship was of constitutional dimension and
on whether it gave parents a compensable and actionable interest in their
continued relationship with their children. Although most courts have found
a constitutional interest in the relationship," 4 others have distinguished the
right to privacy cases from which this interest is derived to reject damage
claims based on the termination of the relationship. 45 On the other hand,

410. See, e.g., Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 183 (1977); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th
Cir. 1984).
411. See, e.g., Logan v. Hollier, 711 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1983) (remanding § 1983 wrongful
death action by decedent's mother, a deferred beneficiary who could not sue under state law
where the decedent had a surviving child, to determine whether a wrongful killing violated the
mother's constitutional rights); cf. Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1981) (brothers
may not bring § 1983 survival action for wrongful killing under Iowa's survival statute); Carter
v. City of Emporia, 543 F. Supp. 354 (D. Kan. 1982) (only heirs may bring wrongful death
actions under Kansas law).
412. See, e.g., Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 290 (D. Colo. 1982)
(rejecting constitutional claim of siblings).
413. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Litigants have also looked to cases attaching procedural
protections to the liberty interest represented by the parent-child relationship. See, e.g., Lassiter
v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
414. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-48 (7th Cir. 1984) (father's
interest in relationship with son of constitutional dimension); Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588
(8th Cir. 1974) (same); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848, 852-53 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Espinoza
v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 463-65 (Colo. 1981) (partially overruling Jones v. Hildebrant, 191
Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976), and holding that children have a constitutional interest in their
relationship with their parents), cert. dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 456 U.S. 430 (1982).
See also infra note 424 and accompanying text.
415. See, e.g., White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983); Jackson v. Marsh, 551
F. Supp. 1091 (D. Colo. 1982); James v. Murphy, 392 F. Supp. 641 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Jones
v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 432
U.S. 183 (1977).
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courts that have considered the availability of § 1983 wrongful death claims
by siblings who do not possess the right to sue under state law have generally
refused to recognize a constitutional interest that can be enforced through
4 16
a § 1983 wrongful death damage suit.
Regardless of how these issues involving the use of § 1983 should be
resolved, courts entertaining § 1983 wrongful death claims have often reached
out to address complex and sensitive constitutional issues that could easily
have been avoided. Mattis v. Schnarr41 7 is typical of these cases. In Mattis,
the plaintiff was a father whose son was shot to death by police as he was
fleeing to avoid apprehension for the commission of a felony. The conduct
of the police was consistent with Missouri law, which authorized the use of
deadly force in such circumstances, but the decedent's father challenged the
constitutionality of the state policy in a § 1983 action in which he sought
damages for the losses he suffered from the death of his son. Under the
Missouri wrongful death statute, relief was available, 4 1 and the Eighth Circuit
held that the plaintiff had a vested right to sue under state law and was
injured by the killing.4 '9 In finding the claim actionable under § 1983,
however, the court also inquired into whether the actions of the defendant
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights rather than the rights of the third
420
party, his deceased son.
In posing this question and resolving it in favor of the father's having a
fundamental constitutional right to raise his son, 421 the court complicated
the Brazier inquiry. Instead of incorporating the apparently adequate state
wrongful death remedy into § 1983 or considering whether § 1983 independently authorized a wrongful death action by a father, the court addressed
the more complex issue of the father's constitutional rights.
In addition to Mattis, a number of courts have decided constitutional
issues without first considering whether to incorporate state limitations on
wrongful death actions into § 1983, and, if so, whether to reject specific

416. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1245-48 (7th Cir. 1984); Sager v. City
of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 290 (D. Colo. 1982); Sanchez v. Marquez, 457 F. Supp.
359, 362-63 (D. Colo. 1978). But see Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186
(10th Cir. 1985).
Although the Tenth Circuit in Trujillo broadly defined the constitutional interest to recognize
a sibling's right to a continued association with her deceased brother, the court required the
plaintiffs to plead and presumably prove that the defendant acted intentionally to interfere
with the protected relationship. Id. at 1190. Thus, the expansion of protected interests in
Trujillo may be illusory, as survivors will virtually never be able to prove their allegations of
intent.
417. 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974). For subsequent proceedings, see Mattis v. Schnarr, 547
F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977).
418. See Mattis, 502 F.2d at 590.
419. Id.
420. The Eighth Circuit's discussion of the constitutional basis of plaintiff's standing to sue
was distinct from its discussion of the constitutionality of the state policy on deadly force. Id.
at 593-96.
421. Id.
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limitations as being inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983.422 This is seen
most starkly in Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 423 the leading federal court of
appeals § 1983 wrongful death case.4 24 The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing the
§ 1983 wrongful death claim by the estate of a deceased father whose son
was wrongfully killed by police, 425 unnecessarily addressed the father's constitutional interest. Wisconsin law gave parents a wrongful death action for
the death of a child but placed a $25,000 ceiling on damages for loss of
society. 426 Rather than borrow state law and examine the ceiling in light of
the purposes of § 1983, the court initially addressed whether the father had
an actionable constitutional interest in his continued relationship with his
son and concluded that he did. 427 Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit then
considered whether the $25,000 ceiling was inconsistent with the policy underlying § 1983; the court held that it was and affirmed an award of $75,000
for loss of society. 428 The Seventh Circuit, however, could have reached the
422. Courts addressing the constitutional issue have also ignored the possibility that § 1983
may authorize a wrongful death action independently of state law, but that argument, which
had been made by the plaintiffs-appellants in the Fifth Circuit in Brazier and which is advanced
in this article, is rarely made by litigants. But see Brief for Amicus Curiae at 44-49, Jones v.
Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977).
423. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
424. Bell has become the starting point in the analysis of § 1983 wrongful death actions.
See, e.g., Estate of Bailey v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 509 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (explicitly
following Bell to hold that a parent whose child has died as a result of unlawful state action
may maintain a constitutionally based § 1983 action for the deprivation of liberty); Kelson v.
City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985) (relying on Bell to conclude that parents have
a constitutionally protected interest in the companionship and society of their children); Trujillo
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1985) (following Bell to hold
that parents have a constitutional interest in their continued relationship with their child but
rejecting Bell to also find a constitutional interest on behalf of siblings); Ascani v. Hughes,
470 So. 2d 207, 211-12 (La. Ct. App.) (relying on Bell to reject siblings' constitutional interest
in their continued relationship with their deceased brother), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 517
(1985); cf. Myres v. Rask, 602 F. Supp. 210, 213 n.4 (D. Colo. 1985) (relying on the district
court decision in Bell to hold that parents have a constitutionally protected relationship with
their child). See supra notes 414-15 for pre-Bell cases addressing the constitutional interest in a
continuing parent-child relationship.
425. Because the father had died before the § 1983 wrongful death action was begun, this
claim was on behalf of his estate, and the Seventh Circuit construed Wisconsin law to permit
the survival of wrongful death actions. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1241-42. However, the court also had
to reconcile Wis. STAT. § 895.01 (1983), which permits personal actions to survive, with Wis.
STAT. § 895.04(2) (1983), which implies that wrongful death actions do not survive by creating
a hierarchy of beneficiaries when an otherwise entitled survivor "dies before judgment." The
court resolved this conflict on federal grounds by finding that it would be inconsistent with
the purposes of § 1983 for state law to bar completely the survival of the deceased father's
wrongful death claim. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1251.
426. See Wis. STAT. § 895.04(4) (1983). During the pendency of the Bell litigation, this
$25,000 ceiling was raised to $50,000. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1985).
427. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1242-45.
428. Id. at 1250-52. Given the court's constitutionalization of the father's interest and its
conclusion that claims for loss of society were available in § 1983 wrongful death actions, 746
F.2d at 1242-50, it is unclear why the Seventh Circuit felt it was necessary to examine the
consistency of the $25,000 ceiling with the purposes of § 1983. If federal law independently
gives parents a constitutional interest in their relationship with a child, that relationship should
be enforceable in a § 1983 action under federal damage policies. In such cases, state limitations
on the available damages should not have any special relevance to the damages available under
§ 1983. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183, 187-89 (1977). See supra text accompanying
notes 186-87.
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same result without deciding the constitutional issue. First, it could have

borrowed the entire state cause of action while rejecting the damage ceiling
under the inconsistentcy clause; second, it could have borrowed the state

wrongful death action without the damage ceiling while applying a federal
law of damages; and third, it could have treated § 1983 as independently

authorizing a wrongful death action while applying the same federal law of
damages.
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of the siblings' § 1983 wrongful death
claim was more puzzling. Under Wisconsin law, siblings were deferred beneficiaries who could bring wrongful death actions when there were no
surviving children, spouses, or lineal heirs."'" Their recovery, however, was
limited to pecuniary losses; claims for loss of society were barred. 4 0 Thus,
under Wisconsin law, the siblings had a wrongful death claim, but in the
circumstances of the case there were no damages under state law to which
they were entitled. In addressing the availability of a § 1983 wrongful death
action by the siblings, however, the Seventh Circuit went directly to the
constitutional issue. Although the court held that the $25,000 ceiling on loss
of society claims by the decedent's father was inconsistent with the purposes

of § 1983,431 it did not address whether the statutory limitation on damages
available to siblings was also inconsistent with § 1983. Rather than resolve
this or the other difficult statutory issues raised by § 1983 wrongful death
claims on the part of siblings, 432 the court immediately considered whether

siblings had an actionable constitutional interest in the continued life of their
brother and concluded that they did not.4

33

Although that constitutional

holding is consistent with decisions of most other courts that have addressed

it, 434 the Seventh Circuit, before reaching a constitutional decision, should

have explored the statutory issues involved in whether § 1983 independently
provides siblings a wrongful death remedy. More importantly, the court

429. WIs. STAT. § 895.04(2) (1983).
430. Id. § 895.04(4).
431. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1251-53.
432. The right of siblings to sue directly under § 1983 because of the wrongful killing of a
brother is a more difficult statutory issue than the right of parents, spouses or children. See
infra note 546.
433. After holding that the siblings did not have a constitutional interest that supported a
§ 1983 wrongful death action, the court reversed the $100,000 loss of society judgment in favor
of the decedent's 12 siblings. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1248, 1279.
434. See supra note 416. In holding that siblings lacked an actionable constitutional interest
in their continued relationship with their deceased brother, the Seventh Circuit relied in part
on its uncertainty about the additional deterrence a cause of action would provide when both
the decedent's estate and father had an available claim. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1247. That concern
about marginal deterrence, however, more closely resembles the statutory inquiry made under
§ 1988's inconsistency clause, see supra note 201 and accompanying text, than a constitutional
inquiry. In rejecting this aspect of Bell, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3251 (1984), had not established familial
relationships as the outer limits of protected relationships. Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs,
768 F.2d 1186, 1189 n.5 (10th Cir. 1985).
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should have reviewed the state damage limitation on the siblings' wrongful
death action under the inconsistency clause of § 1988.
C.

The Third Generation-StateRestrictions on Survival and
Wrongful Death Actions

Although courts are still struggling with the constitutional issues raised by
the second generation of § 1983 wrongful death cases, there is a current
wave of § 1983 survival and wrongful death cases that raise difficult statutory
issues. Arising in jurisdictions that authorize wrongful death actions, these
cases involve state policies that either require the personal action of the
decedent to abate in favor of the wrongful death claim or limit the damages
available in the survival and wrongful death actions. Because most courts
that entertain § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings continue to take
the path of least resistance and look initially to state law for the cause of
action and damage policies, these cases raise questions as to the standards
that apply when courts borrow state authorized actions or review state
damages policies.
When courts have found the interest of survivors in their continued relationship with a decedent to be of constitutional dimension, it should not
be necessary to examine state limitations on damages under § 1988's inconsistency clause. 435 Nor should these issues arise when courts borrow state
wrongful death causes of action but not state damage policies. In such cases,
courts can address the available damages under the federal standards generally used in § 1983 litigation.
There are however, three important issues under the inconsistency clause
of § 1988 that arise when courts review borrowed state survival and wrongful
death policies in § 1983 litigation involving wrongful killings. Although
litigants cannot avoid these issues in survival actions because of the Supreme
Court's adoption of a borrowing approach, 43 6 they will be able to avoid
them in § 1983 wrongful death actions if the Court holds that § 1983
independently authorizes a wrongful death action without regard to state
law.

435. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183, 188 (1977). But see Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205, 1250-53 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding a parent to have a constitutional interest but
still reviewing the statutory ceiling on pecuniary damages under the inconsistency clause). Even
when survivors are asserting their own constitutional interests, it may be necessary to consider
whether an item of damages available under state law may be awarded in a § 1983 action.
Thus, punitive damages against municipalities would not be available in § 1983 wrongful death
actions even if authorized under state law. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247 (1981). Similarly, it has been argued that state-authorized damages for mental anguish and
grief in wrongful death actions are unavailable in § 1983 actions. See Grandstaff v. City of
Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 173-74 n.* (5th Cir. 1985) (Garwood, J., dissenting in part). But see also

Bell, 746 F.2d at 1248-50 (reviewing whether there was a common law limitation on the availability
of damages for loss of society and companionship in § 1983 actions).
436. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
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First, it is unclear whether the courts reviewing the consistency of state
survival or wrongful death policies with the purposes of § 1983 must consider
each cause of action independently. In rejecting the use of a state policy
that required personal actions to abate in favor of the wrongful death action
in Carlson v. Green, 437 a Bivens action, the Court looked only to the survival
issue. The federal government had argued that the state wrongful death
policy should also be considered, but the Court did not directly address that
argument. Nonetheless, the Court's exclusive focus on the survival issue
suggests it will require borrowed survival and wrongful death actions to
438
stand or fall on their own.
A second issue involves the need to sort out the different interests in
compensation in § 1983 cases in which the complained-of conduct results in
death. In Robertson v. Wegmann, 43 9 the Court summarily disposed of the
executor's interest in compensation by pointing out that the interest in
compensation was that of the individual whose rights had been violatedthe decedent; because the plaintiff had died during the pendency of the suit,
he no longer had an interest in being compensated, and the Court would
not rely on § 1983's purpose of compensation in reviewing the state's abatement policy. It is unclear, however, who has the interest in compensation
in § 1983 survival and wrongful death actions involving deaths that result
from the complained-of conduct. Survivors clearly have an interest in compensation under state law, and the availability of § 1983 to pursue wrongful
death claims seems to recognize that interest. 440 On the other hand, survival
actions only seek relief to which the decedent was entitled prior to his death,
and Robertson suggests that this interest in compensation belonged only to
the decedent.
The identification of the different interests at stake also has implications
on whether survival and wrongful death policies should be looked at separately. If the only interest in compensation is that of the decedent, the case
for keeping the survival and wrongful death inquiries separate is weakened.
On the other hand, if survivors have a separate interest in compensation in
cases involving wrongful killings, the case for independently reviewing state
survival and wrongful death policies is strengthened.
Third, it is unclear whether courts that review state damage restrictions
in § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings have followed the marginal
deterrence approach of Robertson,4 ' or whether they are required to do so.

437. 446 U.S. 14 (1979).
438. See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
439. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
440. In Robertson, Justice Marshall stated that the Court's holding that the § 1983 claim
abated does not "preclude recovery by survivors who are suing under § 1983 for injury to
their own interests." 436 U.S. at 592 n.9. The interests of survivors in compensation should
be protected by § 1983 regardless of the methodology employed to conclude that a wrongful
death claim can be pursued through § 1983.
441. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
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When a death results from the complained-of conduct, considerations of
deterrence require careful scrutiny of state damage restrictions to determine
whether they adequately deter wrongful killings. 442 Nonetheless, all state
limitations on damages available in wrongful death actions may not be
inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983, and Robertson may require courts
to review the impact on deterrence of the specific limitation.
1.

Section 1983 Survival and Damages Policies

Most courts that have entertained § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings
have rejected state policies that require the decedent's personal action to
abate. In reaching this result, courts have generally looked at the state
survival action independently of the state wrongful death action and have
concluded that § 1983's goal of deterrence would be violated if an action
did not survive when the complained-of conduct caused the death." 3 A
number of courts, however, have reviewed state survival policies in light of
the available state wrongful death statutes and have concluded that the
wrongful death actions served § 1983's purposes and justified following state
policies that required § 1983 actions to abate.
In Jones v. George,4 " for example, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action
as administratrix of her deceased husband's estate and a § 1983 wrongful
death action in her own name. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent committed suicide while incarcerated on false charges, but, under West Virginia
law, a cause of action for injuries to a person resulting in death did not
survive.44
In reviewing the consistency of the West Virginia abatement policy with
the purposes of § 1983, the district court read Carlson narrowly as having
permitted the survival of the estate's Bivens action only because virtually
no wrongful death damages were available to the decedent's mother under
Indiana law. Thus, the Jones court did not view Carlson as establishing a
uniform federal rule of survivorship when the complained-of conduct caused
death; rather, it treated Carlson as establishing a variable rule based on the
adequacy of alternative remedies and found the same policy applicable in §

442. Cf. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20-21.
443. See, e.g., Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1984); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Va. 1981); cf.
Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282 (D. Colo. 1982) (rejecting damage limitations
in state survival statute); Jackson v. Marsh, 551 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Colo. 1982) (same).
444. 533 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.W. Va. 1982).
445. Id. at 1301 ("West Virginia has... changed the common law to provide for survivability
of 'injuries to the person . . . not resulting in death.' There is no West Virginia law which
permits survival of actions for personal injuries which do result in death.").
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1983 cases." 6 The Jones court then looked to the West Virginia wrongful
death statute under which the decedent's personal representative could seek

a broad range of damages for survivors, including damages for sorrow,
mental anguish and solace, reasonably expected loss of income and services,
and medical and funeral expenses." 7 Because the plaintiff could maintain

wrongful death actions under state law and through § 1983, the court
concluded that § 1983's purpose of deterring
official misconduct was met
448

and dismissed the § 1983 survival action.

A similar approach has been taken by state and federal courts in Alabama.

Under Alabama's wrongful death statute, known as the Homicide Act, only
actions for wrongful death may be brought when the complained-of conduct
caused death, and actions for damages sustained by a decedent during his
lifetime do not survive. 449 In addition, Alabama uses an exclusively punitive
approach to wrongful death actions and only permits awards of punitive
40
damages in wrongful death actions.
In Brown v. Morgan County,4 1 a federal district court rejected the ar-

gument that the Alabama no-survival policy was inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983 by relying on § 1983's goal of compensation. Since the
person injured by a violation of his constitutional rights was no longer alive,
he could not be compensated; thus, any compensatory damages would only
accrue to the estate. With respect to the goal of deterrence, the court looked
to state law and found that the availability of punitive damages met this

purpose of § 1983.452
Similarly, in Carterv. City of Birmingham,43 a controversial case involving
the killing of an uninvolved bystander by the police, 45 4 the Alabama Supreme
Court followed Brown and found the policy of not permitting personal
actions to survive to be consistent with the purposes of § 1983. Although

446. Reading Carlson and Robertson in peri materia, the Jones court found them to stand
for the following proposition:
[W]here death results from civil rights violations . .. survival of a cause of action
based on personal injuries resulting from those violations is in keeping with the
philosophy behind and policies of the remedy ... unless the law applicable to viable
claims joined with the personal injury claims satisfies that philosophy and those
policies as they apply to personal injury claims.
533 F. Supp. at 1304. The court then went on to examine the state wrongful death law that
applied to survivors' claims.
447. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6(c)(1) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
448. Jones, 533 F. Supp. at 1306. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Jones court did
not discuss whether the abatement of the plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering, which was
not recoverable in the state wrongful death action, would have any effect on the deterrence
purpose of § 1983.
449. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1984).
450. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
451. 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
452. Id. at 665.
453. 444 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2401 (1984).
454. For a more detailed account of this case and its political aftermath, see P. SCHARF &
A. BINDER, supra note 8, at 14-17.
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punitive damages were not available from the municipal defendant under §
1983, 411 the state court concluded that the state wrongful death action for
punitive damages satisfied the deterrence purposes of § 1983.46 Thus, neither
survival actions nor wrongful death actions are available under § 1983 against
Alabama municipalities, and the only § 1983 wrongful death claims that can
be brought against individual defendants in Alabama are for punitive damages.
The Alabama state and federal courts, like the federal court in West
Virginia, found the purposes of § 1983 met by the availability of the state
wrongful death action and thus concluded that the no-survival policy was
consistent with § 1983. The Alabama courts, however, subjected the state
wrongful death statute to even less scrutiny than did the federal court in
West Virginia. The West Virginia court at least examined the state wrongful
death remedy on its face as well as in the circumstances of the pending case.
Because survivors could obtain a significant award in the § 1983 wrongful
death action to compensate their losses from the decedent's death, it held
that § 1983's purposes of compensation and deterrence were met. 4 7 The
Alabama courts, on the other hand, ignored the possibility that survivors'
interests in compensation might justify rejecting the no-survival policy and
took a narrow view of deterrence which assumed that the purpose of § 1983
was only to discourage reckless or intentional conduct that-supported a claim
for punitive damages. Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court in Carter only
considered the state wrongful death action, as contrasted to a § 1983 wrongful
death action for punitive damages, which was not available against munic48
ipalities, and thus also ignored the supplementary nature of § 1983 actions.
These approaches to the survival of § 1983 claims when death has resulted
from the complained-of conduct have been rejected by other courts. For
example, in Jaco v. Bloechle,45 9 the Sixth Circuit held that a § 1983 claim
brought by the administratrix of the estate of a victim of an alleged wrongful
killing survived despite Ohio law that required personal actions to abate
where death was instantaneous. 460 In reviewing the Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit

455. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
456. Carter, 444 So. 2d at 379.
457. Jones, 533 F. Supp. at 1305. In concluding that the state wrongful death statute met
§ 1983's policies as they related to decedent's abated claim for personal injuries, the court was
aware of the different interests served by survival and wrongful death policies. Id. at 1305 n.23
("[Tihe court is ascertaining whether or not the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as they relate
to the personal injury claims are complied with in the context of the wrongful death claim
....[I]n West Virginia, those considered to be the parties wronged in wrongful death actions
are the survivors and not the decedent and/or his estate. Therefore, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
for wrongful death would meet both the compensation and deterrence policies of § 1983 as
they relate to that claim. ").
458. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
459. 739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1984).
460. Under OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (Page 1981), personal actions survive the death
of the decedent, but Ohio case law prohibits the survival of personal actions where death was
instantaneous. See Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978). In Ohio,
the damages available in personal actions that survive are limited to those resulting from injuries
during the decedent's lifetime but not for the resulting death. See Jaco, 739 F.2d at 242 n.4.
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emphasized the differences between survival and wrongful death actions,
and the fact that the decedent's heirs had a wrongful death claim under
Ohio law was not relevant to whether the decedent's personal action survived. 46' Although the court came close to considering the decedent's interest
in compensation, it relied primarily on § 1983's goal of deterrence which
would be threatened if personal actions only survived when there was pain
462
and suffering prior to death but not when death was instantaneous.
Similar issues have also arisen in states that do not require personal actions
to abate but that limit the damages that survive. For example, courts en-

tertaining § 1983 actions in cases involving wrongful killings have rejected
state policies that deny the survival of claims for pain and suffering, for
punitive damages, and for the value of the underlying right to life itself. In
reaching these results, courts have not attempted to distinguish the holding
of Robertson, which provided that the interest in compensation belonged to
the decedent; rather they have relied on the additional deterrence that will

result if potential defendants know that they may be liable for a full range
3
of compensatory and punitive damages if their victim dies.6
In Guyton v. Phillips,464 the plaintiff sued solely as administratrix of the
estate of her deceased son who was wrongfully killed by police officers.

Under California law, actions for compensatory and punitive damages survived but claims for pain and suffering did not.4 65 In rejecting the use of
this damage limitation, the court relied upon the substantial impact on
deterrence that resulted from the bar on the survival of claims for pain and
suffering. 466 On the other hand, the court rejected the claim for loss of
future earnings and loss of society, noting that those damages were available
in state-authorized wrongful death actions. 467 Although the court observed

461. Jaco,. 739 F.2d at 243 n.5 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he claim of ... (the decedent's] heirs
under the wrongful death enactment is a cause of action separate from the civil rights claim
...
. Federal courts look to state survival statutes to determine the validity of the action
....
Because ... [Ohio's wrongful death statute] is not adapted to the object of providing for
the continuation of personal causes of action, the wrongful death statute is irrelevant to the §
1988 analysis.
... ).
462. Id. at 244-45. Cf. O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp.
1345 (E.D. Va. 1981) (rejecting the argument that the availability of wrongful death actions
under Virginia law supports following Virginia's no-survival policy in § 1983 actions when the
death was caused by the complained-of conduct).
463. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978) (a "state official contemplating
illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed
against him.").
464. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
465. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1985).
466. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. at 1166. ("The inescapable conclusion is that there
may be substantial deterrent effect to conduct that results in the injury of an individual but
virtually no deterrent to conduct that kills its victim."). The Guyton court also listed more
than 30 jurisdictions that allow the survival of decedents' claims for conscious pain and suffering.
Id. at 1166 n.6.
467. The issue of the availability of future earnings and loss of society in the survival claim
arose in Guyton because plaintiff's state court wrongful death action had been dismissed under
the statute of limitations. Id. at 1167 n.7. In concluding that wrongful-death-type damages
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that the California wrongful death statute was not inadequate, it did so in
the course of pointing out the different purposes of survival and wrongful
death actions. Thus, this aspect of Guyton can best be viewed as recognizing
the different interests protected by survival and wrongful death policies.
In addition to $15,000 awarded for pain and suffering and $85,000 in
punitive damages, the Guyton court awarded the plaintiff damages of $100,000
for the deprivation of life. In deciding to award such damages, the court
was concerned with the absence of deterrence that would result if less
damages were available when a victim died than when he survived. In setting
the amount, however, the court rejected such measures of damages as future
earnings and looked to awards in other cases in
which victims whose federal
46
rights were violated suffered intangible losses. 1
The Seventh Circuit in Bell v. City of Milwaukee 69 followed a similar
approach in assessing the damages available in a § 1983 survival action
brought by the estate of a young black male who was wrongfully killed by
the police. Although personal actions survived in Wisconsin, no damages
were available for the loss of life itself. 470 The Seventh Circuit, however,
after finding the Wisconsin policy to have "more than a marginal loss of
influence on potentially unconstitutional actors," 471 found the policy inconsistent with the deterrence purpose of § 1983 and upheld the jury award of
$100,000 for the loss of the decedent's life. In reaching this result, the court
noted that Wisconsin law permitted claims by survivors and that tort law
in general sought to deter wrongful deaths. Nonetheless, because state law
did not impose damages for loss 472
of life, the court found § 1983's goal of
deterrence not to have been met.

were not available in survival actions "when appropriate remedies were available and were not
precluded by state law," id. at 1167, the court intimated that the damages in question might

be available in the survival action had California not allowed them in wrongful death actions.
The availability of such damages, however, would be inconsistent with the separate interests
protected by the two actions. See Bass by Lewis v. Wailenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1187-90 (7th

Cir. 1985) (vacating a $250,000 jury verdict in a survival action because the jury instructions
erroneously defined damages in terms of the pecuniary losses of decedent's children, a wrongful

death measure of damages).
468. Id. at 1168.
469. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984).
470. Id. at 1240 n.41.

471.

Id.at 1239.

472. Id. at 1239-40. The Bell court initially borrowed the state damage policy denying damages

for loss of life, but found the policy to be inconsistent with the deterrence policies of § 1983
and the fourteenth amendment's protection of life. Id. at 1240. The court then found it
appropriate to fashion a federal rule under which damages would be available to the estate to
provide recovery for loss of life. Id. at 1239. See also Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d
1173, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding Illinois policy that denied recovery on behalf of estates for

loss of life to effectively require abatement of fourteenth amendment claim that defendants
deprived the decedent of his right to life). Cf.O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional
Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding the Virginia policy of denying

recovery for the deprivation of the deceased's constitutional rights to effectively require the
action to abate contrary to the policies of § 1983).
Damages for the loss of life itself have been dubbed "hedonic"

damages and have been
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The same approach to state damage limitations has generally been taken
when states deny the survival of claims for punitive damages. In McFadden
v. Sanchez,473 the Second Circuit entertained a § 1983 survival action arising
out of a shooting death by a police officer. Under New York law, the action
474
for personal damages survived, but the claim for punitive damages did not.
In rejecting the use of the state limitation in a § 1983 action, the Second
Circuit relied on Carlson and, without identifying or separating the interests
at stake, found the state limitation to be "manifestly" inconsistent with
475
federal law.
These analyses of state survival policies independently of state wrongful
death policies are closer to the approach utilized by the Court in Carlson
and seem correct. The Court has often approached § 1983 and Bivens actions
similarly, despite their different origins, and both have the common purpose
of deterring wrongful conduct and providing compensation for victims of
476
illegal governmental conduct.
The deterrence goal of § 1983 and Bivens actions is clearly furthered by
the availability of wrongful death actions, but survival and wrongful death
policies further different interests. Survival actions are brought on behalf
of the decedent's estate to obtain compensation for losses prior to death
and, thus, enable a decedent to accumulate an estate. Wrongful death actions,
on the other hand, whether based on state or federal law, compensate
survivors for their losses. The availability of compensation, however, cannot
be wholly separated from deterrence for it is the availability of compensatory
damages that enables § 1983 and Bivens actions to serve their deterrence
purpose. Nonetheless, the interest in compensation in survival and wrongful
death actions are distinct, and state wrongful death actions may not be
adapted to the purposes of survival policies. 477 Thus, even though the Court
in Robertson discounted the interest of the estate in compensation in pure
survival cases, when death results from the complained-of conduct the interest
of the estate in compensation for the injuries to the decedent has an inde-

compared to damages for the loss of enjoyment of life. Blodgett, Hedonic Damages: A Price
on the Pleasure of Life, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 25; 28 ATLA L. REP. 102-03 (1985). The
latter, however, are a standard element of damages in non-death cases in which injured plaintiffs
are denied the ability to fully enjoy the balance of their lives. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R.4TH
293 (1984). In cases involving wrongful killings, however, damages for loss of enjoyment of
life look suspiciously like damages that occur after death and are only available in wrongful
death actions. See Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (refusing to
allow damages for loss of earnings after death and loss of society in a survival action).
473. 710 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983).
474. At the time of the injured party's death, New York expressly required claims for punitive
damages to abate. This prohibition was subsequently lifted for deaths occuring after Aug. 31,
1982. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusrs LAW § 11-3.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
475. 710 F.2d at 911; accord Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1241 (rejecting
Wisconsin policy of refusing to permit claims for punitive damages to survive).
476. See supra notes 303-04.
477. Cf. Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924 (1984) (refusing to borrow state statute of
limitations that was not adapted to the purposes of § 1983).
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pendent impact on deterrence and should not be considered to be met by
the availability of a wrongful death action. 478
2.

Section 1983 Wrongful Death and Damages Policies

Courts entertaining § 1983 wrongful death claims by incorporating state
wrongful death actions and their damage policies must address many of the
issues that arise in survival actions. Because every state permits wrongful
death actions, however, courts have not had to consider the availability of
survival actions in determining whether § 1983 wrongful death actions are
available. Nonetheless, these issues arise when states limit the survivors who
can bring wrongful death actions and the available damages, but courts have
often constitutionalized these issues and have not approached them as matters
of statutory construction.
In addressing state limitations on the availability of wrongful death actions,
courts should examine the state policy in light of the purposes of § 1983,
and it is necessary to sort out the different interests involved. Although the
Court in Robertson viewed compensation solely from the perspective of the
decedent, in § 1983 wrongful death actions, survivors have an inter est 479
in
compensation independent of the interest of the decedent or his estate.
Similarly, the need for deterrence when the complained-of conduct causes
death supports reviewing the availability of wrongful death actions without
regard to whether the state would allow an action to survive. The marginal
deterrence approach of Robertson, however, suggests that a court might rely
on the state survival policy because a defendant contemplating an illegal act
would unlikely be more deterred knowing that survival actions were available
but wrongful death actions were not. Nonetheless, the possibility of eliminating substantial categories of damages for surviving relatives can significantly affect the deterrence purpose of § 1983.
Courts entertaining § 1983 wrongful death actions have generally found
statutory ceilings on damages and limitations on the elements of damages
to be inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983.480 To the extent a purpose

478. The need to analyze survival and wrongful death claims separately may be greater in
Bivens actions in which there is more uncertainty as to the authority for wrongful death claims.
Although the Court could follow its admiralty precedents and incorporate the federal common
law of wrongful death into Bivens actions, the complexity of such an issue may help explain
the decision of the Court in Carlson to focus exclusively on the survival of the decedent's
personal action. See supra note 229.
479. It is possible that, despite Robertson, the Court would deal differently with the issue
of compensation when death resulted from the complained-of conduct. A purpose of § 1983
is to compensate victims for the violation of their federal rights. When the death is unrelated
to the cause of action, however, only the interest of the decedent is considered and that interest
is extinguished by the death. On the other hand, when death results from the complained-of
conduct, the decedent, through his estate, may still have an interest in compensation.
480. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting $25,000 ceiling on
damages for loss of society); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282 (D. Colo.
1982) (rejecting $45,000 ceiling and limitation of wrongful death damages to net pecuniary
losses).
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of § 1983 is to compensate survivors of wrongful killings as well as to deter
the wrongful conduct, these decisions seem correct. In reaching these conclusions, however, these courts have not considered the implications of the
Court's holding in Robertson that § 1983's purpose of compensation
is for
48
the individual whose rights were violated, not for his estate. '
Courts reviewing the use of state damage restrictions in § 1983 wrongful
death cases have generally not addressed whether § 1983 was intended to
compensate survivors. Nonetheless, in following the borrowing approach
sanctioned by the Court for survival issues, these courts have assumed that
§ 1983 itself was intended to compensate survivors. 4 2 Likewise, courts have
rarely addressed the extent to which specific limitations on damages reduce
the deterrence goal of § 1983. Instead, they have often approached the issue
in conclusory terms and have come close to assuming that all state limitations
on wrongful death damages are inconsistent with § 1983's purposes. 4 3 Such
an approach, however, may be at odds with the marginal deterrence approach
of Robertson. Further, as more difficult § 1983 wrongful death cases arise
involving state policies denying damages for losses not generally compensated
under state law, such as mental anguish and punitive damages, 48 the shortcomings of the borrowing approach become more apparent. These problems,
however, are avoided when courts treat § 1983 itself as a wrongful death
remedy. In such cases, the inquiry is not whether to reject a state damage
limitation but how to construct a federal policy of damages in light of the
purposes of § 1983.
Because the interests at stake in § 1983 wrongful death actions differ from
those in survival actions, courts entertaining the former should be able to
consider the interest of survivors in being compensated in addition to the
role of compensatory and punitive damages in deterring prohibited conduct.
The traditional damages available under state wrongful death actionsloss of support, inheritance, services and society-are intended to make
survivors whole by providing full compensation. State policies that deny
these damages or that place dollar ceilings on them deny survivors full and
fair compensation and fail to deter misconduct by prospective defendants.
Thus, courts that have reviewed these limitations in § 1983 wrongful death
actions have generally rejected them as inconsistent with § 1983's purposes.
More difficult questions, however, are suggested by the increasing number
of states that make available wrongful death damages for mental anguish,
grief, and sorrow. These damage policies also serve the goal of compensation,
albeit more generously, and courts have not hesitated to incorporate them
into the borrowed § 1983 wrongful death remedy. 485 The harder question,

481. See supra text accompanying note 200.
482. See, e.g., Bell, 746 F.2d at 1251-52.
483. Cf. McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394
(1983) (prohibition on survival of punitives "manifestly inconsistent" with § 1983).
484. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
485. See, e.g., Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985); Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 172
(5th Cir. 1985).
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however, arises when states deny those damages by defining damages narrowly in terms of pecuniary losses. If a central purpose of § 1983 is to
provide full compensation to survivors, courts should reject this limitation.
Nonetheless, the fact that a state limitation is rejected does not mean that
federal courts must allow such damages; rather, their availability should
depend on the federal common law of § 1983 damages that the courts have
developed in light of the purposes of § 1983.486
The interest in compensation may be a stronger basis for rejecting some
state limitations on wrongful death damages than the concern for deterrence.
For a state limitation on the availability of damages to violate Robertson's
marginal deterrence approach, it may be necessary for the prospective defendant to not only be aware of the limitation but also to have some idea how
it would affect the intended victim. Of course, when limitations are well
known and broadly applicable, the interest in deterrence requires the limitation to be rejected. Thus, state policies that deny wrongful death damages
for mental anguish and grief should be rejected. Although a defendant may
not have specific knowledge about whether a decedent has survivors who
can claim such losses, defendants can generally assume that there will be some
survivors who can do so. Likewise, defendants can often assume that certain
victims have limited earning potential and are not likely to be providing
financial support to dependents at a sufficiently high level to support a large
damage award. 4 7 Finally, Alabama's rejection of all compensatory damages
gives prospective defendants the clear message that they only need to avoid
reckless conduct to be safe from § 1983 damage awards.
On the other hand, state policies defining the loss of support or prospective
inheritance differently or limiting damages for some classes of survivors may
encourage prohibited acts only when a prospective defendant is aware of
the policy and the impact it will have on the awards to potential survivors.
Thus, a technical state policy of deducting personal living expenses from an
award measured in terms of an estate to be inherited is unlikely to have
even a marginal impact on deterrence, and a court would be justified in not
rejecting such a method of calculating damages under § 1988.488 Likewise,
a borrowed state policy that only denied damages for mental anguish and

486. See supra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
487. For example, Colorado's policy of limiting wrongful death damages to net pecuniary
losses, which excludes claims for loss of society and punitive damages, see supra text accompanying note 178, applies to significantly limit wrongful death damages regardless of the
circumstances of the decedent or the survivors, and should be rejected on its face without
regard to whether prospective defendants have specific knowledge of it.
488. When courts entertain § 1983 wrongful death actions independently of state law, they

may still be permitted to utilize state measurements of damages as a matter of convenience.
Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25 n.11 (1980) (suggesting use of state policies for

convenience); see, e.g., McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1422 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(using Georgia definition of damages to permit survivors to recover the "full value of the life
of the decedent" without regard to his living expenses), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th
Cir. 1984).
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grief to siblings might be consistent with Robertson's narrow approach to
deterrence.
State limitations on the availability of punitive damages in § 1983 wrongful
death actions, however, raise different issues. Punitive damages are available
in § 1983 actions as a matter of federal law for the purpose of curbing
malicious or reckless behavior." 9 Because compensation is not one of the
purposes of punitive damages, it is not necessary to separate the respective
interests of the decedent and his survivors in such damages. The availability
of punitive damages, whether in the survival or wrongful death action, serves
the identical purpose of deterring otherwise culpable defendants from engaging in extreme conduct. Thus, the deterrence purpose of § 1983 is served
by a state policy that made punitive damages available in either the survival
or wrongful death action but not in both. On the other hand, a state policy
that denied punitive damages in both actions would single out § 1983 actions
involving wrongful killings for less favorable treatment than other § 1983
actions and would be inconsistent with the federal law of § 1983 damages
and with the purposes of § 1983.1 9
V.

SECTION

1983 AS A WRONGFUL DEATH REMEDY:

A PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION

It is not necessary to look to state law to fill gaps in the § 1983 cause of
action when federal law provides the relevant policies. Thus, when no answer
is immediately apparent, from the language of § 1983, the language, legislative
history, and purposes of § 1983 should nonetheless be examined to determine
whether the statute itself constitutes a wrongful death remedy. 49' The Supreme
Court has not undertaken this inquiry, and most lower courts that have
reviewed the legislative history of § 1983 in this context have done so to
determine whether state wrongful death remedies may be incorporated into
§ 1983,492 or whether state limitations on wrongful death remedies, once
493
borrowed, should be rejected as inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983.
A.

Proposed Construction

There is a clear and simple answer to the question of the availability of
§ 1983 as a wrongful death remedy independent of state law. That answer,
489. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
490. See supra notes 473-75 & 483 and accompanying text.
491. A § 1983 wrongful death action can also be established by reliance on the federal
common law, cf. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (interpreting general
maritime law), if § 1988 does not preclude reliance on the federal common law, and if the use
of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy is consistent with its legislative history and purposes.
492. See, e.g., Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
493. See, e.g., Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564, 566-67 (6th Cir. 1974); Sager v. City of
Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 287-88 (D. Colo. 1982).

19851

WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS

which is applicable uniformly throughout the country, is suggested by §
1983's "party injured" language, which has never been reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Although most courts have assumed that the plaintiff-the
"party injured" in § 1983-is identical to the "person" whose rights are
violated, 494 that is not necessarily the case. A textual argument can be made
that § 1983 itself authorizes parties injured by the death of another to recover
damages suffered from that injury. 495 Thus, § 1983 may be read as permitting
the third-party standing of survivors suing because they were injured by
conduct that not only violated the decedent's constitutional rights but also
took his life.
Such a proposal may seem bold. It is consistent, however, with the usage
in the other sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and with the civil
actions created by the other Reconstruction-era civil rights acts. It is also
supported by § 1983's legislative history and purposes. Moreover, the use
of § 1983 to pursue a wrongful death claim is consistent with the state of
the law in 1871 when the predecessor of § 1983 was enacted. Although the
common law did not recognize a wrongful death action, the adoption of
statutory wrongful death actions by the majority of American jurisdictions
demonstrates that in 1871 it was well established that survivors had wrongful
death remedies available to them. Finally, the use of § 1983 to authorize
third-party standing in cases in which the decedent can no longer seek redress
for the violation of his rights is consistent with the Court's willingness to
authorize third-party standing in other limited circumstances as well as with
the prudential limitations on the case or controversy requirement. Thus, §
1983 can be read as ex proprio vigore establishing a wrongful death remedy,
and it is not necessary to consult state law to determine whether § 1983 can
be used to pursue a wrongful death claim.
B.

Legislative History

The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 supports the view
that the cause of action created by § 1 should be available to permit survivors
to recover damages they suffered as a result of an unconstitutional killing.
The 42d Congress was vitally concerned with wrongful killings, and the
argument that the new civil actions they created only reach wrongful killings
when state law so provides must be rejected.

494. Although a few courts have construed the "party injured" language in considering

whether an estate or personal representative could succeed to a decedent's § 1983 action, see
Davis v. Johnson, 138 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1955), no reported cases have been found in
which courts discussed the phrase in depth or considered whether the party injured may be
someone other than the person whose rights were violated.
495. See Note, supra note 409 (criticizing Brazier for failing to look to federal law and
interpret the "party injured" language). One commentator, however, has argued that it would
be "a strained reading of section 1983 to say that the 'person' deprived of his rights and the
'party injured' were not always identical." Theis, supra note 268, at 690. But see infra note
552.
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The Supreme Court has reviewed the legislative history of § 1 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1871 many times to answer questions concerning the scope
of § 1983. Although the Court has considered the definition of "person"
to determine who may be a defendant in § 1983 actions, 6 it has never
reviewed the legislative history for the purpose of addressing who is a
"person" with rights secured by § 1983 or a "party injured" under the
statute. 497 Nor has the Court considered whether the legislative history and
purposes of § 1983 shed any light on the statute's availability as a wrongful
49
death remedy.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was a congressional response to widespread

lawlessness in the southern states and the inability and unwillingness of state
and local officials to curb it. 499 Prior legislation had dealt with official abuses
directed toward blacks and Union sympathizers by creating federal criminal
remedies and expanding the president's police power.

°

The Civil Rights Act

of 1871, however, focused on the private lawlessness and atrocities of the
Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations.5

0

As ultimately passed, the Act

increased the power of the federal government. The president was given
expanded power to use the military to protect federal rights 0 2 and temporary
power to suspend habeas corpus; 03 the federal criminal law was expanded
to reach private conspiracies; 5°4 and, a civil cause of action against such

496. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
497. The Court has looked to the Dictionary Act, Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, §2, 16 Stat.
431, for assistance in defining which "persons" may be defendants, see Monell, 436 U.S. at
688-89, but the Act provided no guidance. Nor does it shed any light on whether estates,
executors, survivors or other personal representatives are "persons" or "parties injured" under
§ 1983. See also I U.S.C. §1 (1982) (codified version of Dictionary Act).
498. Lower courts have addressed the meaning of "person" in § 1983 in the course of
determining who has rights secured by the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Porter, 659 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1981) (state has no standing as a plaintiff in a § 1983 case
involving police abuses); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961) (corporation
may assert its constitutional rights under § 1983); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Borough
Council, 381 F. Supp. 228, 231 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (corporation may sue as a "person" under
§ 1983); City of South Portland v. State, 476 A.2d 690 (Me. 1984) (city cannot be a plaintiff
in a § 1983 case against the state because it has no constitutional rights against the state); see
also Note, The Fetus Under Section 1983: Still Struggling for Recognition, 34 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1029 (1983) (fetus cannot be a plaintiff under § 1983). The reasoning on these issues,
however, is often circular. Courts and commentators have looked to the fact that the putative
plaintiffs may not possess the constitutional rights they are seeking to conclude they are not
a "person" who can sue under § 1983.
499. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133, 1153-56 (1977).

500. Id. at 1143-44.
501. See Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1947 (1985); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
336-40 (1983).
502. Section 3 authorized the president to employ the federal militia to suppress "insurrection
domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies" that violate federal law when state
authorities are "unable to protect, or . . . fail in or refuse protection of the people in such
rights" and such failures are deemed to be denials of equal protection.
503. The President in his message suggested that the urgent legislation need only be temporary,
but only § 4, which authorized suspensions of the writ of habeas corpus, had a sunset provision
under which it expired at the end of "the next regular session of Congress."
504. See § 2, Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
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conspiracies was created. 505 The far-reaching proposals of Senator Sherman
to impose an affirmative duty on counties to prevent private violence were
rejected, but a compromise civil action for nonfeasance was created. °6 Finally, the Act included a relatively uncontroversial provision creating a civil
remedy against persons who acted under color of state law to violate the
constitutional rights of persons within the United States. 0 7
On March 23, 1871, President Grant had sent an urgent message to
Congress describing conditions in the southern states that rendered "life and
property insecure" and urging the passage of legislation to "effectually secure
life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of the law in all parts of
the United States. 0 8s At the time the message arrived, Congress had been
considering'a number of proposals to enforce the fourteenth amendment 5°9
and had recently received a lengthy investigative report describing the widespread lawlessness in a number of the southern states, particularly North
Carolina, and the complicity of state and local officials in that lawlessness.510
President Grant's message appears to have been a catalyst for the Republicans who controlled Congress, and on March 28, 1871, five days after
that message was received, Representative Shellabarger, the chair of the
select committee to which the President's message was sent, presented a bill
to the House of Representatives.51
Despite the proposal's focus on private lawlessness, it also expanded the
available sanctions against state and local officials who acted to deprive
persons of their constitutional rights. This was accomplished by creating a
civil counterpart to earlier criminal legislation that prohibited actions taken
under color of state law violative of federal rights, including actions that
involved wrongful killings.

505. Id.
506. Section 6, Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. See Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1978) (reviewing the legislative history of Senator Sherman's
proposed amendment).
507. See supra note 272.
508. President Grant's message to Congress provided in its entirety:
A condition of affairs now exists in some of the States of the Union rendering
life and property insecure, and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the
revenues dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some
localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond
the control of the State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive
of the United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for
present emergencies is not clear. Therefore I urgently recommend such legislation
as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property,
and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States. It may be expedient
to provide that such law as shall be passed in pursuance of this recommendation
shall expire at the end of the-next session of Congress. There is no other subject
on which I would recommend legislation during the present session.
CoN . GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1871).
509. See, e.g., S. 99, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1871); H.R. 189, CoNG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1871).
510. S.REP. No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174

(1961).
511. See

CONG. GLOBE,

42d Cong., IstSess. 317 (1871).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:559

In presenting the proposal, Representative Shellabarger informed the House

of Representatives that § I of the Act was modeled after the criminal
provisions of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Aside from differences

concerning the broader reach of the civil remedy, which was not limited to
former slaves, Shellabarger stated that the earlier statute "provides a criminal

proceeding in identically the same case as [§ 1] . . . provides a civil remedy." 5"'
Because § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 18661'" had extended the criminal sanc-

tion to situations in which persons acting under color of state law deprived
others of their life,"' there can be little doubt that § I of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871 was also intended to provide a civil remedy in such cases.
Moreover, in defending the constitutionality of legislation to secure the rights
of citizens, Shellabarger noted how "plainly and grossly absurd" it would
be to deny such power to the national government and "leave all the protection and law-making to the very States which are denying the protection. "' ' "
The debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871 makes clear that its proponents
were vitally concerned with the unlawful killings that characterized the reign

of terror in the southern states. They repeatedly referred to wrongful killings

512. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871).
513. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 had been enacted prior to the proposal of the fourteenth
amendment, and was re-enacted after its ratification. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 43637 (1968). The full text of § 2 is as follows:
SEC. 2 And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be
subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of
any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment,
pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held
in a condition of slavery or inioluntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason
of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
514. Although § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not expressly proscribe murder, its
legislative history demonstrates it was aimed at killings by state or local officials. Section 2
created a criminal sanction when there was a "deprivation of any right secured or protected
by this act." As originally introduced, § 1 of the 1866 Act had expansively protected "civil
rights" and "immunities" from discrimination based on race or slavery; it also guaranteed all
inhabitants the "same right . . . to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1866). Opposition to
the breadth and ambiguity of this formulation arose in the House because of concerns that
the term "civil rights" might be extended to political and social rights, despite the efforts of
proponents to present the bill as one of limited objectives. For example, Representative James
Wilson, the bill's manager, strongly denied that this version reached the political right of
suffrage or the right of equality in jury service or public school attendance. Such rights were
not, he argued, civil rights which he defined to include a "right of personal security." Id. at
1117-18. Although proponents of the Act deleted the objectionable phrase "civil rights" after
recommittal to committee by the House, the bill continued to enumerate the specific rights protected from discriminatory treatment, including the guarantee of personal security. See generally
1 J. CooK & J. SOBIESKI, supra note 350, at 1.19. Thus, under the criminal provision, a racially
discriminatory killing was subject to criminal penalties.
515. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871).
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in identifying the evils they were addressing, and they relied extensively on
16
the investigative report that vividly described the state of lawlessness.
Representative Lowe of Kansas, a Republican proponent of the Act, stated
as follows:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling
to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that
hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise,
have gone unwhipped of justice. t 7
In summarizing the concern about the actions of the southern states,
Representative Beatty of Ohio noted that
certain States have denied to persons within their jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. The proof on this point is voluminous and unquestionable . . . [Mien were murdered, houses were burned, women
were outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot down;

and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment
or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent:' 8
Finally, Congressman Butler, although disappointed by the failure to obtain an even stronger bill, remarked as follows:
This, then, is what is offered to the people of the United States as remedy
for wrongs, arsons, and murders done. This is what we offer to a man
whose house has been burned, as a remedy; to the woman whose husband
has been murdered, as a remedy; to the children whose father has been
killed, as a remedy.11 9

Although some of these comments refer to the private lawlessness to which
20
the civil and criminal remedies created by § 2 of the Act were addressed
there is no indication in the legislative debates that Congress intended to
create remedies for killings that resulted from private conspiracies but not
from official lawlessness. Moreover, the criminal sanction from which § 1
was derived was clearly available when the perpetrator acted under color of
law,52' and the tie-in between the new civil remedy and its criminal counterpart is unmistakable. Thus, there is strong support for the conclusion
that wrongful killings under color of law were not only actionable in the
courts of the United States through the criminal sanction, but also gave rise
to a civil claim under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 .522
516. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961) (reference to reliance on this report).
517. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (emphasis added).
518. Id. at 428.
519. Id. at 807.
520. References in the legislative history to murder and murderers are commonplace and are
often not tied to specific sections of the proposal.
521. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
522. Wrongful killings that result from private conspiracies are also subject to a criminal
sanction under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982), the successor to the criminal sanction in § 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871. For the same reasons that § 1983 is available as a remedy for wrongful
killings under color of law, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982), which is the current version of one of
the civil conspiracy actions created by § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, should be available
as a remedy for wrongful killings that result from private conspiracies to violate the equal
protection requirement. See also infra notes 534-37 and accompanying text.
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The absence of detailed discussion on the reach of § 1 is not surprising
given the lack of controversy concerning the provision. Its proponents accepted that it did not confer new rights, but only a new civil remedy available
in federal court. 23 On the other hand, § 2, which created a civil and criminal
remedy against private conspiracies, was controversial, and the debate on it
was intense. As originally introduced, § 2 was only a criminal provision,
but it proscribed private conspiracies to perform acts that violated the "rights,

privileges, or immunities" of other persons. The criminal acts were then
enumerated, and expressly included murder.5 4
Opponents of the legislation argued that Congress lacked power under the
fourteenth amendment to regulate private conduct and that only the states
could enact criminal codes. 525 Even some Republican supporters objected to
the breadth of the original formulation, 26 and eventually Representative

Shellabarger offered an amended version of § 2 to create a civil remedy and
to more closely tie the underlying rights to the fourteenth amendment. 27 In
doing this, the amended bill dropped all references to specific crimes, but

there is no indication of any intent to exclude from the proscribed conspiracies those that achieved their prohibited evils through murder, or to create
a civil remedy under § 2 that was not as broad as the criminal one. The
controversy involved federalizing responsibility for enforcing what opponents
viewed as state law, and no suggestion was made that the new remedies
would be available when the conspiracy maimed its victims but not when it
killed them.
Thus, Judge Brown in Brazier v. Cherry concluded:
[I]t defies history to conclude that Congress purposefully meant to assure
to the living freedom from such unconstitutional deprivation but that,
with like precision, had meant to withdraw the protection of the Civil

523. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (Rep. Shellabarger), 481-82 (Rep.
Wilson), 568 (Sen. Edmunds) (1871).
524. Section 2 was intended to avoid the defects of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, and, as
introduced, § 2 provided:
That if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band or
conspire together to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities
of another person, which, being committed within a place under the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law of the United
States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem,
robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction
of legal process or resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or
larceny; and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy shall do any act to
effect the object thereof, all the parties to or engaged in said conspiracy, whether
principals or accessories, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be liable, . . . and the crime shall be punishable as such in the
courts of the United States.
Id. at app. 68-69 (Rep. Shellabarger).
525. See generally Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State
Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1967).
526. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 382-84 (Rep. Hawley), app. 110-13 (Rep. Moore),
app. 206-10 (Rep. Blair) (1871).
527. Id. at 477-78.
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Rights statutes against the peril of death. The policy of law and the
legislative aim are certainly to protect the security of life and limb as
well as property against these actions. Violent injury that would kill was
not less prohibited than violence which would cripple. 28

Although this statement was made in the course of holding that a § 1983
action, in conjunction with state law, survived the death of a victim and
could be used as a wrongful death remedy, the conclusion that the 42d
Congress intended § 1 to reach wrongful killings is relevant to. the question
of how to construe § 1983 in the first place.
This analysis is also consistent with a textual review of the other surviving
Reconstruction-era private civil rights actions, including the civil actions
created by other provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1981
of Title 42, which is derived from the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870,529
provides "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" the same
right to make contracts, and to participate in judicial proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Section
1982 of Title 42, which is also derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,530
limits its protection to "citizens of the United States" and provides them
the same property rights as are enjoyed by white citizens. Neither of these
sections contains any reference to the appropriate remedy or to the party
who can seek redress for their violation. 53 ' Thus, the text of these sections
does not shed any light on the proper interpretation of the "party injured"
language of § 1983, and whether persons other than those whose rights are
violated may sue depends on an analysis of the language and purposes of
§ 1983.532
However, § 1985, which is derived from § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,' 3 3 also contains the phrase "party injured," and the textual argument
made under § 1983 is similar to that made under § 1985. Section 1985 proscribes
five separate classes of conspiracies 534 and contains a single remedial section
providing that "the party so injured or deprived may have an action for
the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against
any one or more of the conspirators. ' 535 Under these provisions the "party
injured" either by an act under color of state law or pursuant to a proscribed
conspiracy can be a person other than the person whose underlying rights

528. 293 F.2d 401, 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
529. See § 1, Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; §§ 16, 18, Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16
Stat. 144.
530. See § 1, Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
531. But see Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (1969) (implying a
damage remedy into § 1982).
532. See infra note 550.
533. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
534. See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) (analyzing § 1985).
535. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982).
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were violated. 3 6 Moreover, there is persuasive legislative history that supports
interpreting § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as being available to survivors
37
in cases that involve wrongful killings.
There is, however, a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that expressly

provides survivors a legal remedy, and the argument has been made that its
presence negates any congressional intent to permit § 1983 actions to be

available as a wrongful death remedy.
Section 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the watered-down version

of Senator Sherman's amendment that was rejected twice by the House.53

536. The version of this remedial language as originally enacted is also consistent with the reading
that the injured party and the party whose rights are deprived need not be the same person:
And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
any person shall be injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the person so
injured or deprived of such rights and privileges may have and maintain an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation of rights
and privileges against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspiracy
Section 2, Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
537. In reporting § 6 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which now appears at 42 U.S.C. §
1986 (1982), Representative Shellabarger, the bill's floor manager, addressed the measurement
of damages in death cases and made clear his belief that the rejection of the common law bar
on wrongful death actions in § 6 was equally'applicable to the civil conspiracy actions under
§ 2 of the Act, which are now contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982):
Now, here my friend from New York [Mr. Cox] asked how the damages should
be measured, and somebody replied, "Let them be measured in a hat." But there
is one method of measuring damages, as it exists in our State, to wit: that if the
death of a party shall be occasioned there shall still be a right of action. And
my interpretation is ... that this language operates back upon the second section
[current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982)]. It will be remembered that the
second section gives a civil right of action for injury to person or property...
but it gives no right of action where'a death occurs. I think that is a defect in
the second section. And, at common law, where death ensues from a wrong
against a person, there is no right of action ....
Now, I think this amendment
will give a right of recovery in all cases, either under the second section or under
this section, where death ensues.
CoNo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 805 (1871).
It could also be argued that the language of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 incorporating
the procedural requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see supra note 325, created a
mechanism, now contained in § 1988, for initially borrowing and then reviewing state wrongful
death policies to determine if they were consistent with the purposes of § 1983. A similar
borrowing provision was also included in the cause of action created by § 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, which created a civil action agginst certain proscribed conspiracies. Because
Congress had not yet enacted the Conformity Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 196, 197, most federal
courts were required to follow a system of "static conformity," see supra note 405, in which
they borrowed state practices established prior to Lord Campbell's Act and the widespread
adoption of wrongful death statutes in this country. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the availability
of §§ I and 2 as wrongful death actions could be established through a statutorily authorized
borrowing of state law, as now done under § 1988. Moreover, the legislative history of the
civil actions created by §§ I and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 strongly suggests that they were
both intended to be available as wrongful death remedies when 'proscribed .actions took the lives
of victims as well as violated those victims' federal rights.
538. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 666-69 (1978).
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As ultimately enacted, however, § 6 created a civil remedy against persons
who are aware of conspiracies under § 1985 and who have the power to
prevent them or aid their prevention but neglect or refuse to do so. The
section made such persons "liable to the person injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by any such wrongful act which such
...

person ...

by reasonable diligence could have prevented." 53 9 It then

went on to contain the only explicit survival or wrongful death provision in
the civil rights acts:
[1]f the death of any person shall be caused by any such wrongful act
and neglect, the legal representatives of such deceased person shall have

such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding five thousand dollars
damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of such deceased person,
if any there be, or if there be no widow, for the benefit of the next of
kin of such deceased person.5 4

This provision supports the arguments that the "party injured" throughout
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is the party whose rights were violated, and
that when Congress intended to provide remedies to other "legal representatives" it did so explicitly. 54 ' These arguments, however, must be rejected.
The inclusion of an actionable interest in specified legal representatives when
death resulted from the illegal conduct can best be explained as an effort
to limit the unusual form of liability imposed by § 6 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, and not as a limitation on the actions available under other
sections of the Act.5 42 Likewise, the inclusion of a ceiling on the damages
available in actions under § 6 for nonfeasance in no way supports the
conclusion that Congress intended that ceilings be used in the more traditional
actions for misfeasance under § 1, even when such actions are brought on
43
behalf of survivors.5
Further support for the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy is
available from a review of the state law against which the 42d Congress
legislated. Although the common law in 1871 denied the existence of a cause
of action for wrongful death, most states rejected the common law rule by
539. See § 6, Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The phrase "person injured" was changed
to "party injured" in the 1874 codification of federal law. See U.S. REv. STAT. § 1981 (1874).
This provision is now contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982) in nearly identical language.
540. § 6, Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
541. See Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401, 410 (5th Cir. 1961) (De Vane, J., dissenting)
(relying on this negative inference).
542. See 15 VAD. L. REv. 623 (1962) (arguing that the civil action for passive nonfeasance
created by § 6 does not support an inference that wrongful death suits by survivors are unavailable
under §§ 1983 and 1985, which require active malfeasance).
543. Although the Court has sometimes looked to other sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1871 in construing § 1983, see supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text, in Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 n.4 (1978), Justice Marshall characterized § 1986 as a survivorship
provision and found it only applicable to the wrongs mentioned in § 1985. Congress also adopted
a specific statute of limitations to apply to the unique actions for nonfeasance created by § 6
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, but the Supreme Court has declined to apply it to actions created
by other sections of the Act. See Burnett v. Grattan, 104 S. Ct. 2924, 2929 (1984).
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enacting general wrongful death statutes patterned after Lord Campbell's
Act. 51 Thus, by 1871 there was no well-established state policy of denying

wrongful death remedies to survivors, and the availability of state wrongful
death remedies was the rule, not the exception. The existence of wrongful
death statutes had become part of American jurisprudence, and it is likely
that members of the 42d Congress were 5aware
of the expanding right of
45
survivors to bring wrongful death actions.
Although other aspects of the law of wrongful death, especially those

involving damages, were in a state of flux in 1871, the immunity from civil
suit previously given those whose illegal actions resulted in a killing was no
longer well established. Thus, the widespread availability of wrongful death
actions makes it inappropriate to condition the use of § 1983 as a wrongful
death remedy upon the existence of express legislative history, and any
ambiguity from the language of § 1983 and the use of the phrase "party

injured" should be resolved in light of the purposes of the legislation. It is
simply not convincing to argue that Congress, in making civil remedies

available under § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, chose to exclude from
the phrase "party injured" persons whose injury resulted from the wrongful
54 6
killing of a family member.

C. Third-Party Standing
The traditional policy of the federal courts is that parties may not assert
the rights of others, 547 and some courts have rejected the use of § 1983 as
a wrongful death remedy because they have been reluctant to transform §
1983 into a third-party standing statute.5

48

These concerns, however, are

misplaced.

544. See supra note 78.
545. See supra notes 252 & 537.
546. The interpretation of the "party injured" language of § 1983 as referring to someone
other than the person whose rights were violated raises the question of whether there are any
limits as to who can qualify as a "party injured" for the purpose of bringing a § 1983 wrongful
death action. Cf. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1247 (7th Cir. 1984) (expressing
need to define some principles to limit potential parties in refusing to recognize a constitutional
interest in siblings). As can be seen from the use of § 1983 in other contexts, however, suits
have often been brought by nonrelatives with professional or other relationships with persons
whose rights were violated. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
The better way to proceed in the context of § 1983 actions involving wrongful killings is to
look for guidance in the legislative history of § 1983. For example, in adopting § 6 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, Congress exhibited special concern for the families of the deceased,
including widows and next of kin. This provides support for a construction that permits wrongful
death suits by parents and children. See supra text accompanying note 519.
547. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("IThe plaintiff generally must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights
or interests of third parties.").
548. See, e.g., Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 550 P.2d 339 (1976), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 183 (1977). The issue of whether a party may assert the rights
of others is distinct from whether a surviving relative had an actionable constitutional interest
in a continued relationship with the decedent.
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The case or controversy requirement of article III of the Constitution does
not prohibit third-party standing, but the Supreme Court has developed
prudential limitations on when it will permit an injured party to assert the
rights of others.- 9 When Congress has created a statutory action on behalf
of a third party, the Court has deferred to this judgment.5 0 In addition,
when there is a special relationship between the party injured and the person
whose rights have been violated, the Court has been willing to allow the
injured party standing to advance the rights of the third party. 5 '
Although the Court has not addressed the issue of third-party standing
in terms of the text of § 1983, it has permitted parties who have been injured
to assert the rights of others in actions authorized by § 1983.552 Typically,
such cases have involved the assertion of constitutional claims on which the
legislative history of § 1983 had little relevance, but the availability of §
1983 in such circumstances demonstrates there is no constitutional or prudential bar to § 1983's being used as a third-party standing statute. 53
When § 1983 is used to raise wrongful death claims, however, its legislative
history and purposes have a special significance that justify its use as a thirdparty standing statute. Moreover, as Professor Currie recently noted, many
standing questions, especially those involving statutory actions, are really
questions as to the definition of the cause of action and require determinations of what action is authorized and who may bring it. 54
Permitting survivors to obtain damages for losses they suffered as a result
of the unconstitutional killing of a close relative is also consistent with the
prudential doctrines that govern when the Court allows third-party standing.
In Warth v. Seldin,5 5 the Court denied city taxpayers standing to advance
the rights of low-income persons allegedly excluded from a suburban community by restrictive zoning ordinances. Unlike the city taxpayers who had
no special relationship with those whose rights they were seeking to enforce,
survivors pursuing wrongful death actions are, by definition, claiming a close
relationship with the decedent. The termination of that relationship by the

549. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTIONAL LAW §§ 3-23 to -29, at 100-14 (1978).
550. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208-12 (1972)

(statutory language broadly defining "person aggrieved" as "[a]ny person who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice" gives person not discriminated against
standing to sue claiming someone else was subjected to a racially discriminatory housing
practice).
551. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1976) (special relationship justifies
permitting physicians to raise patients' privacy rights).
552. See generally Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of ThirdParty Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MiAMI L. Ray. 393, 460 n.289
(1981) (identifying cases in which the Court implicitly permitted parties to raise the rights of
others under § 1983). Professor Rohr also suggests a possible construction of § 1983 under
which the "party injured" need not be the person whose rights were deprived, and concludes
that § 1983 poses no obstacle to third-party standing. Id. at 460-61 n.289.
553. See, e.g., Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
554. See Currie, MisunderstandingStanding, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 41 (1982).
555. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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wrongful killing and the resulting damages to the survivor provide the sur-

vivor with the constitutionally required "injury in fact" as well as with a
special relationship that justifies permitting the survivor to pursue the rights
of the decedent. Moreover, unlike the circumstances in Warth in which the
low-income persons were at least in theory able to pursue their own rights,
decedents will have only rarely been able to do so5.56
The doctrine of third-party standing has often been criticized,15 7 and it
has been argued that courts should not extend that doctrine to cases involving
damage claims.5 u Nonetheless, federal courts commonly award damages to

injured parties asserting the rights of third parties in diversity cases under
state wrongful death statutes 5 9 in special damage actions under federal

statutes, 60 and under general maritime law. 561 Such cases clearly meet the
prudential limitations on third-party standing. The plaintiff-the survivoris injured because of the death of the decedent; the rights enforced by the

plaintiff are those of the decedent. More importantly, the availability of
these third-party damage actions further supports the observation that the

issue of third-party standing can often be reduced to a question of defining
the cause of action.5 12 Thus, the availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death
action ultimately turns on the issue of statutory construction and the strength
of the argument that the language, legislative history, and purposes of §
1983 support its use as a wrongful death remedy.
VI.

THE CONTOURS OF THE §

1983 WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION

If the Supreme Court interprets § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy
regardless of state law, it will still have to answer questions typically ad-

556. In some cases, a substantial amount of time may elapse between the injury and death,
thus enabling the person whose rights were violated to bring his own action. Cf. Delesma v.
City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1985) (wrongful death actions brought by children of
decedent based on a 1960 incident alleged to have caused death in 1982). The Court, however,
has not required a showing that the party whose rights are being enforced by a third party
was unable to advance them himself. See Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 104
S. Ct. 2839, 2847 (1984).
557. See, e.g., Sedler, The Assertion of ConstitutionalJus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70
CALIF.

L. REv. 1308 (1982).

558. See Rohr, supra note 522, at 459-61, 463 (arguing that third-party standing should only
be available in cases involving claims for declaratory and injunctive relief).
559. See, e.g., Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 (1880).
560. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)); Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat.
1007 (current version at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982)); Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, ch. 111,
41 Stat. 537 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1982)).
561. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
562. Unlike the clear congressional authorization of third-party damage actions under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act and similar statutory areas, see supra note 560, Congress has
authorized federal courts to hear wrongful death claims under the general maritime law by
implication through the jurisdictional statute. Nonetheless, whether based on statutes or the
common law, the issue of the availability of wrongful death remedies reduces to a question of
the definition of the available cause of action and not standing.
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dressed in wrongful death statutes, such as who may sue, what elements of
damages are available, and how to distribute any awards. In fact, the
difficulty of some of these issues and their legislative nature has made some
courts reluctant to develop nonstatutory wrongful death remedies.5 63 Nonetheless, there are tools available to address these problems. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide guidance for managing litigation and determining who is a proper plaintiff, and damage issues that arise are governed
by the same principles of compensation used in determining available damages in other § 1983 cases. Moreover, the damages available may help define
both who is a proper party and how to distribute the proceeds from successful
suits. Finally, there may be room for a limited use of state law to address
some of these questions. 64
Although the emergence of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy independent
of state law will raise a number of unique damage and other issues that do
not typically arise in § 1983 litigation, this is not a basis for rejecting the
use of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy. 65 The federal common law that
governs damage issues and other aspects of § 1983 is capable of responding
to the requirements of the § 1983 wrongful death action. Finally, if the
problems of determining what damages are available in § 1983 wrongful
death actions and these related questions prove too difficult or if the Court's
resolution of them is unacceptable, Congress can address them through
legislation as it has in other statutory wrongful death actions.
A.

Proper Parties

The question of who can bring a § 1983 wrongful death action involves
a determination of both the party in whose name a case may be filed and
the identity of the party for whose benefit it is brought. The latter issue is
one of substance and its resolution depends initially on the language, legislative history, and purposes of § 1983.
Regardless of whether state or federal law is used to identify the parties
for whose benefits wrongful death actions are brought, there will be technical
issues of who is a proper party. With state law no longer the starting point,
federal courts can address these issues by looking to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and by considering the nature of the claim and the damages
being sought.

563. See Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1, 8 n.11, 550 P.2d 339, 345 n.11 (1976), cert.
dismissed as improvidently granted, 432 U.S. 183 (1977).
564. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25 n.11 (1979) (leaving open the use of state
survivorship law as a matter of convenience in Bivens cases). When § 1983 wrongful death
actions are filed in state courts, see supra note 50, state rules of civil procedure may provide
some guidance, but most questions will generally be answered by state wrongful death statutes.
565. Cf. Moragne, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (rejecting difficulty of addressing technical issues of
wrongful death action in finding such an action available under the general maritime law).
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Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that actions
be pursued in the name of the "real party in interest."
Nonetheless,
executors, administrators or other representative parties with duties to the
decedent under state law, or the decedent's beneficiaries may also sue. Thus,
state law may identify the nominal party.
The duties of statutory representatives are also defined by state law, and
those representatives may file wrongful death actions under § 1983. Their
ability to pursue such § 1983 wrongful death claims in federal courts, however, will be determined by federal rules, but the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure incorporates state law.167 Thus, statutory beneficiaries may have
wrongful death claims pursued on their behalf only by their statutory representatives, and they will not be able to proceed independently.5 6s
The borrowing of state procedures to govern issues involving the real party
in interest and capacity to sue, however, does not prevent nonstatutory
beneficiaries from pursuing wrongful death actions independently. Thus,
parties with no rights under a state wrongful death statute may nevertheless
file actions in their own name under § 1983 to seek damages that result
from the wrongful killing of their respective decedents.
The identity of the beneficiaries of § 1983 wrongful death actions is a
function of the losses those beneficiaries have experienced and the relief they
seek. Thus, family members legally dependent on the decedent should have
little difficulty becoming plaintiffs in § 1983 wrongful death actions. Likewise, family members who were not legally dependent on the decedent but
who were receiving actual financial support prior to the killing should also
be able to claim that the death denied them support. Finally, persons claiming
loss of services or loss of society may have suffered a palpable injury and,
if such damages are available in § 1983 wrongful death actions, they should
be able to recover them.
Problems may arise, however, where nonstatutory beneficiaries file § 1983
wrongful death actions. Without the constraints of a comprehensive state
law, there may be no limit on the number of persons claiming that their
relationship with the decedent resulted in compensable injuries. Initially,
however, the ability to claim damages will depend on the element of damages
available in § 1983 wrongful death actions. There are also a number of other
sources of guidance that courts could follow to develop limiting principles.
For example, courts entertaining § 1983 wrongful death actions could rely

566. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
567. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
568. Some federal courts, however, have mistakenly viewed the technical issues of identifying
the real party in interest as a substantive issue, and have dismissed actions they concluded were
brought by the wrong party. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1981);
Javits v. Stevens, 382 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But cf. Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977 (1lth
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 S. Ct. 1118 (1983). Under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, an action should not be dismissed on the ground it is not being prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest until the real party has an opportunity to ratify the suit or
commence his own. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
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on Roscoe Pound's observation about wrongful death statutes having become
part of the general law and look to see how states generally limit the
beneficiaries who could pursue claims.5 69 Similarly, courts could look to the
beneficiaries under federal wrongful death statutes.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provide some assistance in
making § 1983 wrongful death litigation more manageable. Given the absence
of a comprehensive federal statute, there are many unresolved questions as
to the scope of the § 1983 wrongful death action, and defendants may be
subject to multiple or successive suits arising out of the same death. Although
this may currently happen in states that permit survival and wrongful death
suits to be pursued simultaneously,5 70 the use of § 1983 as a wrongful death
remedy without the constraints of settled state law may expand the number
of potential beneficiaries and potential law suits. In such cases, however,
defendants may be able to rely on Rule 19, which creates a mechanism
whereby indispensable parties may be joined.171
B. Damages
Damage issues in § 1983 wrongful death actions require courts to look to
federal common law and to the general principles of compensation applied
in non-wrongful death § 1983 cases. In addressing such issues, courts should
look to the state of the law in 1871 to determine whether there was a wellestablished policy precluding the availability of particular elements of damages. If an element of damage was clearly unavailable in 1871, courts may
still consider the evolving law of damages, public policy, and the purpose
of § 1983 in deciding whether to make that element available. In such cases,
however, there must be a strong showing before a well established policy
would be rejected. On the other hand, when elements of damages were not
clearly precluded, courts should search for the most appropriate damage
policy without any presumption in favor of using state law. In any case, it
should not be necessary to demonstrate affirmatively that an element of
damage was available in 1871 to support making it available today. Thus,
when particular elements of damages were not generally available in 1871,
courts should look to the broad purposes of § 1983-compensation and
deterrence-to determine which policies best meet these ends. 72

569. See source cited supra note 252. A review of state common law would search for
a policy that is consistent with the purposes of § 1983. Alternatively, federal courts, as a
matter of convenience, could look to the law of the forum state. Cf. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 2425 n. 11 (1980) (suggesting use of state law for convenience in Bivens actions). Such an approach,
however, could reintroduce the state law policies that often led plaintiffs to avoid state law in
the first place.
570. Many states already require the consolidation of survival and wrongful death actions
to avoid parallel litigation.
571. Under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant faced with multiple
suits by different survivors may seek to have the unnamed parties joined and their interests
litigated in the same suit. See FED. R. Cry. P. 19.
572. See supra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
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Section 1983 actions involving wrongful killings also raise survival issues,
and the Court has required courts to look to the state law of survival. In
addressing the availability of survival actions under § 1983, federal courts
have often had to address whether specific state limitations on the damages
available in survival actions are inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983.
For example, some states expressly prohibit the survival of punitive damages
as well as damages for pain and suffering. However, the framework that
the Court has developed to determine the consistency of state policies with
573
the purposes of § 1983 has been used to reject such limitations.
Federal courts entertaining § 1983 survival actions have also had to address
the appropriate measure of damages when state law was silent. For example,
states that do not permit personal actions to survive provide little guidance
as to the appropriate measure of damages. In such cases, there is little
difficulty in concluding that the decedent's estate is entitled to damages for
the losses the decedent suffered during his lifetime. Thus, loss of income or
medical expenses during the period between the time of injury and death
should be available in the § 1983 survival action even if state law required
the action to abate. The more difficult question, however, is whether an
award should be made for the illegal killing and for the violation of the
constitutional right itself. These issues often arise because the circumstances
of persons whose deaths result in § 1983 survival and wrongful death actions
often preclude significant damages under the state wrongful death statute.
Thus, the question often arises whether the survival action will be able to
award damages for injuries that may not be described as actual injuries,
and some courts have been willing to award damages in such cases for the
loss of life and for the violation of the rights despite the absence of consequential damages.574
C. Distribution
The distribution of the proceeds of § 1983 wrongful death and survival
actions depends on the nature of the damages awarded and the identity of
the plaintiffs who obtained them. When survival claims are made under §
1983 for the wrongful killing, the estate would typically bring the action,
and either the decedent's will or state law on intestate succession will govern
the distribution of the proceeds of any litigation.

573. See, e.g., McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 (2d Cir.) (rejecting state policy denying
survival of claims for punitive damages), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983); Guyton v. Phillips,
532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (rejecting state policy denying survival of claims for pain
and suffering).
574. See Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (approving damages
to estate for loss of life where decedent was an emancipated adult male and survivors could
not recover in state wrongful death action); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (awarding $100,000 for deprivation of the right to life). See also supra notes 464-72 and
accompanying text.
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In § 1983 wrongful death actions, on the other hand, the distribution of
damages will depend on the nature of the damages awarded, and the allocation will generally not pose significant questions. When damages are awarded
for loss of support, loss of inheritance, loss of services, loss of society, or
mental grief or anguish, the parties experiencing those losses are the ones
to whom the awards will be distributed. When punitive damages are obtained
in wrongful death actions, the question of distributing the award will be
more difficult, but courts should be able to resolve such issues based on the
5
identity of the parties bringing the suit and, when necessary, state law. 7
CONCLUSION

The use of § 1983 as a remedy in cases involving wrongful killings has
undergone a significant expansion in recent years. Originally tied to the
provisions of state law, such actions are on the increase as the personal
representatives and survivors of decedents seek federal remedies that avoid
the limitations of state law. Although courts have been willing to reject state
law limitations that are inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983, courts
should break away from their initial dependence on state law and develop
an independent § 1983 wrongful death action. Such a development is supported by this analysis of § 1983 ex proprio vigore as a wrongful death
remedy.

575. Cf. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1254 n.62 (7th Cir. 1984) (looking to
state law and the distribution of compensatory damages to allocate punitive damages in a
§ 1983 wrongful death action).

